

A PENGUIN SPECIAL

W. B. CURRY

THE CASE FOR FEDERAL UNION

"One of the soundest pieces of constructive reasoning that I have read for a long time. The case it makes out against national sovereignty is unanswerable. . . .

He has met a widespread want. I cannot recommend his work too highly."

—Wickham Steed.

"A million pounds' worth of sense, courage and hope for sixpence."—J. B. Priestley.



THE CASE FOR FEDERAL UNION

BY W. B. CURRY

How is peace within the State maintained? Not by Pacts, but by government, and the rule of law. World peace can only be secured by similar means. The remedy for war must be sought in the establishment of effective world government.

This book analyses the various forms that world government might take, and concludes that *Federal Government* is the only form that combines effective government with the retention of what is permanently valuable in the liberal democratic tradition, and advocates that a beginning might be made with a Federal Union of the leading democracies. It urges that the British Government should take a lead by announcing that it would welcome such Union as the basis of the general settlement to be reached after the war. There is an important chapter in which the sceptical enquirer will find answers to all the principal objections that have been raised against the Federal Union proposal.

THE AUTHOR

WAS originally trained in Physics at Cambridge, where he was a Senior Scholar of Trinity College. Was on the Staff of Bedales School from 1922 to 1926, and Headmaster of the Oak Lane Country Day School, Philadelphia, U.S.A. from 1927 to 1931. Since 1931 he has been Headmaster of The School, Dartington Hall, Totnes, one of the leading progressive co-educational schools in England.

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In *The School*, a volume in the XXth Century Library, he set forth his views on the connection between education and society.

His special concern is peace, but as long as he can remember he has had no faith in peace advocacy unaccompanied by definite proposals for world government. He has always had cosmopolitan sympathies with a conscious hatred of the sovereign State and all that it implies. Five years residence in America did much to strengthen his conviction that he is a man first, and an Englishman second.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

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UNION

by
W. B. CURRY



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To

ANNE BEN and JULIAN

To

ANTHONY and MICHAEL

To

ALL CHILDREN EVERYWHERE

and

TO THAT SANER AND MORE HOPEFUL
WORLD IN WHICH THEY YET MAY
LIVE

NOTE

The words FEDERAL UNION have now gained wide currency as the name of a proposal for establishing a peaceful, democratic, and orderly world. Since it is the object of this book to put the case for Federal Union as one writer at least sees it, it seemed best to use these words in the title. But Federal Union is the name, not merely of a proposal, but also of a society which has been founded to advocate this proposal. This society is mentioned in the text, and in the epilogue readers are urged to join it. In order to avoid misunderstanding it must therefore be clearly stated that while the author is a member of the society known as Federal Union, and hopes that its membership will rapidly grow, the society is not committed by anything contained in this book, which is in no sense an official publication. This book is a personal statement for which the author is solely responsible.

“ . . . writing now means somehow prevailing over oneself, for what to write when everything one touches is unspeakable, unrecognizable, when nothing belongs to one, no feeling, no hope; when an enormous provision, gotten I know not where, of suffering, despair, sacrifice and misery is used up in large amounts, as though everybody were somewhere in the whole mass, and the single person nowhere; nowhere any longer is the measure of the individual heart applicable which used to be the unit of the earth and the heavens and all expanses and abysses. What used the cry of a drowning man to mean—even if it was the village idiot, who with a suddenly sharper cry reached out of the water, everybody flew to the scene and was on his side and against his sinking, and the swiftest risked his life for him. How immemorial everything has become . . . ”

—*A war-time letter (1915) from RAINER MARIA RILKE.*

“ . . . The world has become so intolerably tense, so charged with hatred, so filled with misfortune and pain that men have lost the power of balanced judgment which is needed for emergence from the slough in which mankind is staggering. Our age is so painful that many of the best men have been seized with despair. But there is no rational ground for despair: the means of happiness for the human race exist, and it is only necessary that the human race should choose to use them.”—BERTRAND RUSSELL: *Education and the Social Order.*

FOREWORD

AN OPEN LETTER TO JOHN CITIZEN

DEAR JOHN (or Fritz, or Alphonse—it doesn't really matter),

At any moment, you and your wife and family may be blown to smithereens, or asphyxiated, or scalded or burnt to death, or otherwise brought to an unseemly and painful end. In order to produce this incredible state of affairs we have all lived for years under a crushing burden of taxation, and a steadily increasing degree of interference with the normal liberties and routines of our daily lives. Whenever we have stopped to think we have realised that it was all crazy and unnecessary, and that instead of preparing for mutual slaughter, we might begin to realise that we hold within our grasp greater possibilities of human happiness and development than mankind has ever had before.

If you are between twenty-five and forty years of age this is the second war in your own life-time, and the whole of your life, as long as you can remember, has been overshadowed and burdened by war, the threat of war, the preparations for war, and the talk of war. Have you never, as you enjoyed the peace of some lovely landscape on a warm summer day, had that peace disturbed and shattered by the thought of all the loveliness that was being destroyed in other similar countryside? Have you never felt that love and peace and quiet happiness and the enjoyment of beauty were becoming almost impossible for you while so much of all that makes for civilisation was being wiped out and trampled under foot? Have you never, as you surveyed

the waste and sheer idiocy of it all, been exasperated almost beyond endurance? I cannot believe that you have never felt these things, and never passionately longed for a world in which sanity and humanity might gain a hearing, and folly and cruelty and hate be silenced for a while. I cannot believe that you have never asked yourself, as I have asked myself over and over again, why the devil do we put up with it?

I have written this book because I believe there is a way out, and because in spite of all the evidence you have provided to the contrary, I still believe that you might not continue to put up with it if you could see your way out. But I must admit that I am becoming despondent. There is nothing I can say in this book that has not been said before by more eloquent pens than mine. H. G. Wells, for example, has been pegging away at this theme for more than a generation now, and he has said it better than I can ever say it. He is a writer to whom all who work for a more sanely organised world owe a greater debt than they can ever acknowledge. He has brought to the preaching of this message all his magnificent gifts of imagination and enthusiasm, and the brilliantly illuminating phrase, and he has commanded a larger audience than I can ever hope to reach. *The Outline of History*, which you bought in millions of copies, taught you the lesson as plainly as it can be taught, and it ended with a plain statement of the lesson of all recent developments: "There can be no peace in all the world now but a common peace, no prosperity but a common prosperity." Wells has told you this, and many others have told you this, but somehow it seems you don't wish to see.

You appear to prefer the claptrap of nationalism, your separatisms, your petty jealousies and your patriotic vanities, to that creative life of peace and happiness and plenty that is there, within our grasp, if only we would unite with our fellow-men throughout the world. We

cannot get it by standing alone. We can only get it by union.

I am not, as I have said, the first person to tell you this, nor, I suppose, will I be the last. But I had to say it, and I had to say it in this way. I have tried not to be offensive, but it may be that here and there my feelings have got the better of my judgment. When that has happened I hope you will forgive me.

I have addressed this book to you, and not to politicians or learned professors of political science, because ultimately it is you who count. And because, too, the politicians won't pay any attention until you convince them that they won't get your vote unless they do.

In the last resort a sanely organised world order will depend upon a public opinion that insists upon it and supports it because it understands why it is necessary. This book is offered as a contribution to the development of that public opinion.

Yours, in all sincerity, dear John,

W. B. CURRY.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For the last twenty years the topics discussed in this book have been, next to my work, my chief pre-occupation. It would be impossible to remember, let alone to acknowledge, all the books, pamphlets, and articles to which I owe the gradual crystallisation of my ideas, and all the unintentional plagiarisms I must therefore have committed. But I know that on these topics I could not write a paragraph without betraying the debt I owe, together with most of my generation who have come to a similar outlook, to two writers in particular. To Bertrand Russell and to H. G. Wells I wish to record my affectionate and deeply respectful gratitude. If they should chance to see this book I hope that they will not feel ashamed of yet another addition to their very numerous spiritual grandchildren.

I have quoted extensively from Mr. Clarence K. Streit's *Union Now*. I have to thank the publishers, Messrs. Jonathan Cape, for kindly giving permission to do this.

Finally, to Miss Susan Payne I owe more than merely formal thanks. She undertook the heavy labour of typing and retyping the various drafts with an enthusiastic cheerfulness which was a constant stimulus and encouragement.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
FOREWORD: AN OPEN LETTER TO JOHN CITIZEN	ix
I. WHY THIS BOOK IS PUBLISHED NOW . . .	19
II. WHY WE STILL GET WAR	33
III. NATIONS AS GROUPS	45
IV. DOES NATIONALISM MAKE SENSE? . . .	65
V. THE LIBERAL TRADITION	83
VI. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF WORLD ORDER .	105
VII. THE FORMS OF WORLD ORDER	119
VIII. UNION NOW	137
IX. SOME QUESTIONS, DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS ANSWERED	175
X. EDUCATION AND WORLD ORDER	201
EPILOGUE: A CONCLUDING LETTER TO JOHN CITIZEN	211

CHAPTER I

WHY THIS BOOK IS PUBLISHED NOW

THE greater part of this book was written at the beginning of August, when there was still a slender, though dwindling hope that the immediate outbreak of war might be averted. It was originally planned as a contribution to the discussion of how a breathing space, if we were fortunate enough to get one, might be used to set up an international order which would eliminate the menace of war for good and all.

Like many other people I had been immensely impressed by the proposals contained in Mr. Clarence K. Streit's *Union Now*¹, and believed that if the leading democracies could be persuaded to federate along the lines he proposed, they could become the nucleus of a democratic world order infinitely more hopeful than anything hitherto attempted.

It seemed to me significant that the English organisation known as 'Federal Union' had been founded by a group who, when they first came together, had not heard of Mr. Streit or his book, though their proposals were on very similar lines. It was clear that this idea was stirring in the world, and that given reasonable time for organisation and propaganda, its realisation might come more quickly than any of us dared to hope. Men and women were becoming increasingly exasperated by living under this constant threat of war. They could plan with reasonable assurance neither for their own lives nor for their children's. Increasingly people seemed prepared to consider the plain truth they had neglected

¹ Messrs. Jonathan Cape.

for so long, that peace is not a matter of good intentions, but that it can only result from effective ordering of the common affairs of mankind.

The time seemed ripe for a cheap and short introduction to this subject, and in July it was arranged that this book should be completed by the end of September, and appear in the autumn.

Much of it was rendered out of date by the outbreak of war, and a good deal of it has had to be re-written. Nevertheless I believe that its theme has become more important than ever, and I should like to begin by explaining why.

The rise of Hitler and the outbreak of the present war represent the final collapse and failure of the European settlement effected after the war of 1914-1918. We entered that war with the professed object of putting an end to German militarism, and of making the world safe for democracy. It was to be a war to end war. Now, after only a quarter of a century, we find ourselves engaged once more in the same enterprise. Now, as then, we announce our resolve to tolerate no longer what Mr. H. G. Wells called 'this drilling, trampling foolery in the heart of Europe'.

His description was apt enough. 'Drilling trampling foolery' should not be tolerated anywhere, and so long as it goes on there can be no decent or tolerable life for mankind. But last time we set out to get rid of it we failed. We must have failed miserably, for only fifteen years after that war, 'drilling trampling foolery' was again in charge of Germany, and within another year or two the race of armaments was once more in full swing.

It is worth while to ask why we failed, since unless we face that question squarely we shall be in danger of repeating the mistakes of 1919. For let us remember that we won that last war, that Germany was decisively beaten, and that, as Hitler is never tired of reminding

us, the peace terms were dictated by the Allied and Associated Powers to a helpless and humiliated Germany. We got our own way, and imposed on Germany crushing indemnities, unilateral disarmament, and the loss of her empire. Few in 1919 could have believed that in only twenty years German power and German ambition would again assert themselves. We fought the war, and we won it; but we failed to achieve the object for which millions believed they fought and died.

There must be no second mistake. These failures are too costly. In that last war nine million men were killed in battle; twenty-two million were seriously wounded; six million were missing. The war was succeeded by an epidemic of influenza which inflicted on an undernourished continent more deaths than had already resulted from battle. The aggregate death and suffering directly resulting from the war was therefore greater than if every man, woman and child in the British Isles had been killed, starved to death, or mutilated. It is a total impossible for the imagination to conceive. You must add to the suffering of those killed and wounded, the agonies of pain and anxiety suffered by those at home who cared for them. It takes, as a French writer recently reminded us, eighteen years of love and pain, of toil and care, of sacrifice and unremitting attention, to produce a healthy young man. It takes but a second to kill him.

It is hard to assess the economic cost of a war, and the estimates therefore vary, but the most accurate estimate for the last war is probably that reached by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. According to them, the total cost of the war to all the belligerents was seventy thousand million pounds. That is a total that beggars the imagination. Let us think of it in terms easier to grasp. £70,000,000,000 is approximately £10,000 for every family in England. At 4% that means £400 per annum. For such a sum,

therefore, every family in England could be endowed on a scale substantially in excess of its present standard of living. For a hundredth part of such a sum, every slum in the world could be rebuilt, every town equipped with proper hospitals and schools. If mankind were prepared to raise and spend any such sum on constructive endeavour, this whole planet could become a garden.

It is intolerable, in the face of these facts, that we should have to listen to the balderdash of the Mussolinis who tell us that "War alone brings up to their highest tension all human energies and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it". Since 1914 there has hardly been a year in which some portion of mankind has not been receiving the stamp of nobility. The ennobling character of the results is plain for all to see. Poverty, misery, despair; endless treks of hopeless and homeless refugees; social reconstruction neglected while armaments pile up; cities destroyed, and years of work blown to smithereens in as many seconds; men, women, and children disgustingly mutilated and disfigured but yet living; orphans and widows created by the million; lives wasted, and hopes frustrated. If these are the marks of nobility, and they are at least its inescapable accompaniment, then for myself I am content with less exalted aims.

For a generation now it has been a commonplace that science has made war obsolete, that, as the late Lord Bryce put it, "unless we end war, war will end us". But since, while admitting this commonplace in theory, we continue to ignore it in practice, and appear to imagine that we can continue to organise the world as if it were not true, it may be worth while repeating why its plain recognition, in practice as well as in theory, has become the inescapable condition of the survival of our species.

The first reason has already been indicated. War has become destructive on a scale unimaginable a couple of centuries ago, and its totalitarian character has changed

its whole quality. During the Napoleonic war, while England and France were actually at war with each other, Sir Humphry Davy and Michael Faraday toured France, visiting eminent savants and being treated as honoured and distinguished guests. It is inconceivable that visits of such a character should occur during a modern war, and among the distinguishing features of the war of 1914-1918 was the almost total severance of professional relationships between the scientists in the opposing camps. Nowadays no phase of national life escapes. We are all in it from the beginning. But there may be compensation in the thought that as we creep about our darkened cities, for all the world as if artificial lighting had never been invented, it will at last be brought home even to civilians that war is an intolerable and unmitigated nuisance, so that when this time we say "Never again" we shall mean what we say.

Secondly there is the inter-relatedness of the modern world. A hundred years ago it would have been possible for a war between China and Japan to be fought and won before we in England had received evidence that it was even in progress. It was possible then to think of the world as made up of separate, small areas, each able to maintain its existence in independence of the others. All that has been completely changed. The world is not politically or psychologically a society, but economically and technically it is already one community. No country could attempt any serious application of the principles of autarchy without substantial modification downwards of all its standards of living. The world is now a community in the sense that its separate parts are members one of another. We can no longer ignore what happens, even in the remotest parts of the earth. This means that the maintenance of civilised life depends upon a very complex organisation. That organisation will simply not work effectively in a world full of the menace of war. We must take our choice. For the first time in the history of man-

kind it is possible, owing to the discoveries of modern science, for a full and satisfactory life to be provided for every man, woman and child on this globe. But to realise that possibility we need a unified world at peace.

"The real economic argument against war," wrote Sir Norman Angell, just after the last war, "does not consist in the presentation of a balance sheet showing so much cost and so much gain. The real argument consists in the fact that war, and still more the ideas out of which it arises, produce ultimately an unworkable society. The use of our power or our knowledge for the purpose of subduing Nature to our service depends upon the prevalence of certain ideas, ideas which underlie the 'art of living together'. They are something apart from mere technical knowledge which war, as in Germany, may increase, but which can never be a substitute for this 'art of living together'. . . . The War has left us a defective or perverted social sense, with a group of instincts and moralities that are disintegrating Western society, and will, unless checked, destroy it."

It follows that lasting peace is no longer merely a blessing; it has become a vital necessity, and those who talk with Mussolini about war bringing to their highest tension all human energies are a menace to the survival of our species. Human energies can now only be brought to their highest tension by a full recognition that "there can be no peace in all the world now but a common peace, no prosperity but a common prosperity."

We have got to realise that the world can no more continue to function in an atmosphere of wars and threats of wars than England could continue to function if we reverted to the heptarchy, and allowed each of the seven resulting States to become a Sovereign State in the modern fashion. This, however, is the theme of the next chapter.

War then must go. It is too late to avert this war, but if we can avoid the mistakes of 1919 we may succeed in

averting the next. The cost of this war in life, suffering, and treasure, and in the machinery of civilised life, will be tremendous. The least we can do is to see that it is not all wasted.

We are all agreed that we have no quarrel with the German people and that our sole quarrel is with the German Government. That is exactly what President Wilson said when he entered the war in 1917. If we content ourselves merely with the defeat of Hitler and his Government, and allow ourselves to believe that only Hitlerism is an obstacle to the peace of the world, then we shall no more achieve an enduring peace at the end of this war than we achieved it at the end of the last.

What was the mistake that was made last time and what, therefore, is the mistake that we must avoid making this time? The mistake, to use a medical metaphor, was that we were content with isolating and endeavouring to eliminate the immediate cause of a particular outbreak of epidemic disease, without bothering to ask ourselves what are the basic conditions which make it possible for this sort of outbreak to occur. We were, in fact, concerned merely with treatment and not with prophylaxis. War has become endemic in human society, and since we are all now agreed that the continuance of war is incompatible with the survival of civilisation, we must ask ourselves not merely what caused this particular war, but what are the fundamental political conditions out of which the likelihood and possibility of war arise. Under what conditions would it have been impossible for Hitler to emerge from the position of an obscure neurotic to become a menace to the whole world?

It is of the utmost importance that we ask this question now. In the last war too many people were content to suppose that we should win the war first and then, when we had won it, decide what use to make of the victory. They forgot that unless a nation exercises the most resolute self-control it is bound as the war progresses to

become filled with a hatred and bitterness that make a decent peace impossible. It is easy now to say that we have no hate for the German people. It will not be so easy when the casualty lists begin to be published and some of our towns have been bombed. If victory is to be worth securing we shall need to keep steadily in mind, day in and day out, that this war is to have a constructive purpose, and that that purpose will be frustrated if we allow ourselves to be dominated by mere hate.

Few people outside of Germany would deny that the worst possible result of this war would be for Hitler to win. That would produce a world in which life would no longer be tolerable save for insensitive barbarians. The sole remaining hope would be that the barbarians would presently exterminate each other in internecine strife.

But we must not be content with merely avoiding this result. For the next worst thing that could happen would be for us, having won, to content ourselves with another Versailles. *That folly must not be repeated. The war must not be fought all over again in 1965.*

And thus we come, as Mr. Shaw wrote in 1914 in his *Common Sense about the War*, to: "the only body of opinion in which there is any hope for civilization: the opinion of the people who are bent, not on gallantry nor revenge nor plunder nor pride nor panic nor glory nor any of the indiviousnesses of patriotism, but on the problem of how to so redraw the map of Europe and reform its political constitutions that this abominable crime and atrocious nuisance, a European war, shall not easily occur again."

That is what this book is about, save that instead of "Europe" I should write "the world".

To those who maintain that the only proper immediate object of endeavour is the defeat of Hitler, I would say: remember the last war. So much was the scum allowed to come to the top (let us not forget Bottomley), so little

WHY THIS BOOK IS PUBLISHED NOW 27

was done to prepare public opinion for the necessary conditions of a settlement that would prove lasting, that a decent peace when the time came was impossible of realisation. The defeat of Hitler has become a necessary condition for the establishment of a peaceful world. It is not, however, a sufficient condition, and if we concentrate our attention too exclusively on opposition to what Hitler stands for, we shall begin to forget what *we ought* to be standing for. It is not sufficient to defeat Hitler. If victory is to be worth fighting for, we must have better notions of what to do with victory when we get it than we had last time.

If the peace that succeeds this war is not to sow the seeds of the next, we shall need a peace settlement different from any other that has ever been made. It must be a settlement that includes the neutrals and the Germans, and tackles the causes of war at their roots. Unless deliberate steps are taken to keep such ideas constantly before the public mind, we shall relapse into mere hatred and desire for revenge. It will be 1918 and the Khaki election all over again. Only the sincere adoption of a constructive policy has any chance of making victory worth its cost.

Furthermore, such a policy would afford the maximum chance that Hitler would be overthrown from within. That, in turn, affords the best chance of shortening the war. If the war is allowed to become merely one Imperialism against another, one group of powers against another, each striving for mastery and domination, then Hitler will not be overthrown from within. Most of his people will rally round him for the ordinary patriotic reasons. If the war is no more than Britain and her allies versus Germany and her allies, why should we blame them? But if Britain and France can make it plain from the beginning, and say so loudly and frequently by every device of advertisement which modern technique affords (including the admirable device of air-raids in which


leaflets are dropped instead of bombs) that the only settlement at which they aim is one which will provide for the beginnings of a democratic Federal structure for all mankind, and if it is clear that in the democracies themselves there are powerfully organised movements resolutely determined to see that on this matter there is no backsliding in the hour of victory, we can hope not merely for the moral support of our friends, we can hope also to detach from the governments of the autocracies large sections of their own populations. A decent German, wishing, like his opposite number in England or France, to live at peace and get on with his work, may nevertheless be prepared to fight behind Hitler if he believes that he is fighting to prevent Germany from being crushed by Britain and France and to prevent a repetition of the Versailles settlement. Is he as certain to obey orders if he believes that by fighting for Hitler he is fighting, not for Germany and against Britain and France, but for barbarity, autocracy and separatism, against the possibility of creating a democratic Federal Union that would end war for ever and give to him and his kind the world over the freedom, dignity, security and peace, for which they all crave?

During the last war, a few students of public affairs, but with not nearly enough public support, organised themselves to study and advocate the idea of a League of Nations. The League of Nations Society was formed in 1915, and the League of Free Nations Association early in 1918. They were afterwards amalgamated as the League of Nations Union. They undoubtedly influenced the course of events. It has recently been revealed, through the publication of certain of President Wilson's letters, that Mr. Brailsford's book *A League of Nations*, published in 1916, played an important part in shaping his ideas as to the nature of a peace settlement. The establishment of the League of Nations, and the enunciation of the Fourteen Points, therefore owed something to

an advocacy that must, at the time, have seemed to most people voices crying in the wilderness. Is it not possible that advocacy NOW of Federal Union might play the same part in the next few years as was played between 1914 and 1918 by propaganda for the idea of a League of Nations? It must play indeed not the same part, but a better part, for the League we got was only half a League. May not that have been, at least in part, because too many men of good will were content to devote themselves too exclusively to winning the war, in the confident but rash hope that it would be time enough to consider the peace when victory had been achieved?

We must therefore proceed resolutely with our propaganda for federal world government, and the propaganda must be clear, bold and uncompromising. As Mr. Wells has put it:

“The only way to organise world peace lies through such a federation, and the only way to get that federation is boldly frontwise, in the sight and knowledge of all mankind.”



CHAPTER II

WHY WE STILL GET WAR

"We may sign Kellogg Pacts and Kelloggesque Pacts in Europe until there is a shortage of parchment and gold pens, and we shall have done nothing real for the peace of the world."—H. G. WELLS.

CHAPTER II

WHY WE STILL GET WAR

IF we wish to get rid of war we must, as with any other disease, discover how to modify or abolish those conditions in society that cause it, or permit it to occur. Many causes of war have been suggested. Some hold that the fundamental causes are psychological and are to be found in the innate wickedness, selfishness, or pugnacity of mankind. Others hold that the causes of war are economic, and others again that they are political. Those who hold that the causes of war are rooted in man's character are apt to infer that we cannot get rid of war until we have learnt how to change human nature. To these I think it sufficient to reply that while it is doubtless desirable to discover ways of making human beings less pugnacious, less selfish, less self-assertive, and more co-operative, it has been possible to get rid of other forms of fighting, for example duelling, without waiting for the psychological millennium. As regards many of his other attributes that left to themselves are apt to have disastrous conclusions, man has discovered that it is possible, by creating the proper institutions, to direct and control them. Surely the same is true of the impulses that lead to war.

Probably the two commonest theories as to the cause of war are the economic theories normally advanced by socialists, and the theories advanced by such writers as Sir Norman Angell. The former school tell us that under capitalism there is an inevitable struggle for the control of markets and raw materials, that so long as capitalism endures this struggle will continue, and that the only way to get rid of war is therefore to get rid of capitalism.

Those who follow Sir Norman Angell say, on the other hand, that war results from the anarchy of sovereign states, from the fact, that is to say, that the world is divided into some seventy nations, each claiming the right to do what it likes, each heavily armed, each recognising no authority superior to its own will, and each inhabited by populations prepared to support it enthusiastically in any quarrel in which it happens to be engaged. Under this system, they point out, each nation claims for itself a type of security which it attempts to deny to other nations, namely the security resulting from a preponderance of armed strength. Furthermore each nation claims the right to be judge and jury in its own cause. They remind us that in quarrels between individuals we have abolished fighting by putting force behind the law instead of behind the litigant, and that if we wish to abolish fighting between nations we must do the same thing.

There are thus two prevailing schools of thought: one asserting that war results from the rivalries of competing groups of capitalists, and the other asserting that war results from the anarchy of armed sovereign states and the absence of effective international law. These two schools of thought are commonly found opposed to each other, and many have been the debates between them. The opposition seems to me unreal, and I believe that both are right. So long as sovereign states exist, vested interests hoping to benefit from their rivalries and their prides will not hesitate to exploit them. If sovereign states did not exist, capitalists could not use them for their purposes. Pennsylvania and New Jersey are capitalist states. Their capitalists doubtless find themselves from time to time engaged in rivalry with each other. Why is it never suggested that this rivalry might lead to war? Not because Pennsylvanian capitalists are more scrupulous than French or German capitalists, but because the political situation is quite different.

This question should be approached in a scientific spirit. Let us imagine an inquisitive scientist from Mars surveying the human species and observing their warlike propensities. What question would he ask? He would observe that mankind is divided into many different sorts of groups, not merely nation-states, but counties, towns, churches, Trade Unions, etc. He would observe that some of these groups are in the habit of fighting or threatening to fight, while others never dream of fighting. Each sort of group is composed of human beings, of exactly the same human beings as the other groups, but organised according to a different pattern. The cause of war, he would say to himself, cannot be a cause which is as true of the groups that do not fight as of those that do fight. It cannot therefore be simply human nature, or something of that sort. The counties that do not fight are composed of the same selfish, pugnacious human beings as the nations that do fight. In what respect therefore, he would ask himself, do groups that fight differ from those that do not fight? That surely is the scientific question. If the question be posed in this form, and I submit again that it is the only scientific form in which to pose it, it admits of only one answer. The groups that do fight differ from those that do not fight in one respect, and one only, namely that they are sovereign states. All the other alleged factors productive of war, such as capitalism and original sin, are just as much present in the groups that do not fight as in those that do. They cannot therefore be the fundamental cause of war. The cause of war must be sought in those factors that distinguish the fighting groups from the non-fighting groups.

This is easily seen if we compare Europe with the United States of America. The State of New Jersey does not think it necessary to 'defend' itself against the State of New York. Its children are not brought up to imagine themselves nobly sacrificing their lives for the honour or

'vital interests' of New Jersey, or in defence of 'gallant little' Rhode Island. European states on the contrary are in a condition of chronic 'defence'. This is not because the inhabitants of New Jersey are more virtuous than those of France or Italy; they are transplanted Europeans, and in their capacity as citizens of the United States of America, they behave in exactly the same fashion as Europeans. The difference is simply that New Jersey has given up all claim to that part of state sovereignty which appertains to external relations. New Jersey has a government which controls its education, its roads, its marriage laws and its internal affairs generally. It has no Foreign Secretary and no Minister for Defence. The matters that would be dealt with by these officers, if they existed, are dealt with by the Federal Government of the United States. The States of the American Union neither fight nor ever dream of fighting each other, because their common affairs are settled by Federal institutions with the Supreme Court exercising an unchallengeable authority in the background, and because local patriotism is not the monstrous and hysterical group egotism it has become in Europe.

Every day makes it clearer that those who desire peace must also desire the surrender of the independent control of foreign policy, and the rapid creation of federal institutions for the whole world, together with the indispensable partial replacement of patriotic by cosmopolitan sentiment.

The root evil then is the international anarchy, and the root problem is how can this international anarchy be ended, for there can be no peace in the world so long as this anarchy prevails. There have been many attempts to combine the abolition of war with the retention of sovereignty. All have proved futile, and, if the above analysis is correct, they will continue to prove futile. It will be worth while to consider one or two of these attempts in greater detail. For example, there was the

Kellogg Pact. As a result of a proposal originally made in June 1927 in a communication from M. Briand to Mr. Kellogg, then the American Secretary of State, all the nations of the world were invited to sign a declaration solemnly renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Certain questions were at once raised, principal among them being the effect of the proposed renunciation upon the right of self-defence. M. Briand replied that each nation would, of course, remain "The sole competent authority to decide whether circumstances required it to resort to war in self-defence". The British Government agreed with M. Briand's admirable sentiments, but insisted that the Pact should not apply to certain areas in the world, principally in the Near East, in which Great Britain claimed a special interest and where the incursion of any other power would be treated as an unfriendly act, possibly requiring "The resort to war in self-defence". One of the first effects, therefore, of the Pact was the assertion of a British "Monroe doctrine". Ultimately, with much pomp and ceremony, the Pact was duly signed in Paris and is, therefore, sometimes referred to as the Pact of Paris.

The Treaty as ultimately signed was simplicity itself. It contained only two clauses. In the first clause the nations agreed to renounce war as an instrument of national policy: in the second clause they undertook to resort only to pacific means for the settlement of whatever disputes might arise among them. M. Briand's qualifications regarding self-defence and Sir Austen Chamberlain's enunciation of a British "Monroe doctrine" were included as reservations to the Pact.

What was the effect of the Pact? The effect is most simply judged by comparing the aggregate expenditure of the powers on armaments in the year following the Pact with that of the year before. If the Pact was taken seriously, this expenditure should have declined. It did not decline by a single farthing. It did not decline

because the Pact made no single step towards the elimination of the causes of war, and by this reservation left open loopholes through which any nation could go to war without apparently violating its obligations under the Pact.

It might seem, by comparison with the recognised right of the individual to defend himself, that M. Briand's reservation was reasonable: but consider the difference. If a burglar attacks me in my house and I kill him in self-defence, I shall be prosecuted for manslaughter and I shall be required to prove that the circumstances left me no alternative. The law will not say that I am the sole authority competent to decide whether circumstances required me to resort to homicide in self-defence. The law could not say so without total abdication of its functions. If I am the sole competent authority in such matters then there is no law.

I am not aware that any of the nations that fought in the Great War admitted that they were fighting aggressively. It was Great Britain that declared war on Germany, and not vice-versa. How many Englishmen would entertain for a moment the idea that our declaration of war constituted us an aggressor nation? They believe, for the most part with perfect sincerity, that "circumstances required us to resort to war in self-defence". Most Germans believe the same thing of their own nation. They believed that they were in danger of encirclement by England, France and Russia, and that "circumstances required them to resort to war in self-defence". As someone said at the time, in the *Manchester Guardian*, if I remember rightly, the Pact prohibited all wars except those likely to occur.

The Pact of Paris was impotent because it did nothing whatever to abate the evil of sovereignty. Indeed it expressly re-asserted this sovereignty. It left the roots of war untouched, and was merely an assertion of pious intentions. As such it achieved, and was bound to

achieve, absolutely nothing. War will not be cured by good intentions. It will be cured when, and only when, we have learned how to substitute international government for international anarchy. To do that we shall need new ideas, new loyalties, and new institutions.

What of such doctrines as those of compulsory arbitration, collective security and an international police force? According to these doctrines, the nations are solemnly to agree to submit disputes to arbitration and to use their collective forces against any aggressor. But what does this mean in practice? If we retain sovereign states and do not set up an international government, who is to control the international police force, who is to take control of the forces that will restrain the aggressor, in time to restrain him, and how is he to be restrained, except by war? Is war, as an instrument of international policy, really preferable to war as an instrument of national policy? In *Union Now*, Mr. Clarence K. Streit discusses very vividly the practical difficulties confronting any such proposals. He considers the case of four nations, A, B, C and D, who sign an agreement that if any one of them attacks a second, the remaining two will go to the assistance of the victim. For that assistance to be effective in time, concerted staff plans made in advance are necessary, since modern war is likely to rely very largely upon the effectiveness of a lightning attack. But unless Collective Security is a mere fancy name for the old policy of alliances, in which case, of course, the aggressor is determined in advance, it is necessary to suppose that any one of the four powers may turn out to be the aggressor. Are we then to suppose that powers A, B, C have conversations between their general staffs in order to decide how, if necessary, to restrain D, and that in the same way, powers A, B and D; A, C and D; and B, C and D, all have triangular staff talks, thus ensuring that the aggressor knows in advance the plans and disposition of the forces that will be opposed to him? The system is

inherently silly, and the larger the number of powers engaged the sillier it becomes. It is silly because it does nothing to substitute law for anarchy, and because it proposes to use in restraint of anarchy armed forces that would not exist, save as an expression of this anarchy. All such plans ignore the fundamental source of the difficulty, which is, that so long as nations impinge upon one another in all sorts of ways, occasions for conflict are bound to arise, and will certainly become acute in the absence of some agreed and enforceable procedure for dealing with problems at a stage *before* they have become acute.

Collective security and international police forces only come into play when problems have already become acute, and war is openly threatened. They come into play at a stage when national passions are already aroused and when the difficulty of peaceful settlement is at a maximum. What then are we to do? Shall we fall back upon pure pacifism and endeavour to convert men to the doctrine that the use of force is always wrong? There can be no doubt that pacifism could end war if only there were enough pacifists. But pacifism, save as an assertion of the individual conscience, presents three serious difficulties.

In the first place, it is flatly contrary to human nature as we know it, and to all the traditions of society. There seems no reasonable chance, therefore, in any future that we can foresee, of converting to absolute pacifism sufficiently large numbers of men to make their influence politically effective.

Secondly, the pacifist solution encounters the difficulties already mentioned, that it does not come into effect while problems are still in a sub-acute stage. What is important is not that men should refuse to fight, but that the situation should not arise in which they are asked to fight.

Thirdly, and arising from this, pacifism does not

suggest a machinery of government. What we need is governmental machinery for regulating and settling the problems that at present lead to war. War is the result of policy. It is, in Clausewitz' famous remark: "diplomacy continued by other means". At present, policy in international affairs is national policy, pursued in the national interest, and judged by national standards. When England and France were debating what to do about sanctions in the case of Abyssinia, each was considering its own national interests. England became converted to the policy of sanctions when it appeared that British imperial interests in the Near East were threatened. France was opposed to sanctions because she still hoped to make a peaceful settlement with Italy and detach her from Germany. So long as international affairs are the battle-ground of the purely national policies of sovereign states, the larger issues concerning mankind as a whole will continue to be overlooked.

In short, the task of constructive pacifism is not so much to consider what ought to be done when war starts, or even by what methods existing problems may be peacefully solved by negotiation. Even if they are peacefully solved, others will arise that perhaps cannot be peacefully solved. The task of constructive pacifism is to create the sort of world in which war is not likely to occur because the conditions out of which war arises have been abolished. So long as these conditions exist we are likely to get war. So long as we are likely to get war, nations will prepare for it. So long as nations prepare for war we are likely to get war. It is a vicious circle, from which there is no escape save through the replacement of the international anarchy by ordered world government.

CHAPTER III

NATIONS AS GROUPS

“In the pages that follow the reader is invited to forget that he is an Englishman and to remember that he is a man; for it is the future of mankind that is at stake.”—
G. LOWES DICKINSON: *The International Anarchy*.

CHAPTER III

NATIONS AS GROUPS

ONE of the most obvious characteristics of human beings is their tendency to form themselves into various kinds of groups:—nations, churches, clubs, colleges, and so on. The most important group in the modern world is the nation, and it differs in several important respects from any other form of group.

The first important difference which we notice is in the degree of authority exercised by the group over its members. Almost every form of group, even, I imagine, an anarchist society, claims some degree of authority over its members, but the nation, when it is organised as a modern State, claims the right to unlimited obedience from its members, and the right to punish, by fine, imprisonment, torture, or death, conduct of which it disapproves, and opinions which it regards as dangerous. It is the modern State and not the modern Church which has inherited the power and authority of the medieval Church.

There is no need to labour this point, for it has been made sufficiently obvious during recent years. Everywhere states have conscripted men to fight in quarrels which they did not understand, and in which they had no real interest, and some states have even dared to conscript wealth !

The next difference which we notice between the nation and other forms of group is that membership of some particular nation is practically compulsory. A man is free to say that he does not wish to be a member of any political party at all, or of any church, or of any club,

but he is not free to say that he does not wish to belong to any nation, or, at least, if he is free to say so his wish will be ineffective, and he is likely if he expresses it to be accused of treason and disloyalty. A man is not invited to become a member of his native land, and the "social contract", as we all recognise nowadays, is a convenient myth. A man is not invited to sign the social contract or else retire in solitude. Even if he settle on some hitherto uninhabited island his countrymen will regard him as a coloniser whether he likes it or not, and hail him as one of the noble army of empire builders.

This point is important, since when membership of an organisation is involuntary, we ought to expect greater regard for individual rights than when the obligations of membership are voluntarily assumed, and can be voluntarily relinquished.

The third difference to which I wish to draw attention is in regard to the relations between groups. If Pennsylvania and New Jersey were to have a quarrel about the traffic across the Delaware bridge, it would not, in all probability, occur to them to raise armed forces by issuing stirring appeals to local patriotism, make violent war upon each other, and destroy the bridge about which they were quarrelling. If any such idea did occur to them owing to a temporary lapse of sanity in the two States they would not be allowed to put it into practice. A quarrel of proportional magnitude between two nations, however, would almost certainly lead to war, and there is no effective authority to forbid it. Not only so, but all attempts to create such an authority have been fiercely resisted on the ground that states must be sovereign. The killing involved in such a war would be regarded as being in quite a different moral category from ordinary homicide, and each nation would be regarded as being within its rights in going to war (i.e. wholesale homicide) in defence of what it conceived to be its own interests.

The mischievous conceptions of honour and sovereignty make it extremely difficult to change this state of affairs. Men have a platonic affection for peace, but are unwilling to surrender national rights in the interests of fundamental change in the organisation of the world, although such change is clearly necessary if civilisation is not to perish.

At present states are bound by treaties and agreements which only weak powers are compelled to observe. The Great Powers can usually break them with impunity. War is a recognised institution of the world, with rules of procedure which are recognised theoretically, and observed practically as far as is convenient.¹

As the late Lord Salisbury remarked on one occasion, "Let those take who have the power, let those keep who can, is practically the only rule of Russia's policy; wherein I am bound to add she does not differ widely from many other civilised states". We are all familiar with the definition of an ambassador as one who "lies abroad for the good of his country".

Thus within its own borders the State claims absolute obedience from its members, while without those borders it recognizes no restraints except the prudence of the highwayman, and such moral principles as it chooses voluntarily to observe. We have two extremes in the world. Within the State there is a degree of authority and control which is altogether excessive. Between the States there is anarchy. Curiously enough it is precisely those who are most shocked at anarchist propaganda within the State who most zealously defend the anarchy which exists in international affairs. The Sovereign State is the limit of present social integration. The League of Nations was an attempt to carry this integration further, but I think there can be no doubt that none of the Great

¹ It is instructive to note that in the preparations for war now going on (August 1939) every nation is proceeding on the assumption that every other nation will violate the existing international conventions for the "humane" conduct of war, and that in due course it will be compelled to do so itself.

Powers would submit to the arbitration of the League on a matter which it considered of first-rate importance.

Senator Borah, when Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the American Senate, gave a blunt expression of the customary view:

"There are some things in this world more to be desired than peace, and one of them is the unembarrassed and unhampered and untrammelled political independence of this republic—the right and power to determine in every crisis, when that crisis comes, untrammelled by any previous commitments, the course which it is best for the people of this nation to pursue. If peace cannot be had without our surrendering that freedom of action, then I am not for peace."

The history of the League affords many examples of this state of affairs. Thus in framing the Covenant, the Commission entrusted with the task had to exercise the greatest care not to insert any clause which might be thought to involve an infringement of sovereignty. For this reason it was a necessary part of the constitution of the League that vitally important decisions should only be taken by a unanimous vote. In this way it was made almost impossible for the League to deal with really important questions except by talking about them. A "question" may be defined as an important matter about which there is a difference of opinion, and it is clearly necessary, if war is to be avoided, to have some way of reaching decisions on disputed matters even when unanimity is impossible.

At the opening of the Assembly of the League in September 1922, the President paid a glowing tribute to the innocuous nature of the League's activities. There were those, he said, who had criticised the League on the ground that it might interfere with the sovereignty of free nations, and he wished to assure his hearers that it would do nothing of the kind. This amazingly pessimistic utterance was greeted with considerable applause.

It was recognised from the beginning that it would be necessary for the League of Nations to set up a Permanent Court of International Justice, and a commission of jurists was appointed by the first Assembly to consider the constitution of such a court. In the original report of the commission, it was suggested that the Court should have compulsory jurisdiction, but this was not accepted by the Powers, and in the constitution of the Court, as finally adopted by the second Assembly, resort to the Court was made optional save in certain classes of dispute in connection with the International Labour Office. That is, if two nations chose to submit their dispute to the decision of the Court, they were free to do so, and there was an admirable organisation at their disposal; but if they chose to fight about it they were also free to do so, except in the case where one nation had already accepted the jurisdiction of the Court or of the Council of the League.

There was, however, an optional clause in the protocol setting up the Court, and by signing it any nation could agree to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in the event of a dispute with any other nation which had also signed it. A great many of the smaller nations signed this clause, but it was not signed by any of the Great Powers. As in any case it is doubtful whether any serious fighting was possible which did not involve the Great Powers, the gain was probably less real than apparent.

In connection with the International Court of Justice, the American Senate afforded an excellent example of obstinate insistence upon the preservation of state sovereignty. On February 24th, 1923, President Harding asked the Senate's consent to the adherence of the United States to the Court. On January 27th, 1926, the Senate gave its consent subject to five reservations. The second part of the fifth, dealing with advisory opinions, provided that the Court should not,

"without the consent of the United States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest."

This is anarchy. The reader will see this clearly if he will ask himself what attitude to law would be implied by an assertion on his part that he will respect the jurisdiction of the English Courts of Law, provided that they do not, *without his consent*, express an opinion on any matter in which he has or claims an interest.

To very many people all this is quite right and proper. They see nothing strange in the organisation of the world into groups of this sort, recognising no authority superior to themselves, and claiming absolute authority over all other sorts of groups. There is indeed what might be called a new religion in the world:—the religion of nationalism. This religion consists in the belief that the interests of the national group to which one belongs are of supreme importance, and that it is permissible to rob and murder members of other national groups in defence of the interests of one's own. This belief is curious because, in order to make it rational, one has to suppose that the interests of one's own country are more important than they would have been if one had been born somewhere else. This attitude is held with passionate fervour by most modern people, and in most countries those who refuse to adopt it are persecuted as were the heretics of old. Many people are able to achieve a reconciliation between this religion of nationalism and the traditional religion by means of a belief in what Mr. Bernard Shaw has called "the sound British patriotism of the Almighty". The logical defect of this reconciliation is that it has to vary according to one's nationality.

This lack of universality is indeed one of the chief defects of patriotism as a religion, since the desires which it inspires in a citizen of one country are different from, and to some extent incompatible with, those which it inspires

in the citizen of another country. A world full of patriotism must be a world full of strife.

It has been frequently remarked that nationalism as we know it to-day is a fairly modern growth, and it will be worth while to consider some of the causes of its development.

For the western nations the world is a very different place from what it was 150 years ago. The chief cause of this difference is science. Before the Industrial Revolution the majority of men lived by their own labour on the soil; few could read or write; and travelling was uncommon. The consequence of this was that national consciousness was hardly developed. This could still be seen until quite recently in countries like Russia and China, where patriotism, as we know it, was almost unknown except in the towns. The interest of the peasant hardly extended beyond his village.

The advance of physical science led to the invention of machinery and the development of industrialism. Men tended to leave the soil and to work in factories. There was an increase in population, an increase in production, and an increase in railways and means of communication. The new way of life made general education of the masses more possible and more desirable, and elementary education became more widespread. Ultimately in the more advanced countries, it became universal and compulsory. The spread of the ability to read brought with it the rise of the cheap press, and we now have the chief factors necessary for the production of nationalist sentiment.

Elementary education, the Press, travel, and commerce all combine to make men more aware of the nation to which they belong, of the possibilities of its growth, and of the possible dangers from other groups. The existing sentiment of loyalty to a sovereign is easily transformed or extended under these conditions to the more abstract sentiment of loyalty to the State. The herd-instinct becomes associated with the State and gives rise to the

sentiment (not the instinct) of patriotism. It must be noted that patriotism cannot be an instinct, since its object, the State, is a highly artificial concept only to be understood as a result of education. Affection for the family may well be instinctive, but it is clear that a child born in New York is not born with an instinctive affection for another child born in California just because the other child will become a fellow-citizen of the United States. If the New Yorker received no education whatever it is clear that the Californian would be as much a foreigner as the Canadian or the South American, and only those would not be foreigners whom he met in the flesh and who lived in his immediate neighbourhood.¹ The notion that the Californian is a fellow-citizen deserving of affection, esteem, and support in quarrels with foreigners, while the Canadian deserves no such affection, esteem and support, is plainly the result, not of untutored instinct, but of a long process of "conditioning" by means of education and propaganda. It follows that this sentiment could easily be altered or diminished by a different form of education.

It is to be noted that the herd-instinct, in ourselves as in other animals, is always associated with hostility to other herds. Ants at once kill any other ant which strays into their midst from a neighbouring ant-heap, and among ourselves the herd-instinct is never really very strong except when it is associated with a feeling of pugnacity towards some other group. It is for this reason that many writers have been led to the conclusion that the best way to promote the establishment of effective world government would be to persuade men that the moon is inhabited by a hostile race who are about to invade us. If men could be brought to believe this they

¹ The instinctive use of the word 'foreigner' still prevails in Cornwall, where it is applied to the rest of the inhabitants of England. A friend of mine, recently staying in Cornwall, was informed by the landlord of his inn, that he 'had never been in England'.

would abolish slums as leading to inefficiency and waste of man-power; disease would be enormously reduced by much more strenuous and co-ordinated efforts than are made now; important raw materials would be controlled by an international body as they were during the war of 1914-1918, and rationed according to need; we would soon forget our ridiculous animosities under the stress of a common fear, and the brotherhood of man would be achieved.

The advance of science and invention, in addition to having been largely responsible for the growth of nationalism, are even now causing an increase rather than a diminution of this disease. It has often been thought that as war became more destructive, the rational arguments against it would prevail and lead to its disappearance. What seems actually to happen is that the destructiveness of war, and the consequent fear which it inspires, lead to increased preparations for meeting it. These increase both fear and national excitement, and lead to an increased likelihood of war. Fortunately, however, there is some reason to suppose that the rational arguments against war are gaining adherents.

It has been suggested above that nationalist feeling is to a considerable extent artificial. If this is so, there must be some agency by which it is maintained. Apart from the innate conservatism which always prolongs the life of traditions which have outlived their usefulness, there are two chief agencies by which nationalist feeling is maintained and artificially stimulated. These are the Press and education.

There are two main reasons why the Press should stimulate nationalist feeling. The first is purely commercial and depends upon the ease with which the instinct of pugnacity may be aroused, and the fact that men prefer to read opinions with which they agree rather than opinions with which they disagree. It is manifest that a newspaper which tried to tell the truth about other

nations, and tried to keep us mindful of the defects of our own, would suffer in circulation in comparison with a newspaper which represented all foreigners as scurvy devils except when they happened to be our allies, when, of course, they would acquire virtues second only to our own. Indignation over the wickedness of others gives a peculiar satisfaction, and those who control the Press are well aware of this. The late Lord Northcliffe had a list of instincts to which it was possible to appeal successfully by means of a newspaper, and at the head of this list was the instinct of pugnacity. As Sir Norman Angell has frequently pointed out, there is here a vicious circle analogous to what is called Gresham's Law in economics. This law tells us that if good and bad coinage are put in circulation together, the bad coinage will drive the good coinage out of circulation. So it is with our instincts as they are played upon by the Press. The mental habits which it is desirable to form in a world like this are those which lead us to be cautious in forming judgments about matters with which we have no direct acquaintance, since it is very easy to be mistaken about such matters owing to prejudice or insufficient evidence. Those habits, however, which it is easiest to stimulate are those which lead us to form hasty judgments of a violent character without bothering very much about the evidence. If this sort of judgment were discouraged by the Press, the habit of forming the other sort of judgment might become more common. In fact, of course, the precise opposite occurs, and we are encouraged everyday in the popular Press, by means of flaming headlines and highly coloured invective, to form passionate and unintelligent opinions about difficult and complicated matters in regard to which caution would be the only safe rule. In this way that method of forming opinions which it is desirable to encourage is not encouraged at all, whereas those primitive impulses which it is desirable to control become artificially strong through over-stimulation. The chief of

these is the impulse towards a pugnacious habit of thought in regard to foreigners. Militant patriotism is probably the most widespread and the most dangerous of modern vices. It can hardly be doubted that it does vastly more harm than all the ordinary vices put together.

The other important reason why the Press promotes nationalism is that industrialists have often found it convenient to be able to rouse public feeling against their competitors either in the home market, or, more usually, in some undeveloped foreign market. The necessary deception of the public can only be achieved successfully if nationalist feeling is strong, and this has therefore been encouraged in the past by those industrialists who were able to control means of propaganda. Of course this attitude on their part is not necessarily deliberate and self-conscious. Men rarely act as the result of a cold calculation. But those who profit by an existing order are likely to be hospitable to arguments in its favour, and to wish to encourage the emotions which support it. This source of nationalist propaganda is likely to be weaker in the future than in the past, since big financial operations tend increasingly to become international in their scope and origin. Strong nationalist feeling may, therefore, become a barrier rather than a help. It is probable that some at least of the big financiers and industrialists would, if they could, have checked the orgy of nationalism with which Europe has been plagued since 1914.

Before leaving this subject of the Press, it is desirable to emphasise that the Press can only appeal to instincts which are already there, and that at present it is doing all in its power to strengthen those instincts which are most in need of control. There is no real remedy here except the growth of an intelligent and critical scepticism. If, in these matters, people would learn to think more and feel less; if they would learn to distrust violent assertions, and to read books and newspapers with which they disagree, a great deal would be achieved.

We should bear in mind that it is always possible to present a more or less plausible case for hatred of any country, and that whether we regard a particular country as wicked or virtuous depends chiefly upon whether those who control the Press choose to stress its vices or its virtues. Thus in America, until recently, lynchings of negroes occurred about sixty or seventy times a year, and were usually horrible and ghastly affairs. Circumstantial accounts of these lynchings in the popular Press of other countries would be sufficient to arouse violent public opinion against America whenever it was desired to do so. In the same way, German atrocities in Belgium, or more recently in concentration camps, British atrocities in Ireland, South Africa or India, Japanese atrocities in Korea and in China, Bolshevik atrocities against their political opponents, French and Belgian atrocities in the Congo, Turkish atrocities in Armenia, and a thousand other villainies (real or imagined, it makes little difference) may all be used with advantage when the occasion arises.

There are still millions of people who regard the printed word with superstitious reverence. "It's in the papers", they say, and therewith seek to end a controversy. It would be a salutary exercise for most of them to be compelled to read about six newspapers a day for several months. A healthy scepticism in regard to the Press might thereby be generated which would do untold good.

An amusing illustration of the nature of propaganda is afforded by the following extracts:

(Extract from the Italian newspaper, *Popolo d'Italia*. Editor, Signor Mussolini. Written before Rumania's Declaration of War.)

"People must at last cease from describing the Rumanians as our sister nation. They

(Extract from the same paper, written after Rumania's Declaration of War.)

"The Rumanians have now proved in the most striking manner that they are

are not Romans at all, however much they adorn themselves with this noble appellation. They are an intermixture between the barbarous aborigines, who were subjugated by the Romans, and Slavs, Chazars, Avars, Tartars, Mongols, Huns, and Turks, and so one can easily imagine what a gang of rascals has sprung from such an origin. The Rumanian is to-day still a barbarian, and an individual of very inferior worth who, amid the universal ridicule of the French, apes the Parisian. He is glad enough to fish in muddy waters where none of those perils exist which he seeks to avoid as much as possible, as he has already shown in 1913."

worthy sons of the ancient Romans, from whom they, like ourselves, are descended. They are thus our nearest brethren, who now, with that courage and determination which are their special qualities, are taking part in the fight of the Latin and Slav races against the German race—in other words, in the battle of freedom, civilisation, and right against Prussian tyranny, domineering, barbarism, and self-seeking. Just as in 1877 the Rumanians showed what they could achieve by the side of our brave Russian Allies against Turkish barbarism, so will they now also with the same Allies, in the face of Austro-Hungarian barbarism and uncivilisation, throw their sharp sword into the scales and weigh them down. Nothing else indeed could be expected from a people which has the honour of belonging to that Latin race which once ruled the world."

The other great source of nationalist propaganda is education. In most countries the greater part of elementary education is in the hands of the State, and the holders of political power have therefore a very powerful weapon with which to influence the opinions and close the minds of the coming generation. In many countries patriotic ceremonies and observances are required in all schools, and it is often compulsory for schools to begin each day with a ceremony at which the children salute the flag and take the oath of allegiance. The school which I attended

as a boy between eight and twelve ended each week with a so-called singing lesson, which consisted almost exclusively of the learning and singing (with gusto) of patriotic songs. Teachers who do not conform to the conventional views on these matters are dismissed. At least they are dismissed if they are honest enough to proclaim their opinions. But they soon learn not to do this. Not only in regard to patriotism, but in regard to a host of other matters, teachers must profess strictly conventional views. Intelligent and well-informed persons rarely accept the conventional views on all subjects, but intelligent teachers soon become habituated to the necessary hypocrisy. This leads to a cynicism which is very harmful to genuine education. It can only be avoided either by seeing that all teachers are stupid or by giving them greater freedom.

Apart from direct interference of this sort the chief ways in which education promotes nationalism are by atmosphere and by the teaching of history.

The atmosphere in which most children are brought up is one in which nationalism is taken for granted. This is not in any way deliberate, since most adults also take it for granted that nationalism is good and that internationalism is wicked. It rarely occurs to people that the passion of nationalism, like other passions, is in need of control if it is not to be harmful. Children are exhorted to self-control as regards their other passions, and shielded from anything which might unduly arouse them. This is not the case with the passion of nationalism, which seems to be most admired when it is least under control. As Lord Hugh Cecil has remarked, we do not hear people say of *Rule Britannia* that "it is an excellent poem but hardly fit to be placed in the hands of a child". By patriotic songs and pictures which are often in the worst of taste, and only tolerated because they are patriotic, by the celebration of Empire Days and the like, by patriotic exhortations from retired admirals, generals,

and aldermen, and in innumerable minor ways, nationalism is fostered in schools.

The other way in which nationalism is fostered in schools is by the biased teaching of history. In all countries history is taught in such a way as to make the children imagine their own country to be specially glorious. The facts about the Battle of Waterloo are quite well known to historians, yet German children have a quite different notion of what happened from that which English children acquire. German children imagine that the battle was almost lost when Blücher turned up just in time to save the situation. English children imagine that Blücher turned up just in time to cheer. In the same way English children and American children have different notions of what happened during the American War of Independence. Children come to imagine that their own country has played a more decisive part in history than it has actually played, that it is incapable of defeat, and that it is always in the right. It follows from the last two propositions that might is right, and that the big battalions are on the side of the Lord. We have thus all the ingredients for a degree of national self-complacency which we would think intolerable in an individual.

So far, I have considered the kind of thing nationalism is, the ways in which it has become a powerful force, and the ways by which it is maintained and strengthened. I shall conclude this chapter with a preliminary consideration of some of its practical effects.

The first and most obvious practical effect is, of course, the maintenance of large armaments. Each State feels that it is its duty to be as powerful as possible in order to make other nations unlikely to attack it and in order also that the opinions of its diplomats may be thought important. This latter reason is more important than is commonly realised, and it is possible that armaments play a more important role in peace than they do in war. The armaments of each State are, of course, represented as

purely defensive, and it is conventionally supposed to be surprising that other States should view them with suspicion: in fact they always do view them with suspicion, and we reach, accordingly, a state of affairs in which each State regards the armaments of its neighbours as a menace and its own armaments as a guarantee of peace. Every increase in the armaments of one State brings a corresponding increase in the armaments of the others, and there is brought into being the familiar race of armaments. The progress of invention renders armaments not only more dangerous but also more costly and, accordingly, we find States in which social expenditure is urgently required postponing and refusing it, at the same time that millions are being spent on weapons of destruction. It is difficult to see how this lunatic state of affairs can be remedied except by a diminution in the intensity of patriotic feeling, and the organisation of international government. It is astonishing that in every large country there should be those who maintain that peace can be preserved by being stronger than all likely adversaries. According to this logic, we shall have peace when every nation is stronger than every other nation!

The second practical effect of nationalism is the growth of a system of alliances. Two States, A and B, each feel themselves to be menaced by a third State C, and they therefore patch up their own quarrel and conclude what is called a "defensive alliance". *It is always interesting to observe how easily solutions for international difficulties can be found when fear of a third party acts as a motive.* The third State, C, however, finds it difficult to believe in the purely defensive intentions of its neighbours and becomes apprehensive. It, therefore, seeks to ally itself with a fourth State D, to which it represents the alliance of A and B as dangerous; at the same time, however, D will find itself being offered inducements by States A and B not to enter into any such alliance. According to the custom and morality of States, D will

weigh up the probabilities of victory in the coming war and decide accordingly whether to ally itself with C, or with A and B. This process continues until most of the important States are bound in a network of alliances and counter-alliances, each upholding in public the doctrine of the balance of power, while manœuvring in private to have the balance upset in its own favour. The word 'balance' is used in two senses; in the first sense, as when we talk of two weights being balanced on a pair of scales, it is used to express equality; in the second sense, as when we talk of having a balance at the bank, it is used to express inequality in one's own favour. As a witty diplomat has expressed it: "When States talk about the balance of power, they profess the first and mean the second."

When two States enter into a formal alliance, it is usual to state in the Preamble that the High Contracting Parties have no object save the preservation of the peace of the world. In fact, nothing could be more calculated to upset peace than such a system of bribery and power-seeking, and nothing could make war more destructive and widespread when it comes.

In addition to the public political alliance, there is usually a secret treaty and a secret military agreement. In the published treaty, it is customary to guarantee the integrity and independence of some part of the world, but adding in the secret treaty that if 'circumstances' should cause this independence to be threatened, they will agree to divide the territory between themselves in a manner which is prescribed. In the military agreement, there is an arrangement whereby the General Staffs of the allied countries 'maintain contact'. In this way, plans and preparations are made in advance for the war which will inevitably follow from this system of 'peaceful' alliances. To those who find themselves insufficiently cynical about the activities of States, I can cordially recommend the reading of treaties, especially secret

treaties, of which several have been published since 1919.

The evils we have just considered are directly due to the institution of sovereignty, and can only be finally remedied by the creation of a genuine international authority. Whatever may have been its utility in the past, the sovereign State has now become an unmitigated nuisance, wasting our lives and frustrating our hopes. While it continues to exist and make its preposterous claims, mankind has no hope of a peaceful or even a tolerable existence.

CHAPTER IV

DOES NATIONALISM MAKE SENSE?

“ . . . unaided common sense will tell us that about individuals we have a chance of making statements more profitable and more probable far than any we can hope to make about an entity so vague and multifarious as a state or society. There is some getting at a man: you can say something fairly definite about the desires and idiosyncrasies of John Smith or Wei Sing; but what for certain can be said about those of Great Britain or China? When we talk of ‘China’s honour’ or ‘England’s interests’, it is impossible we should mean anything precise, and unlikely that we mean anything at all. Not all the inhabitants of the British Isles have the same interests, neither have all Chinamen the same feelings. But we might be able to name with confidence the ruling passion of a particular Chinaman and trace with assurance a line of conduct that would be favourable to Smith. Had England refrained from declaring war on Germany, England, as everyone knows, could never again have held up her head, but I dare say Smith would have kept his nose in the air.”—CLIVE BELL: *Civilization*.

CHAPTER IV

DOES NATIONALISM MAKE SENSE?

IN the previous chapter it has been suggested that the idea of the nation is held to-day with something like religious fervour and that the results are mainly bad.

The nation, as representing a community of tradition, of language and of interest, is a natural unit, and it would be futile to wish to abolish it, but most nations either are, or would like to be, sovereign States, and the evils of nationalism result from the excessive tyranny which these States exercise over their members and the lack of legal restraint in their relations with each other.

What is desirable is that men should feel themselves to be members of a variety of groups in which they associate for a variety of common purposes, without feeling that one particular group, called the nation, deserves a degree of respect and worship altogether superior to that accorded to any other group. We need both an extension and a moderation of the group consciousness at present associated with the nation. It is not desirable that this group-consciousness should be religious or quasi-religious, since this attitude leads at once to intolerance and tyranny. It is necessary, if civilisation is to survive, that the groups which we call nations should become more like other groups, less fierce, less exclusive, less aggressive, less dominating, admitting allegiance to, and submitting to some measure of control by, the community consisting of mankind as a whole. This idea appears to meet with immense resistance, but I believe that this resistance could be very greatly diminished by a more widespread awareness of the essential contradiction between the cultural

and economic unity which mankind has already established in very large measure, and the nationalist obsessions which still dominate so much of our political thought and behaviour. It is the object of this chapter to examine this contradiction.

The world is already in fact one unit to a degree altogether greater than seems to be commonly realised. For an immense number of practical purposes we do in fact behave as members of an international society, while continuing to think and feel as if we were only members of a national society. We live simultaneously in two worlds: the technical world, which is already international: and the world of political thought, feeling and prejudice, which is still mainly national.

Let us consider a few of the ways in which internationalism is already an established reality, even if less fully established than would be the case if nationalist obstacles were removed. Consider Science. Here we have a field of human endeavour in which no nation can claim a monopoly or even a priority, and in which it is impossible to disentangle the parts which each nation has played. The very names of the electrical units demonstrate the degree to which the modern body of scientific knowledge is the result of international co-operation. It so happens that they are named after distinguished physicists, and the volt, the ampere, the ohm, the henry, and the watt, are named respectively after an Italian, a Frenchman, a German, an American and an Englishman. Consider the great names in any branch of Science. Take a few at random from Physics: Archimedes, Newton, Leibnitz, Galileo, Kepler, Laplace, or, coming to our own day, Einstein, Planck, Heisenberg, de Broglie, Rutherford, Eddington, Millikan, Compton. Which nation can claim these, or even a majority of them? There is no such thing as English Physics, or French Biology. The very idea is laughable. The world of science is already an established international world with

its international conventions and its international means of communication.

Or take invention.

"Anyone," writes Mr. Streit, "can make himself a megaphone and extend his voice a little. But to make a telephone that will extend his voice anywhere, one needs generations of inventors and scientists of many nations. One needs to comb the world to get all the little things required to make a telephone. If a man could find them all in his backyard and invent the whole thing himself, to use it he would need another man, and to make the most of it he would need all mankind. One can telephone round the world to-day, but one does not telephone to oneself. The more civilized and civilizing the machine, the more we must depend on all the planet and all mankind to make and use it."

Turn to music, and the arts. During the war of 1914-1918 we were debarred from listening to music written by Germans or Austrians,¹ but who would claim that our musical life was thereby enriched? Bach, Beethoven, Brahms, Schubert, Handel, Purcell, Cesar Franck, Stravinsky, Ravel, Rachmaninov, Verdi—which nation claims all of these, and which nation's musical life would be richer if it confined itself to listening to the music of its own composers? Visit any Art gallery and look at the signatures on the pictures. Again, you will find an international list.

Even our political life, most nationalist of all, is full of ideas of foreign origin. Socialism, Liberalism, tariffs, free trade, Conservatism. Which nation invented them and which has a monopoly of any one of them? In every case the principal thinkers have been drawn from more than one country. There may be a few primitive tribes here and there, whose lives have not been enriched by absorption from abroad, but there is no developed or civilised people, the river of whose national life is not fed by tributaries having their sources in every part of the

¹ No German and Austrian music will be played at the Promenade Concerts this season, and a programme of French and Russian music will be substituted for the Wagner concert announced for to-night. *Daily Mail*, August 17th, 1914.

civilised globe. Nationalism in culture, then, is obsolete, and those who desire to regain it must desire at the same time to deprive themselves of the greater part of what constitutes civilised existence.

But it is in economics that the contradiction between reality and nationalist obsession is most complete and most devastating. In this department our thinking has been utterly bedevilled by nationalist superstitions. People commonly apply to international trade ideas and criteria that they would never dream of applying to trade between different areas within the same national state. The economic arguments will often be exactly the same in one case as in the other, but patriotic blinkers prevent people from perceiving the fact. The United States has tariffs against Canadian goods in order to protect American producers from "foreign" competition. Nevertheless, most Americans, if asked, would admit that it would be a good thing economically for the United States and Canada to be united. If they were united the tariff wall would immediately be abolished, but the Canadian wheat that competed with American wheat would be exactly the same wheat as before. The economics of the situation would be in no wise altered. All that would have happened would be a mystical change whereby wicked foreign wheat had suddenly become virtuous American wheat, but it would be exactly the same wheat.

Professor Plant¹ has suggested an instructive parable in this connection:

. . . "We often deplore the difficulty of labour transference within Great Britain, where so many pitiful examples confront us of continuing unemployment in depressed areas side by side with acute labour shortage in other regions, and yet it is a commonplace that the post-war years have seen a great deal of internal migration into the home counties and the South of England generally in response to the new demand for labour arising out of industrial developments, which themselves are the product of recent scientific discovery

¹ *The Population Problem*, Allen and Unwin.

and manufacturing invention. Would that development, with all its attendant benefits to the standard of life of the population of this country, have been allowed to proceed so quickly if Southern England had been a separate "nation" with its own autonomous legislature? Would not the Southern Ministry of Labour have been bombarded by demands to conserve all employment for Southern-born natives? Local labour shortage would have led to higher wage-rates and labour-costs, which would have placed a lower limit on industrial expansion and on employment capacity in the developing regions of the South. Could an unemployed Welsh miner or Northern industrial worker expect to be granted a labour permit in the face of accusations that immigrant labour was depressing money wages? Can we doubt that the condition of the inhabitants of this island would have been far less prosperous if local authorities had had the power to restrict immigration into their localities?"

International trade is an example of the division of labour, and the arguments in favour of international trade are exactly the same as the arguments in favour of any other kind of trade, namely that by specialisation and division of labour we increase the amount of our wealth by making each of us more efficient, and increase the diversity of our consumption by gaining access to goods that cannot be produced or grown economically at home. To this argument, political frontiers are absolutely irrelevant. That this is so is made abundantly clear by the plain fact that no one has ever deliberately and artificially introduced economic frontiers separating adjacent portions of existing sovereign States, though they would have done if economic barriers were desirable in themselves. It is surely a very remarkable thing, if economic barriers between the different parts of the world are desirable, that the world should be so arranged that these barriers coincide exactly with the existing frontiers of nations! For these frontiers enclose nations of vastly differing areas, and are very largely the result of dynastic, military, and historical accident, having no connection with the realities of modern economic life.

In short, the economic case for universal free trade is overwhelming. It results from the essential economic irrelevance of national frontiers, and the fact that barriers to free economic intercourse are merely a method of causing work to be done in the wrong place. It is for this reason that they create employment, but the employment they create is useless. If the creation of employment is all that is desired, then as Mr. Keynes once pointed out: "There is nothing a tariff can do that an earthquake cannot do better."

Economic progress involves constant readjustment. If the methods of production were static, we might discover once and for all what each part of the world was best fitted to do, and let it go on doing it. But populations rise and fall, new inventions make old ones obsolete, and methods of production change. Innovation involves a shift in the distribution of resources and this in turn involves stress and strain and damage to vested interests. That the vested interests should object is natural enough. Witness the objections of whalers to the introduction of coal gas, since the gas would reduce the demand for lamp-oil. Witness the vehement opposition from horse breeders to the introduction of stage-coaches, on the ground that without them more horses would be required to carry the same number of passengers.

In Lord Stamp's *The Science of Social Adjustment*, there is a very amusing extract from a book entitled *The Grand Concern of England*, published in 1673:

"These Coaches and Caravans are one of the greatest mischiefs that hath hapned of late years to the Kingdom, mischievous to the Publick, destructive to Trade, and prejudicial to Lands . . . For, formerly, every Man that had occasion to travel many Journeys yearly, or to ride up and down, kept Horses for himself and Servants, and seldom rid without one or two Men; but now since every Man can have a passage into every place he is to travel unto, or to some place within a few miles of that part he designs to go unto, They have left keeping of Horses, and travel without Servants;

And York, Chester and Exeter Stage Coaches, each of them with forty Horses a piece, carry eighteen Passengers a week from London to either of these places; and in like manner as many in return from these places to London; which comes in the whole to 1872 in the year. Now take it for granted, That all that are carried from London to those places, are the same that are brought back, yet are these 936 Passengers carried by forty Horses; Whereas, were it not for these Coaches, at least 500 Horses would be required to perform this Work. Take the short Stages, within twenty or thirty miles of London, each Coach with four Horses carries six passengers a day, which are thirty-six in a week, 1872 a year; If these Coaches were suppressed, can any Man imagine these 1872 Passengers and their Servants, could be carried by four Horses?"

This is only a short excerpt from Lord Stamp's quotation, the whole of which is well worth consulting, both for entertainment and instruction. In old-world English, and with many quaint examples, it sets forth all the grounds for resisting progress that have been advanced from that day to this.

The objections of vested interests to innovation have always been there and always will be there. What is less understandable is the ease with which they gain support from those who, in the long run, stand to benefit from the innovation. The essence of progress in economic affairs is the direction of resources into new channels, not hitherto used or available. The aim of social or political intervention in economic affairs should be to facilitate change, not to resist it. That unemployment should be caused by new invention is essential if other new inventions are to be exploited at all. Who would make aeroplanes, motor-cars, telephones, wireless sets, gramophones; where would the armies of teachers, doctors and dentists come from, if we still needed as large a proportion of the population as formerly to produce our necessary supplies of food, clothing and shelter? These new industries are only possible because invention has enabled the old industries to employ fewer work people and yet produce more goods.

It is futile therefore to resist technological advance on the ground that in the aggregate it creates unemployment, since it need do no such thing. If such unemployment were inevitable, the whole human race would have been unemployed long since, since the number of people thrown out of work by new inventions during the past century must easily exceed the total employed population. The goal, then, is one of adjustment, not of mere resistance to change. Our problem is not to discover how to prevent change, but how to make it as painless as possible.

When the adjustment takes place across national frontiers, vested interests are in the most favourable position for resistance, for they can at once appeal to national prejudice, on the ground that home labour is being thrown out of work by foreign importations. There is no limit to the nonsense on this topic that is both talked and believed. I read an article recently by the motoring correspondent in one of the Sunday newspapers, in which he claimed that since, on the average, it takes one man one year to make a motor car, for every foreign motor car imported into this country, an Englishman is thrown out of work for a year. This was set forth in all seriousness, and doubtless accepted by most of his readers, as an argument against imported cars. After years of public discussion of this subject it seemed never to have entered his head that the imported car would be paid for, that the payment would normally take the form of British exports, that British labour would be employed in producing these exports, and that the possibility of these exports being bought resulted directly from the sale of the foreign car to an Englishman.

For all I know, it would be possible, if one took sufficient trouble, to grow bananas under glass at John o'Groats, and, given a sufficiently large subsidy or tariff, the industry might even become profitable. It would create so much employment per banana that we should presently read in the columns of a Sunday newspaper that every imported crate of bananas threw a great many

Englishmen out of work for a year. That the high resulting cost of the bananas would deprive large sections of the British population of a valuable food-stuff would not, to our economic nationalists, seem a consideration of any very great importance.

In short, economic nationalism does not make sense. No economist of any repute doubts for one moment that a peaceful world, practising universal free trade, would be richer than a world whose trade is choked with prohibitions, quotas, licences, tariffs, currency restrictions, and every other sort of interference with the free flow of trade across national frontiers.

Our attitude to the problem of refugees affords another example of how nationalist obsessions can cloud the judgment. Here were tens of thousands of homeless and helpless people, cast out from their own homes and jobs, with the most manifest claim upon our help and understanding. On the one hand the claims of humanity told us to welcome them to our shores and to let them find work amongst us. On the other hand, so it seemed to almost everyone, considerations of our own economic welfare told us to practise a policy of exclusion. This is not the place to probe the matter in detail, and try to weigh up the various arguments. It suffices for my purpose to point out that in popular discussion a whole class of important considerations was totally neglected. They were neglected because nationalist blinkers made people for the most part incapable of perceiving them.

For what was the economic argument? Foreigners, it was alleged, if allowed to find work, were likely to deprive our own people of jobs. Therefore foreigners must not be allowed to find jobs, except in cases where it was clear that no native labour was being displaced. It was observed that if Herr Schmidt found a job, it was possible that but for Herr Schmidt, Mr. Smith would have had it instead. Therefore, the argument ran, since we must not risk Mr. Smith being out of a job on account of Herr

Schmidt, Herr Schmidt must not be allowed to find a job. At this point the argument usually ceased. By stopping there it amply satisfied nationalist prejudice, but unfortunately it also omitted some vitally important considerations. For let us suppose that Herr Schmidt gets a job. To begin with, he will spend his wages, thereby giving employment to those who produce what he buys. Secondly he will occupy houseroom, thereby increasing the demand for houses, furniture, and a variety of capital goods. This will further increase the demand for labour in the industries that supply these things. Thirdly, he will normally work in a fashion that involves the use of capital goods; factory, office, tools, or whatever it may be. He will not usually provide the savings out of which these things are purchased. He therefore enables other people's savings to find, and to give, employment. These three arguments explain why it was possible for Sir Samuel Hoare to state in the House of Commons that 11,000 refugees had provided employment directly for 15,000 English workpeople.

There is a fourth consideration which is usually altogether ignored. We have professed for some time to be worried by a prospective decline in the population. Now the population can be recruited in one of two ways, either by home production or by imports. The method of home production satisfies Hitler's doctrines of blood and soil and racial purity; but that is not all that can be said against it. Biologically the notion of pure races is nonsense, and the Aryan race in particular is a myth. Historically the most successful nations are obvious and flagrant mixtures. Economically the method of home production is the most expensive, for a grown man or woman in a civilised community is a valuable capital asset costing anything from £300 to £2,000 to produce. It follows that on the average each adult must produce during his working life, not merely enough to pay for his own keep, but enough also to repay the community the capital cost of his own upbringing and training. An im-

migrant is therefore a valuable capital asset which we are offered free. We have the advantage of his training and education without having had to pay for it, and since, in doing a normal adult's share of the work of the community, he will produce enough to repay the cost of his upbringing, he is offering to repay the country of his adoption instead of the country that actually met that cost. It is clear that this was an important contribution to American prosperity during the years of substantial immigration. It meant that the proportion of productive workers to the whole population was considerably larger than it would otherwise have been.

Here then are four important arguments affecting the economics of the refugee problem which were ignored in popular discussion of the subject,¹ and which were certainly without appreciable effect on our policy. The argument which viewed foreigners solely as competitors for jobs had a stronger emotional appeal, and it was allowed almost completely to swamp the considerations on the other side. The emotional appeal in this instance was purely nationalist in origin, and if it had been weaker, and our cosmopolitan sympathies stronger, if, in short, we had been able to think as human beings instead of as patriots, our approach to this problem would have been both more rational and more humane.

We must not leave this subject without considering the important problem of communications. Here we see nationalism almost at its worst. A friend of mine recently had breakfast in India on a Sunday morning and supper in London on the following Tuesday evening. During that flight of three days, he crossed any number of frontiers, and was subject in turn to any number of different regulations controlling the use of the air. Sovereign states, of course, are not content with governing the ground they cumber, but they claim also

¹ Save for the admirable Penguin Special *You and The Refugee* by Sir Norman Angell and Mrs. Dorothy Frances Buxton.

to control an inverted pyramid of space going out to infinity. Military aviation doubtless grows by leaps and bounds as a result of our nationalism, but civil aviation is hampered at every turn by the necessity of conforming to countless foolish regulations. When a day's march could rarely take a man beyond the confines of his own country and when he had no faster means of transport than a horse, national frontiers doubtless made some sort of sense, but when an aeroplane can cross the Atlantic in less than twenty-four hours and then cross the whole of Europe in a shorter time still, our national boundaries begin to seem obsolete. When people talk of the difficulties of uniting the world they forget how small it has become in terms of speed and communication.

This is very strikingly illustrated by a fact about American politics which is always very surprising until one is told the reason for it. The elections to the Federal government take place in November, but the new President and Congress have not hitherto assumed office until the following April. At first sight this delay of several months appears to be simply irrational, and one wonders why Americans should have devised a system involving this long and sometimes very troublesome transitional period during which a government is in office but, owing to being under sentence of death, is unable to initiate any important legislation.

The reason is that owing to the vast area covered by the United States, this delay was necessary in the 'horse and buggy era' to enable new congressmen to get to Washington from the furthest parts of the Union. *That delay did not prevent union then.* Nowadays, a government representing the whole world could assemble in a matter of days. Washington is closer to England now than to Boston in 1787.

Nationalism, then, no longer makes sense in terms either of culture, of economics, or of travel and communications.

"We cannot give our world the tendons that mass production and consumption give it, the blood circulation that steamships, railways, automobiles and aeroplanes supply, and the nervous system with which electricity permeates it, and expect it still to function as it did before we made it one organism. When our common organism begins to ail, we cannot reasonably expect to cure it by each nation seeking to cure its portion of the nerves, blood and tendons separately, whether by its own devices or its own dervishes. Nor can we now dispense with tendons, blood and nerves. True, we got on without them once. That was when we were, politically, like the amoeba—one-celled creatures. But once the germ from which we start develops tendons, blood, nerves, we can no longer live without them, nor without a head, an effective means of governing the whole. These are thereafter vital."¹

Nevertheless, there still remains the idea that nationalism somehow is defensible in terms of freedom, that world government would diminish our freedom and must therefore be resisted. This obsession is very deep-rooted, and yet I believe that it no longer has any relation to reality. If you ask a patriot why he objects to World Government he will usually reply that he wishes his country to retain its independence of action, and, in effect, that he does not like the idea of its affairs being meddled with by a 'pack of foreigners' sitting in Geneva. He will add that no sovereign State can be expected to surrender any of its independence unless compelled to do so by force.

Let us look a little further into this freedom that is so important that rather than surrender it, nations are prepared to risk final destruction in a world war. We are not to have World Government, it seems, because we must retain the right to manage our own affairs. The world is spending this year² some thousands of millions on armaments. Are these armaments part of a plan for the better management of our affairs? Do we enjoy them? Are they part of the pattern of life as we should

¹ From *Union Now*, Clarence K. Streit.

² Written before the commencement of the War.

ideally wish to see it? In short, does anyone *want* these armaments? Apparently not, since when you ask the patriot whether he wants them, he replies, 'No, of course we don't want them, but *we have to have them because other nations have them.*' They are the result, apparently, not of choice but of compulsion.

Now there are some things we really do want. Think of the inroads on poverty, ignorance, and disease that could be made with those thousands of millions we are spending on armaments! Every slum in the world could be cleared for a fraction of this total. Think of what one per cent of it would mean to medical research! Why then, in the free exercise of our sovereign right to do what we like, don't we spend the money on education or houses or social services? The answer is that, being free and sovereign, *foreigners won't let us.* They compel us to spend money on armaments instead. So what our sovereignty amounts to is this: we waste our substance in order to preserve the right to be compelled to waste our substance.

Consider the question of trade. It has already been made clear that trade barriers ought to be reduced or abolished, that a world of universal free trade, embodying, as it would, the maximum use of the principle of division of labour, would be better off than a world whose trade is choked with quotas, currency restrictions, and high tariff barriers. England, for instance, would like to sell her goods as freely in Europe and the rest of the world as New Jersey sells her goods in the rest of the U.S.A. But New Jersey does not wish, or at least has lost the right, to keep out 'cheap foreign cars' from Detroit. New Jersey, having lost her freedom to impose tariffs, has retained her freedom to export her goods.

Or again take the question of travel. Freedom of movement is surely a sufficiently elementary freedom, and yet in Europe it has practically died out, and what remains is accompanied by every kind of vexatious

restriction.¹ And all in the name of this precious freedom of sovereign States. How different, and how freer, when States are no longer sovereign. You can travel from New York to San Francisco without once having your baggage opened and pawed about by a customs official, without any tiresome examination of passports, and without either having to change your money half a dozen times, or be searched as you pass from Utah to Nevada in order to be sure that you are not taking too much money with you. In short, in the U.S.A., human beings (for whose welfare States ostensibly exist) have retained the freedom to travel because the separate States have lost the freedom to make themselves a nuisance to travellers. If only one could say of the world, as one can say of the U.S.A., 'Once you are allowed in, you may go where you like!'

The freedom conferred by sovereignty seems, therefore to be a very queer thing. It compels us to do without things we want in order to spend vast sums on armaments that we don't want. It causes us to throttle each other's trade and to impede each other's travel. From time to time it causes us all to be conscripted and thus lose our freedom altogether. Finally it gives rise to periodic

¹ I have just been spending a holiday on the French side of the Lake of Geneva, about fourteen miles from the City of Geneva. Here we have a clear example of the essential silliness of national frontiers. From time to time I wished to go into Geneva by car. On each occasion the time occupied in travelling was less than the total time occupied at the various customs houses, while papers were being examined, and officials carefully noted the make of the car, the number of cylinders, its colour and type of body, and, believe it or not, the amount of petrol in the tank! This last was to insure that I did not bring back into France more petrol than I took out. There is nothing in the least natural about these frontiers. French is spoken on both sides, the scenery, vegetation and way of life are much the same, and there is nothing to indicate that one is going from one country into another, except for a barrier across the road and some officious gentlemen in uniform. These formalities add nothing whatever to human happiness, welfare or security. They are a mere time-wasting nuisance. They wasted only a little of my time: they waste all the time of the customs officials year in and year out.

outbreaks of mass mutual homicide during which millions lose not merely their freedom but their lives. Is it possible to conceive of anything much more bound than this freedom of sovereign States?

Suppose instead that we lost this freedom. Suppose that, like the States of the U.S.A. *all* States had lost the right to maintain armed forces, the right to do what they like in matters affecting other countries, the right to impose tariffs or interfere with free travel. What a hideous state of slavery would result! We should no longer be liable to be conscripted in order to kill and be killed in conflicts arising out of imperial rivalries. The whole world would be our shop and the whole world our market. We should wander as freely over the world as now Americans wander over America. If we wished to tax ourselves in order to improve our roads, our schools, or our houses, we should be free to do so, much more free indeed than if we had already spent more than we could afford, and borrowed the rest, in order to 'defend' ourselves. As regards social life generally, why should we be less free than we are now? Individually we should be richer, happier, healthier and freer. Collectively we should have lost only the martial elements in national pride. What should we have lost that is worth preserving?

The inter-dependence of the modern world means that a world order sooner or later is inevitable. Either it will be imposed after a period of slaughter and chaos, or it will come about because men perceive it to be desirable. Which shall it be? If men were rational the answer would not be in doubt, for, as I have tried to show, even the sacrifices demanded are mainly illusory. The last twenty years do little to encourage the hope that the forces of reason may prove stronger than hate and fear, but we may do well to keep in mind the reminder of the late Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson, that while reason may be a small force, it has the advantage over the others of always working steadily in the same direction.

CHAPTER V

THE LIBERAL TRADITION

"Power, like a desolating pestilence,
Pollutes whate'er it touches; and obedience,
Bane of all genius, virtue, freedom, truth,
Makes slaves of men, and, of the human frame,
A mechanized automaton."

—SHELLEY: *Queen Mab*.

"Liberalism is the supreme form of generosity; it is the right which the majority concedes to minorities, and hence it is the noblest cry that has ever resounded in this planet."—ORTEGA Y GASSET.

"Believe, obey, fight."—MUSSOLINI.

CHAPTER V

THE LIBERAL TRADITION

Sir Norman Angell has pointed out that in part what we are witnessing in the world is not so much a revolution as a counter-revolution. It is an attempt to undo what Dr. Goebbels has called "all the principles of 1789". It is these, he says, that the Nazi regime is out to smash. On all sides in these days we hear it said that the liberal tradition is dead and that those who adhere to it are mere pathetic survivals of an age that is already gone. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the liberal tradition contains elements that are indispensable to any society in which life would be worth living. It enshrines much of what is most valuable in civilisation. In this chapter I wish to state and defend what I believe to be the essential ingredients in this tradition.

It is worth while to remind ourselves that until comparatively recently it would have been possible to omit this chapter, on the ground that most readers would take its contents for granted. The opening paragraph of Lord Morley's essay *On Compromise*, published in 1874, contains the following words: "The right of thinking freely and acting independently, of using our minds without excessive awe of authority, and shaping our lives without unquestioning obedience to custom, is now a finally accepted principle in some sense or other with every school of thought that has the smallest chance of commanding a future." Lord Morley was no cloistered philosopher, but a man of affairs in close touch with political and social movements, and it is melancholy to reflect that over the greater part of the world the schools

of thought now in control are precisely those deemed by Morley in 1874 not to have "the smallest chance of commanding a future".

The change that has come over the world is seen very clearly if we contrast Morley's optimism with the following passage from the latest book¹ by H. G. Wells, a writer who until recently has been noted for the buoyancy of his temperament, and who has given us, again and again, inspiring visions of what mankind may yet achieve.

" . . . the spectacle of evil in the world during the past half-dozen years—the wanton destruction of homes, the ruthless hounding of decent folk into exile, the bombings of open cities, the cold-blooded massacres and mutilation of children and defenceless gentle people, the rapes and filthy humiliations and, above all, the return of deliberate and organised torture, mental torment and fear to a world from which such things had seemed well-nigh banished—has come near to breaking my spirit altogether . . . for my generation there have been things so unforgettable and disappointments so bitter that for us laughter has become almost a brutality."

Clearly it was a dangerous illusion to suppose that the main battle for liberty had been won, and that the future would see merely an extension of its area, and a refinement of its meaning. We now know that the problem is more difficult than had been thought, and that there are economic, political, and educational foundations of liberty to which insufficient attention has been paid.

Mussolini tells us that liberty is not merely a corpse, but a 'putrefying' corpse. The Germans, more given to metaphysical subtleties, assure us that while the freedom of democratic States is an illusion, there is a 'true' freedom which consists in the right to obey Hitler. Finally the Communists, while prepared to support democratic denunciation of the destruction of freedom by Hitler and Mussolini, yet agree with Hitler that 'democratic' free-

¹ *The Fate of Homo Sapiens.*

dom is an illusion in all the States in which it exists, and are prepared to use his methods in the furtherance of their own ends. Few and far between appear to be those who still believe that liberty is not a sort of icing or decoration to be added to the political cake, *after* it has been cooked, but that it is the most indispensable of its ingredients. Liberty is the chief political good, not because it is an end in itself, let alone the main end, but because without it the best things in life are unattainable.

For the purposes of this book it is general principles and neither programme nor details that need to be discussed. Thus, Sweden, Great Britain, France, the United States of America, are all examples of countries in which the liberal tradition exists and has a measure of vitality. Nevertheless, the political and social systems in these countries differ appreciably one from another. The liberal tradition is concerned with certain basic principles which they have in common.

At this stage it may be worth while to suggest a reply to a jibe which is not uncommon. It is sometimes suggested that because of such things as the Dreyfus scandal, because of the treatment of Tom Mooney, or of Sacco and Vanzetti, in America, because of the treatment by the British authorities of political offenders in India, it is absurd to suggest that in these countries there is any liberalism worth defending. No one of course, could maintain for a moment that the liberal democracies are either unanimous in what they believe or wholly successful in practising what they think they believe. The point is that in each of these countries the liberal tradition still retains sufficient vitality to make people spring to its defence when it is threatened, and to make it difficult or impossible for governments openly and explicitly to deride or disregard it. In this respect it resembles such a commonplace virtue as honesty. Most of us are at times dishonest, even though most of us profess to believe that

honesty is better than dishonesty. Would it be better, because we are sometimes dishonest, to discard the idea of honesty altogether, and to suggest that it is only a foolish bourgeois superstition professed by hypocrites who know no better?

What I suggest therefore is that the liberal tradition, while nowhere fully expressed or respected, nevertheless retains vitality in the liberal democracies, and must be strengthened and defended as an indispensable ingredient in that international society we hope to create.

What then is the tradition? To begin with it asserts the supremacy of the individual. In this respect it is precisely opposed to the new totalitarian doctrines. According to these doctrines, the State is the ultimate reality and the individual derives whatever significance he possesses from his membership of the State. The State, therefore, must no more consider his freedom or dignity as ends in themselves than the body considers the freedom or dignity of one of its constituent cells as an end in itself. As the cell is to the multi-cellular organism, so is the individual to the State. The State is absolute and real: the individual has no reality apart from the State. Such is the official doctrine of the countries professing Nazi or Fascist philosophy. All this is made quite clear in the following quotations from Mussolini's article on "The Doctrine of Fascism", printed in 1932 in the *Enciclopedia Italiana*.

Fundamental Ideas.

Article 7. Against individualism, the Fascist conception is for the State; and it is for the individual in so far as he coincides with the State, which is the conscience and universal will of man in his historical existence. It is opposed to classical Liberalism, which arose from the necessity of reacting against absolutism, and which brought its historical purpose to an end when the State was transformed into the conscience and will of the people. Liberalism denied the State in the interests of the particular individual; Fascism reaffirms the State as the true reality of the individual. And if liberty is to be the attribute of the real man, and not of that abstract

puppet envisaged by individualistic Liberalism, Fascism is for liberty. And for the only liberty which can be a real thing, the liberty of the State and of the individual within the State. Therefore, for the Fascist, everything is in the State, and nothing human or spiritual exists, much less has value, outside the State. In this sense Fascism is totalitarian, and the Fascist State, the synthesis and unity of all values, interprets, develops and gives strength to the whole life of the people."

Political and Social Doctrine.

Article 3. Above all, Fascism, in so far as it considers and observes the future and the development of humanity quite apart from the political considerations of the moment, believes neither in the possibility nor in the utility of perpetual peace. It thus repudiates the doctrine of Pacifism—born of a renunciation of the struggle and an act of cowardice in the face of sacrifice. War alone brings up to their highest tension all human energies and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it. All other trials are substitutes, which never really put a man in front of himself in the alternatives of life and death. A doctrine, therefore, which begins with a prejudice in favour of peace is foreign to Fascism. . . .

Article 10. The keynote of Fascist doctrine is the conception of the State, of its essence, of its tasks, of its ends. For Fascism the State is an absolute before which individuals and groups are relative. Individuals and groups are "thinkable" in so far as they are within the State. The Liberal State does not direct the interplay and the material and spiritual development of the groups, but limits itself to registering the results; the Fascist State has a consciousness of its own, a will of its own; on this account it is called an 'ethical' State. In 1929, at the first quinquennial assembly of the regime, I said: 'For Fascism, the State is not the night-watchman who is concerned only with the personal security of the citizens; nor is it an organization for purely material ends, such as that of guaranteeing a certain degree of prosperity and a relatively peaceful social order, to achieve which a council of administration would be sufficient, nor is it a creation of mere politics with no contact with the material and complex reality of the lives of individuals and the life of peoples. The State, as conceived by Fascism and as it acts, is a spiritual and moral fact because it makes

concrete the political, juridical, economic organization of the nation, and such an organization is, in its origin and in its development, a manifestation of the spirit . . ."

To the liberal, all this is anathema. He regards the State as a mere convenience, a convenience, as Mr. Leonard Woolf has reminded us, just as a water-closet is a convenience. Both are indispensable and important, but neither should be worshipped. It is the individual alone in whom virtue ultimately resides, and in whom civilisation can alone be realised. The State is but one of the many groups in which individuals find it convenient to organise themselves for the purpose of realising their common ends. The precise boundaries of the particular State in which a man happens to be born are mainly the results of historical accident, and it is quite absurd to give the inhabitants of that area and those who govern them the almost mystical veneration that patriots commonly seem to think they deserve.

The question is not of merely theoretical interest, since the answer to it vitally affects what we conceive to be the functions of the State and the proper relationship between the State and the individual. If the power and glory of the State are things in themselves, if the State is itself the only absolute reality in our lives, then it is right that those who represent the State should treat the rest of us as mere raw material. If we are miserable, if we are stunted, if our lives are narrow and mean, if we are turned out in standard types, for all the world as if we were so many Ford cars, what will it matter so long as the State is great and glorious? If, on the other hand, we take the individual man as the measure of human excellence, we shall judge the State in proportion as it brings happiness and individual excellence into the lives of the individual men and women who compose it. Where it promotes individual human welfare we shall support and defend it. Where it is opposed to individual human wel-

fare we shall resist and attack it, for we shall insist that individual human welfare is the only sort of human welfare that exists, and that all contrary doctrines are mere superstition.

The American Declaration of Independence declared that among the "unalienable rights" of men are "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness", and that "to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men". Judging by the activities of modern governments, one might suppose that it was to secure "death, slavery, and the pursuit of misery" that they were "instituted among men". Would it not be wise to return to the earlier and sounder conception?

If it be admitted that the proper goal of society is the good of the individual, the question then arises, under what conditions is this good most likely to be realised? The liberal answer is clear. Individual good is most likely to be realised under conditions of freedom.

Now freedom is a word that is often used in very peculiar ways and, according to those who worship the State, there is a 'true' freedom which consists in the right to obey the police. It is not desirable to use words in fancy senses, and I prefer to use freedom in its ordinary everyday meaning of the opportunity to realise one's desires. There is a maximum of liberty then, when there is a maximum of opportunity to act according to one's own desires, and a minimum of compulsion to act according to someone else's desires. It is clear that this kind of liberty can never be complete, but if it be admitted that liberty is desirable we shall scrutinise with greater vigilance all proposals for diminishing liberty.

The problem arises in society for two reasons. Firstly, there is a clash between the interests of different individuals. This leads to the conclusion that unless we are to have freedom for the strong and slavery for every-

one else, there must be an authority which can administer justice impartially. This kind of authority differs from that favoured by tyrants since its object is to maximise individual liberty. By diminishing the liberty of the highwayman, we increase the liberty of everybody else. This aspect of authority then is one that can be defended on the grounds of respect for liberty alone.

Secondly, as society becomes more complex, organisation becomes necessary. For example, the rules of the road increase the freedom with which we may safely use the roads. In the same way, by restricting the liberties of those suffering from contagious disease we are increasing the liberty of all the rest, since they can travel abroad with greater impunity. The doctrine of liberty does not therefore lead to the conclusion that all restraint is undesirable. It suggests criteria by which to judge how much restraint is necessary.

Why is liberty good? Principally, I think, because it is the psychological condition of growth and progress, alike for the individual and the community. As John Stuart Mill put it: "He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties." Thus free individuals are more likely than slaves to possess such qualities as taste, intelligence, joy of life, constructiveness, and courage. These qualities cannot be widely distributed in a society which has no respect for individuality. On the contrary, excessive restraint produces warped, unlovely people, with a narrow and fearful outlook. Contempt for liberty is usually associated with a certain crude, insensitive barbarity, even though it may clothe itself in some such apparently idealistic belief as the Hegelian theory of the State.

As regards the community, I think it is clear that freedom for individual experiment, both in ideas and

in conduct, is a necessary condition of progress. Those who quarrel with freedom of thought, on the ground that it is necessary to prevent the dissemination of wicked and erroneous ideas, forget that the question of free thought never arises except over issues that are doubtful. (No one ever went to prison owing to a desire to assert that twice two is seven.) It is precisely because the issues are doubtful that all sides should be heard. It is out of the conflict of opinion that knowledge and wisdom arise, and a man can never be said to understand even his own views, until he has also understood his opponent's views. It may be said that thought is necessarily free, and that only speech can be restricted. But while, theoretically, a man in a concentration camp may be at liberty to think as he pleases, he will think more fruitfully, and is more likely to think at all, if he is free both to discuss and to publish his thoughts, and if his thoughts have at any rate the potentiality of issuing in action.

"I insist thus emphatically on the importance of genius, and the necessity of allowing it to unfold itself freely both in thought and in practice, being well aware that no one will deny the position in theory, but knowing also that almost everyone, in reality, is totally indifferent to it. People think genius is a fine thing if it enables a man to write an exciting poem, or paint a picture. But in its true sense, that of originality in thought and action, though no one says that it is not a thing to be admired, nearly all, at heart, think that they can do very well without it. Unhappily this is too natural to be wondered at. Originality is the one thing which unoriginal minds cannot feel the use of. They cannot see what it is to do for them: how should they? If they could see what it would do for them, it would not be originality. The first service which originality has to render them is that of opening their eyes: which being once fully done, they would have a chance of being themselves original. Meanwhile, recollecting that nothing was ever yet done which some one was not the first to do, and that all good things which exist are the fruits of originality, let them be modest enough to believe that there is something still

left for it to accomplish, and assure themselves that they are more in need of originality, the less they are conscious of the want."¹

The progress of thought and, ultimately, therefore, the progress of everything else, depends upon the steady development of fresh ideas, and this in turn depends upon an atmosphere which allows the utmost freedom of publication and criticism. Many people dislike freedom because it is bound to lead to a certain untidiness. People who do as they like and think as they like, cannot be made to resemble troops on a barrack square, all performing the same antics to the same order at the same moment. But, as Professor A. N. Whitehead has reminded us: "In a live civilisation, there is always an element of unrest. For sensitiveness to ideas means curiosity, adventure and change. Civilised order survives on its merits and is transformed by its power of recognising its imperfections."²

From what has been said, it follows that society should strive to permit the utmost freedom of speech and action. What form should be taken by the limitations to freedom that are shown to be necessary? This brings us to one of the most important ingredients in the liberal tradition, and one which has been most contemptuously set aside by the totalitarian régimes. This ingredient is the idea of law. The essence of law is that where freedom is restricted, it should be in accordance with agreed and published rules, administered in an agreed and public fashion, by a judiciary which is independent of the executive. The idea of law is thus the very antithesis of the idea of the arbitrary power of officials.

A recent and in itself rather trivial occurrence will illustrate the point. A man was walking along Knightsbridge, wearing one overcoat and carrying another

¹ From *On Liberty*, by John Stuart Mill.

² *Adventures of Ideas*.

over his arm. Some overcoats had recently been stolen in the district and a policeman accosted the man and asked him what he was doing with two overcoats. The man replied that they were both his, and that anyhow, it was none of the policeman's business. The policeman arrested the man on suspicion, and took him along to the nearest police station, where he was able to establish his identity and his right to both overcoats, and was promptly released. The man brought an action against the police for wrongful arrest and, I am glad to say, was awarded £300 damages. The Lord Chief Justice expressed himself in very strong terms about the incident and voiced the hope that the time would never come in this country when we accepted the principle that officials could do no wrong. Contrast this with Hitler's statement regarding the events of June 30th, 1934, when he defended scores of killings without charge or trial, with the statement: "On that night *I* was the Supreme Court of the German people."

One should never forget Walt Whitman's warning against "The never-ending audacity of elected persons", or Lord Acton's warning that "power always corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely." One would have supposed that these two warnings were expressions of the universal experience of the human race, which assures us that no one is good enough to be trusted with arbitrary power over others, and that if a few such saints exist they are the last persons likely to thrust themselves into positions of arbitrary authority.

It is a profoundly shocking thing that whole communities should now be prepared to set aside the teachings of the long experience which led to the establishment of Habeas Corpus. In the reigns of James I and Charles I it was possible for people to be sent to the Tower "for certain reasons of State known unto His Majesty". We thought we had changed all that, but nowadays, it is possible to be sent to prison, concen-

tration camp, or scaffold, for "certain reasons of State known unto" Hitler, Mussolini, or Stalin. The objections now are the same as the objections then. The arbitrary authority of officials is an intolerable invasion of the proper rights and dignity of human personality. For this, if for no other reason, we should strive to perpetuate and strengthen the liberal tradition.

This tradition is concerned, not merely with the method of law enforcement, but also with the kind of law that is permissible. Contrast the rules of the road with Hitler's recent edict bringing all associations for physical culture under the direct control of the State, or Sir Oswald Mosley's slogan, "All for the State, and the State for All". The rules of the road are a necessary means of increasing, not merely the safety of the roads, but our actual freedom to use the roads. We drive more freely through knowing what the other fellow is likely to do. The rules of the road therefore are a means of maximising our opportunity to realise our own purposes. They are not a method of telling us what our purposes ought to be, but merely a means of helping us to attain them. The tyrant wishes to tell us not merely how to attain our purposes, but to dictate them as well. He wishes to plan our lives for us and not merely help us to live them.

The next essential ingredient in the liberal tradition is the idea of democracy. Democracy consists essentially in two fundamental principles. The first is the principle of consent: the idea that each of us is, in some sense, part of the government, and because part of it, has agreed to be bound by its decisions. We accept the law because we also help to make it. Secondly, there is the principle of reason and persuasion. Reason and persuasion depend upon respect for individuality and upon the notion that people must be converted and not coerced. It follows that democrats think that counting heads is better than cracking them. These principles in turn depend

upon some others. Firstly, upon the principle that the wearer knows best where the shoe pinches, and that he is most likely to complain if he knows that his complaint will be listened to, and that the complaint is not likely to lead to even greater evils. There is not much point in complaining about the quality or absence of the butter if the result is to land one in a concentration camp. We ought to know better than to suppose that tyrants will know by intuition whether the shoe is pinching. It seems more in accordance with common sense to let the wearer have the right to howl. Secondly, there is the principle already mentioned that no one can be trusted to legislate for another without his consent. Human nature is simply not good enough. One sometimes hears it said that democracy would be all right if only men were saints and philosophers. The truth is that democracy is necessary because men are not saints and philosophers. The defects of human nature may lead to the failures of democracy, but they also make democracy indispensable if worse is not to befall.

"The people I admire most are those who are sensitive and want to create something or discover something, and do not see life in terms of power, and such people get more of a chance under a democracy than elsewhere. They found religions, great or small, or they produce literature and art, or they do disinterested scientific research, or they may be what is called 'ordinary people', who are creative in their private lives, bring up their children decently, for instance, or help their neighbours. All these people need to express themselves; they cannot do so unless society allows them liberty to do so, and the society which allows them most liberty is a democracy."¹

Thirdly, the preservation of democracy depends upon the recognition that law and order are valuable things: so valuable that they ought not to be jeopardised because impatient minority groups have not the time to rely upon reason and persuasion to convert the majority to

¹ From *What I Believe*, by E. M. Forster.

their views. In countries like England, which have known many generations of law and order, and in which we have come to take it for granted that people will be law-abiding, we tend to forget that many centuries of effort have gone to make that assumption possible.

Certain psychological factors are bound up with all this. There is the habit of tolerance. Tolerance does not mean indecisiveness, and a man is not entitled to be called tolerant merely because he is incapable of making up his mind. Tolerance does not mean the absence of definite opinion. It does not mean sitting on the fence. It means the recognition of the other man's right to equally definite opinions. It was expressed once and for all in Voltaire's immortal sentence: "I disagree with every word you say, and I shall fight to the death for your right to say it." Associated with this is the habit of rationality. Rationality implies a scientific attitude to beliefs: the notion, that is to say, that beliefs should be held on a basis of probability as suggested by the available evidence. What we need is what Goethe called "an active scepticism which seeks to conquer itself". A rational man believes in the possibility of knowledge, but since he knows the pitfalls in the way of acquiring it, he is less likely to be in need of Cromwell's celebrated injunction "*Sirs, I beseech you in the bowels of Christ to think it possible that ye may be mistaken.*" Tolerance and rationality depend upon an absence of fanaticism and the fierce ruthless enthusiasms that fanaticism engenders. As Bertrand Russell has reminded us: "Fanaticisms produce armies that can fight, not parties that can discuss". If we are to secure voluntary social co-operation among people who disagree we need "a diffused liberal sentiment, tinged with scepticism".

Democracy can survive only if it is respected by both minorities and majorities. Minorities must be prepared to make their case patiently by the methods of reason and persuasion. Majorities, on the other hand, must

not abuse their power and suppose that they can do no wrong. The State is not above the principles of decent behaviour, and murder, atrocity and theft are not less murder, atrocity and theft, because they are committed by monochromatically-shirted bullies who happen to call themselves the State.

One very important advantage of democracy over dictatorship is that a democratic leader, not claiming a semi-divine authority, can admit that he has made a mistake. If others decide that he has made a mistake he can be replaced by peaceful means. Contrast this with the position of a dictator who has obtained power by force. He must, as the speeches of Hitler and Mussolini show, be more of a demagogue than the most ranting democratic statesman who ever attained to power. Because of the ridiculous pretensions that he and his followers make for him, he must never be wrong. "Just", says Goering, "as Roman Catholics believe that in religious matters the Pope is infallible, so we Nazis believe that in political matters Hitler is infallible." In 1808 Napoleon was involved in Spain in an adventure he had come to regret. A correspondent urged him to admit his mistake and cut his losses. This is his reply:

"You talk lightly of it, but think of my position. I am a usurper; to reach the place I am now in, I had to have the best brain and the best sword in Europe. To keep myself where I am, I must have the whole world continue to believe this. I must maintain, not lower, the reputation of the brain, and the reputation of the sword. I cannot face the world and say that I have been gravely mistaken, and remain with a beaten army. Judge for yourself; is it possible?"

What can be said of a system of Government in which fallible men must constantly claim omniscience? What, in the long run, must happen to such men even if at the beginning, which is unlikely, they are good and wise? Such power and such pretension must in the end make men mad.

The liberal tradition then consists essentially in the ideas of law, liberty, democracy, tolerance and rationality. It believes that there must be judicial checks upon the arbitrary power of officials. It exalts the common man and the purposes of the common man. It insists that he is an end in himself and must not be regarded as a mere cog in somebody else's machine.

Nevertheless, liberalism is undoubtedly in a state of eclipse, and I suggest that this may be at least partly due to two important mistakes. The first mistake is that liberals have allowed their very proper respect for individual liberty to be too much identified with the doctrine of *laissez-faire* in economics. Thus, during the nineteenth century, liberals opposed the Factory Acts on grounds of individual liberty, and on the same grounds, Herbert Spencer even opposed Public Health Legislation. He did not appear to see that our freedom is diminished if we are not in some degree protected from quacks and itinerant sufferers from contagious disease. That *laissez-faire* is not an immediate logical inference from the notion of individual liberty is easily seen if we consider the factors involved in the decisions made by the owner of a large factory. When Henry Ford gave up Model "T" and began to experiment with Model "A" he closed his factory for a longish period while the experiments were going on. According to the doctrine of *laissez-faire*, he was exercising the right to do what he liked with his own. But was that really all that he was doing? He had collected in Detroit some thousands of workpeople who had come there with their wives and families, bought and set up homes, in many cases doubtless incurred debts, and generally established themselves. They had done all this on the assumption that their livelihood was now bound up with the fortunes of the Ford factory. When Mr. Ford decided to close his factory he was taking a decision affecting the lives of thousands of men, women and children, more intimately and profoundly than it

affected his own life, which, as regards food, clothing and housing, doubtless went on as before. The prevailing economic system enabled him to take this decision in a manner that was essentially irresponsible. This is not a *personal* criticism. I do not mean that he was morally irresponsible, in the sense that he neglected all these factors in his own mind. When I say that the decision was irresponsible I mean that he was not accountable to anybody else for having taken it aright, and could not lose his job unless, by taking it, he made himself bankrupt. In short he had a very powerful motive to take his own interests fully into account, but no motive of comparable strength to give the interests of his workpeople equal weight. I cannot see that the right of one man to make decisions irresponsibly in this sense, affecting the lives of multitudes of others, is a right which can be derived from the doctrine of individual liberty. On the contrary, it seems clear that if the liberty of all, and not merely of the rich and powerful, is to be respected, decisions affecting their welfare must be taken under conditions providing at least some measure of public control.

During the nineteenth century it was doubtless true that *laissez-faire* was the most efficient economic system then available. Because liberals then believed both in *laissez-faire* and in liberty, they have tended to identify them ever since. This has had a doubly unfortunate effect. The idea of liberty has fallen into disrepute among many who perceive the necessity for some measure of public control in economic affairs. Secondly, because liberals have looked askance at the whole idea of public control of economic affairs, planning tends to get into the hands of illiberal people. It will be a first-class disaster if this continues to be the case, since planning should only be undertaken by those who have come to believe in it reluctantly. It is manifestly not safe in the hands of those who rejoice in it, since they will tend to forget all about

the welfare of individuals and think only of the beautiful symmetry and efficiency of their plans.

It is especially important that liberals should interest themselves in the whole problem of planning since the root difficulty in planning is the preservation of individual liberty, both as regards consumer's choice and choice of occupation. One often hears it said nowadays that the only remaining economic problem is that of distribution, but this is an undue simplification, since the problem of distribution is already effectively solved in one sense in armies and in prisons. The solution of the problem of distribution in a society which attempts to retain effective individual discretion at a high standard of living is a far more complicated problem.

The confusion between liberty and *laissez-faire* has had another unfortunate effect in that it has caused reformers to neglect unduly the economic basis of liberty. Because they have rightly seen that the liberty claimed by Henry Ford to do what he liked with his own is a liberty which no State ought to grant, and because, therefore, they have perceived hostility between property rights and human rights, they have tended to jump to the conclusion that this hostility must always exist. Hostility, however, only exists between human rights and the illegitimate kinds of property rights. It is important not to confuse the need for private property with the objection to public property privately controlled. The need for property arises because economic security is the only dependable foundation for personal liberty. The Englishman's traditional desire to regard his home as his castle; the American's traditional boast that he can look any man in the face and tell him to go to hell, are both expressions of the sort of independence which normally only exists when the means of existence are not immediately threatened. Two examples will suffice. Anyone who has done political work in England for a Labour or Liberal candidate at an election, is bound to have had the experience of attempting to

hold a meeting in a village and finding it quite impossible to get anyone to take the chair, even though he knows quite well that there are ardent supporters of his candidate in the village who would very much like to do so. They dare not publicly espouse the cause in which they believe because to do so will threaten their means of livelihood. This is an example of independence being destroyed by economic anxiety. An example on the other side is afforded by the changed attitude of domestic servants. A generation ago, domestic servants were cheap and plentiful and they were also, therefore, servile, since an assertion of independence would have led to loss of livelihood. Nowadays, they are scarce and expensive, with the consequence that the commonest topic among middle-class housewives is the shocking independence of the modern maid, who has actually been known to insist upon hours of work and conditions of housing approaching those obtainable in other occupations. It is clear, therefore, that the ownership of property should be as widely diffused as possible. As Bacon put it: "Property is like muck. It is not good, except it be spread." We want people who cannot be easily coerced, bribed or bullied. Middle-class independence depends upon economic security and in the last resort is a good thing. Those who advocate socialism or any other economic improvement, should endeavour to assure that under their system a man's right to live, and to be maintained as a result of his willingness to labour, is somehow a vested right, a piece of property not dependent upon the arbitrary acts or caprice of officials.

The other great mistake that Liberalism has made has been in becoming unduly identified with the principle of nationalism. Liberals have been too sympathetic with small nations "rightly struggling to be free". As shown in the previous chapter, the liberty of the State has become incompatible with the liberty of the individual. We must come to realise that small nations, struggling to

establish silly little republics, speaking obsolete, archaic languages, and striving for the right to surround themselves with taboos, tariffs and censorships, have no claim upon liberal sympathies. They are a symptom of the ugly and mean separatism which is frustrating the drive towards a unified world. Nations have no more right to sovereignty than individuals to absolute independence. Both mean anarchy and both are destructive of the law and freedom which are the basis of the liberal tradition.

If, however, liberalism can shed itself of these two traditional associations, the one with *laissez-faire*, and the other with nationalism, then what remains will be the very core of the idea of civilisation. The task of the twentieth century is the creation of an international and economic order without surrendering what is vital in the liberal tradition. The survival of liberal ideas has become incompatible with the continuance of war and national sovereignty. For the sake of liberalism and peace alike, therefore, we must search for the means of creating world controls based upon the democratic principle.

CHAPTER VI

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF WORLD ORDER

" . . . We are facing a task vast and difficult enough to tax all the gifts and resources of mankind, a task whose magnitude the majority of us—even among the most devoted—are only beginning to apprehend, and the very prevalent persuasion that a few amiable declarations, a few amiable conferences, a Pact or so and a picnic or so, will suffice to lay the foundations of a permanent world peace is a pure delusion. A permanent world peace implies a profound revolution in the nature of every existing government upon earth, and in the fundamental ideas upon which that government is based. . . .

Did we realize that sufficiently? And is it sufficiently realized to-day? It is the hard verity towards which a number of reluctant minds are being forced at the present time. . . .

. . . On the day when a man—with a ton of goods—can travel from Cardiff to Vladivostok, or from Moscow to San Francisco, as he can travel now from San Francisco to New York, without a passport and without a customs examination, and without seeing a single battleship on the sea, a single soldier in uniform, or a single war plane in the air, the chief structures of a World Pax will exist. And until he can do that, the Great Peace will still be unachieved."—H. G. WELLS: *The Common-Sense of World Peace*.

CHAPTER VI

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF WORLD ORDER

BEFORE proceeding to the substance of this chapter it will be useful to summarise the argument of the preceding chapters. In the first chapter it was shown that the elimination of war is indispensable to the survival of our civilisation. The progress of science and invention has changed the character of war and has made the world already one community. All war is now civil war, and its destructiveness is such that if it continues it will destroy society altogether. Unfortunately, science and invention have sped ahead of our moral and political ideas, which are still rooted in a past that science has made obsolete. The political organisation of the world, as regards the relationships between States, is still one of anarchy, and we cling obstinately to the ideas and institutions that express this anarchy. Anarchy is the condition out of which the likelihood and the possibility of war arise, and our task is to substitute order and government for the anarchy we endure at present.

“The outbreak of the Great War was the condemnation, not merely of the actors who strutted for their brief hour across the stage, but of the international anarchy which they inherited, and which they did nothing to abate.”¹

The first four chapters amount then to the assertion that a world community must be created and that it must be a community in the full sense of the word. Already it is a community in the sense that its different parts are

¹ Professor G. P. Gooch.

members one of another and that no part of the world can any longer afford to ignore what is happening in the rest of the world. What the world community lacks is the other characteristics of a community, namely common ideas, common loyalties, common purposes, and the common institutions that express those ideas, loyalties and purposes. It is clear that the ultimate world community will not be created over night, but it is important, as a guide to the next steps, to have in mind its indispensable fundamental characteristics. The world community will need to create organs of administration, and we must decide what are the functions that must be handed over to the world controls that need to be established.

The first characteristic of any genuine community is that it *feels* itself to be a community. This will involve a revolution in the feelings and ideas of most of us. I remember meeting in America a Quaker lady who had just returned from Europe and who was describing to me some of her impressions. Foreigners, she was telling me, had such and such habits. Suddenly she corrected herself: "No, I must not call them 'foreigners', I mean people who live in other countries." Why did she correct herself? She corrected herself because she was a woman of decent, kindly, humane feeling, who lived in a world in which the term 'foreigner' is to some extent a term of abuse, and she did not wish to be abusive. Most of us find it difficult to forgive foreigners for having foreign ways, and we must cure ourselves of this. We must come to realise that our country has the same sort of importance as is possessed by a county in England, a canton in Switzerland, or a State in the U.S.A. It is a convenient unit for certain purposes but it is monstrous to regard it as the ultimate limit to our sense of the community. The brotherhood of man, so far from being a vague, sentimental aspiration, has become a definite practical doctrine. If only men could be startled into believing it, the

brotherhood of man has become the most practical doctrine in the world, for it has become the condition of the survival of Man. The full realisation of this idea will demand certain changes in education, but these will form the subject of a later chapter.

What are the functions at present under the control of national States which, as an indispensable minimum, must be handed over to the organs of a world community ?

First of all, there is the independent control of foreign policy. All existing Foreign Offices would be better abolished. In a rational world countries would no more have Foreign Offices than counties now have Foreign Offices. Foreign Offices are concerned by their very nature with questions that affect the world as a whole. Internal questions are dealt with by other departments. The questions now dealt with by Foreign Offices should manifestly be dealt with by a world authority. To rid the world of diplomats would be one of the most useful services that could possibly be performed for mankind.

Secondly, there must inevitably be a pooling of all armed forces. Independent national armaments are, by their very existence, an expression of the belligerent character of the sovereign State. It is commonly maintained nowadays that the sole use of national armaments is to act as a world police force and to restrain aggression. There is a simple test of the sincerity of those who advocate that view. Are they prepared to put these national armaments under international control and so fuse them with the armed forces of other countries that there are no longer any armed forces in the world which retain the consciousness of belonging to a separate national State ? This is the clear logical conclusion to any suggestion that armaments exist only to perform police functions. They cannot be trusted to perform police functions so long as they are in the control of a possible litigant. Those who resist this conclusion must, in their hearts, envisage a time when national armaments may be needed in the

pursuit of purely national policy. In their hearts they must echo the sentiments quoted from Senator Borah, on page 48.

If any armed forces continue to exist in the world they must be under an international control which decides both their strength and the uses to which they are put. Anything short of this is anarchy.

Thirdly, the economic relations between States must be governed by an organ of the world community. At present international trade is regarded not as a form of the division of labour, or as a means of co-operation, but as a species of warfare. When my butcher reduces the price of meat, it never occurs to me to think that he is attacking my standard of living—quite the contrary. But let a foreign country reduce the price of its product, and a howl goes up to impose a tariff or a quota, or monkey with the currency, with the object of destroying the advantages it is offering us. From the point of view of a world community, tariffs in their present form are wrong, even if in specific instances they happen to be economically justifiable.¹ They are wrong because, when imposed unilaterally as a result of the pressure of vested interests in a single State, they are always an attempt to divert and interfere with the free flow of international trade in the self-regarding interests of a particular group. The Ottawa Agreements, for example, were bound to affect the economic welfare of Danes, Dutchmen, Germans and others. From the point of view of the world community, what was wrong with these Agreements and the negotiations that led up to them was not so much any technical flaws they happened to possess as the fact that

¹ I do not wish to appear to be asserting or implying that I can think of instances in which tariffs would be justifiable. I only wish to insist that if, for very exceptional reasons, such instances do occur, the arguments must be such as to commend themselves to an impartial international authority. I doubt if there are any tariffs of that nature in the world now. Existing tariffs result from the pressure of vested interests and depend for their support on the strength of national feeling.

they were expressly formed to secure sectional advantages. The harm that would be done to other sections of the world community was not even considered relevant. The spirit of tariffs is the spirit of warfare, and from such a spirit it is useless to expect a peaceful world.

Consider for a moment the prevailing doctrine of the balance of trade. Every country strives to attain what is called a 'favourable balance', by which it means a state of affairs in which exports exceed imports. Now since every export from one country is *ipso facto* an import to another country, it follows that the total exports of the world not merely equal the total imports of the world, they *are* the total imports of the world. From this it follows that countries pursuing the aim of a favourable balance of trade are pursuing an aim which it is a mathematical impossibility for all countries to attain simultaneously. It can only be attained by one country at the expense of compelling some other country to have what is called an 'unfavourable' balance. In short, the spirit that animates existing economic policies is a warlike spirit and not a spirit of international co-operation. The existing economic policies of most states are immoral because they are anti-social. I happen to be one of those who think that the economic arguments in favour of these policies are mainly tosh, but even if they were not tosh, the moral argument just outlined would retain its validity. Economic nationalism is an obstacle to the attainment of a world community, and if in fact there is need to interfere with the free flow of international trade, then that interference must be planned and administered by an organ of the world community.

Let us remind ourselves that in a real society these questions about favourable and unfavourable balances of trade are never even asked. Who ever heard of the balance of trade of Newcastle-upon-Tyne?

Fourthly, the operations now controlled by international finance, and by national finance operating

abroad, must be brought under world control. A modern industrial state is organised in such a way that much of what it produces must be exported. This, of course, is not undesirable, since it depends on the specialisation which accompanies technical advance and is simply an advanced case of the division of labour. The exports are of two kinds: export of consumable commodities in return for which other consumable commodities are imported, and export of capital. In the case of the export of consumable commodities, the capitalist often finds that most of the developed markets are partially closed by means of tariffs and, for this and other reasons, he may seek for markets in undeveloped countries. This tends to bring him into conflict with the competing capitalists of other countries, and the capitalists of each country both desire a monopoly of the market for themselves and fear to have it closed against them by its becoming the monopoly of some conflicting group. In this way, there arises a scramble for spheres of influence, and each capitalist group plays upon the nationalism of its own country in order that the developing market may either become a Protectorate or be openly annexed on some pretext or other.

In the case of the export of capital goods, the case is somewhat different. Let us suppose that it consists in the building by a British firm of a railway in some undeveloped country. The firm in question has now a serious interest in the political stability of the country, since it has to consider the safety both of the invested capital and of the interest on that capital. In case of trouble or political disturbance, these will be imperilled, and accordingly, it represents at home that since British capital is involved, it is the duty of the British Government to protect it. Nationalist feeling usually responds, and the appropriate interference takes place.

There is yet a third way in which nationalism and commercialism react, namely in regard to raw materials.

Much of the raw material required for a modern industry comes from abroad, and the industrial interests involved never feel secure until the source of the raw materials is under the political control of their own country. In cases where the raw material is of great strategic importance, as in the case of oil, it is easy and natural for commercial interests to secure the co-operation and support of the Government. The scramble for the control of raw materials is, therefore, a fruitful cause of international conflict. It was the desire for the control of raw materials which led the victorious nations to be so anxious to become trustees for civilisation in the mandated territories after the last war. Spheres of influence may, therefore, serve the triple purpose of being markets for consumable commodities, places where capital developments of a remunerative sort may go on, and a source of important raw materials.

Those who believe that economic imperialism is due to capitalism often say that none of these difficulties would arise under socialism. This view seems to be unduly optimistic, since nationalism is just as potent as capitalism in producing the evils we have considered. Furthermore, the argument that British lives must be sacrificed in defence of British interests and British capital would plainly have more weight if the interests and capital were those of a British Socialist Government than if they merely belonged to private individuals and corporations. We must conclude, therefore, that socialism is not enough. We need internationalism as well.

If it is the case that sources of raw materials, vital to the whole world, are concentrated in particular small areas of the earth's surface, it follows that their distribution should be determined, not by diplomatic or military threats and pressure, but by an international authority whose function is to do justice. The methods now employed are a negation of the idea of a com-

munity, and if we are to establish a world community, the control of international finance and the distribution of raw materials must plainly be among its functions.

Fifthly, there is the problem of colonies. There exist in the world undeveloped areas inhabited by populations not yet ripe for self-government, and at present governed autocratically by certain of the Great Powers. Those Powers that do not possess colonies, either because they were late in the race, or because, like Germany, they were deprived of them in the last war, are filled with a sense of injustice. Our own position in England is somewhat disingenuous. One frequently reads articles in which it is demonstrated that it is foolish for Germany to want her colonies back, on the ground that she greatly exaggerates the advantage to be obtained from having them. Hardly ever does the writer draw the conclusion that if it is not an advantage to Germany to possess them it can equally be of no advantage to us to retain them. If, therefore, it is true that the advantages of colonies are greatly exaggerated, it follows that we ought not to resist proposals for some other method of governing them. If, on the other hand, the possession of colonies constitutes a real and substantial advantage to the owning Power, it follows that their present distribution is a grave injustice bound to threaten the peace of the world so long as it exists.

The system of mandates, set up by the League of Nations, applied, of course, only to the territories taken from the defeated Powers, but it nevertheless implied a belated recognition on the part of the Powers that no country is justified in exploiting colonial possessions in its own purely national interest.

Should the former German colonies have been returned to Germany? To my mind there were two overwhelming objections to this course. The first is that it would have increased the number of people governed by Hitler. We need only go to his own published utter-

ances on the status of non-Aryan peoples to realise how monstrous it would be to put any such peoples at his mercy. Secondly, returning the colonies to Hitler would have done nothing to challenge the principle of private colonial possessions. What is wrong is not that we have the colonies instead of Germany. What is wrong is that anybody has the colonies. What we do about the colonies should be a recognition of this principle. All that any nation has the right to claim is the same access as any other nation to the markets and raw materials of the countries that are now colonial possessions.

The problem of colonies seems to me crucial in the discussion of our present subject, namely, how are we to set about creating world government. That government is not likely to be created all at once. If it is created gradually it will be by setting up, in the first instance, world controls for those problems which, because they have already reached a critical stage under present conditions, are crying aloud for some new organisation. Those who desire world government should be on the look-out for the problems that can be most quickly handed over to the organs of the world community. The problem of colonies is just such a problem. Something must be done about colonies, since the present situation is altogether unworkable and untenable. It would surely not be difficult, given the will, to create international commissions which would control all the non-self-governing parts of the world, charged with the responsibility of governing those areas, first of all in the interests of the inhabitants, and secondly, in a manner that does equal justice to the claims of all other sections of mankind. The only way to take the question of colonies right out of the arena of international squabbling is to put them once and for all under international control. There is no reason why Germany should not have an equal seat on the Board of Control to be established. If she should ask for more, the moral grounds for resisting her

would be overwhelming. At present the moral grounds for resisting her are far less clear.

Sixthly, the control of international communications of all sorts could very easily be handed over to a world authority. Already such organs as the International Postal Union, International Cable Companies and the like, have familiarised us with the idea. There are no serious technical difficulties in the way of international control of shipping, aviation, postal, cable and wireless services. Because these services are world-wide, their control should also be world-wide.

Seventhly, there must be international control of currency. National currencies serve no useful purpose whatsoever. They are merely a nuisance. Before the war they were a very much mitigated nuisance, since the international gold standard was to all intents and purposes an international currency. Nowadays, when the gold standard is a thing of the past, travel and trade and every economic affair demanding a measure of foresight are impeded and frustrated by the fact that no one knows from one day to the next what his money will be worth in other parts of the world. In an interdependent world this is mere foolishness. The control of currency is therefore one of the prime functions of world government.

Eighthly, there is the problem of movements of population. First of all there is the problem of voluntary migration, which has been made infinitely more difficult since so many countries adopted the policy of closing their doors to nearly all immigrants save those who could guarantee to make no contribution to the economic welfare of the country of their adoption. But since the war there has also been an appalling refugee problem, occasioned by the unwillingness of some states to retain members of their populations and the unwillingness of other states to receive them. Human beings have been tossed backwards and forwards across frontiers for all the world as if they were shuttlecocks. Apart from racial

or political prejudices, populations have also been transferred for reasons of state, and at this moment¹ there is the profoundly shocking forcible expulsion of Tyrolese peasants from the soil on which they and their ancestors have lived for generations. This decision has been made by Mussolini and Hitler without the slightest regard to the welfare or desires of the people concerned. The reasons, whatever they may be, are not reasons concerned with human happiness and welfare. They are reasons of power politics. All this treating of human beings as so many pawns in the political game, to be uprooted whenever it suits a dictator, to be moved hither and thither as if they had no mind or will of their own, is an instance of the outrageous pretensions and the preposterous arrogance of the autocratic sovereign State.²

Here, then, is another problem which must come under the control of our World Federation. There must be no shunting of human beings as if they were mere trucks in a siding. The normal rule should be the recognised right of anyone to go anywhere, save for reasons of quarantine, and to be accepted anywhere as a citizen of the world. There should be no more difficulty in migrating from Paris to London, or London to New York, than there is now in going from Edinburgh to London, or Paris to Nice. A guarantee against forcible sudden transfer for reasons of state should be one of the recognised Rights of Man. Any transfer of population which is needed to facilitate economic adjustment can be achieved without the use of force or compulsion, but only by a method which would never occur to an autocrat, namely that of making the transfer appear advantageous to those whom it is intended to affect.

¹ August, 1939.

² Since the above was written there has been announced (October, 1939) the monstrously inhuman forced emigration of Germans from the Baltic States in order that they may settle in the new "Eastern Territory" of Germany, seized from Poland, and thus gratify Hitler's insane racial passions.

This method takes time, and requires both patience and imagination. That democracy requires it, and autocracy spurns it, is one of the advantages of democracy.

Lastly, the world community must ensure the means of development of world public opinion. I do not, of course, mean by this that everyone in the world should think alike. This could not be realised even if it were desirable. What could be realised, and is not merely desirable but essential, is that everyone should have full and free access to the same sources of information. It must be possible for Germans and Englishmen and Japanese and Americans to read the same books, to argue about the same problems in terms of the same data, and to take equal parts in attempting to influence public opinion the whole world over. Whatever may be the arguments against free trade in ordinary commodities, surely there can be no question as to the desirability of absolutely free trade in ideas and knowledge. Without this a world society is an impossibility. There could be no public opinion in England if the inhabitants of Newcastle were not merely ignorant of the arguments and facts being bandied about in Manchester, but were refused access to them by a censorship imposed by the Newcastle City Council.

At present there are whole sections of the world kept in deliberate ignorance of what other sections are doing and thinking and saying. The right to full and free access to ideas and knowledge the world over must become one of the rights guaranteed by the constitution of the world order we must create. Only so is it possible for world-wide loyalties and world-wide public opinion to emerge.

The League of Nations and much of the existing international machinery provides but the embryonic skeleton of a world community. The bones are beginning to be there, but we have not yet taken any serious steps to provide the world order with either a head or a heart, a nervous system, or a blood supply.

CHAPTER VII

THE FORMS OF WORLD ORDER

“ . . . Any sort of unification of human affairs will not serve the ends we seek, we aim at a particular sort of unification ; a world Caesar is hardly better from the progressive viewpoint than world chaos ; the unity we seek must mean the liberation of human thought, experiment and creative effort. A successful conspiracy merely to seize governments and wield and retain world power would be at best only the empty frame of success, it might be the exact reverse of success. Release from the threat of war and the waste of international economic conflicts is a poor release if it demands as its price the loss of all other liberties.”—H. G. WELLS: *The Open Conspiracy*.

CHAPTER VII

THE FORMS OF WORLD ORDER

WORLD order sooner or later is inevitable. It may come after a period of destruction and chaos, during which for some generations mankind reverts to more primitive ways of life. It may come earlier because mankind suddenly acquires sense. It is inevitable, not only because of the arguments of previous chapters, but because it is in the trend of evolution.

The first life on this planet consisted of unicellular organisms whose social life was presumably non-existent. The first form of association is that in which unicellular organisms coalesce in order to form multicellular organisms. In due course, as evolution produces mankind, we get the family, as the simplest unit of human association. Afterwards we get the clan or tribe, which for a long time remains the limit of friendly association. It is not so long since the men of Mercia were fighting the men of Wessex; later still, the English are united but they are fighting the Welsh, the Scottish and the Irish. As the means of communication improve, so does the unit tend to enlarge. Contrast the united greater Germany of to-day with the multitude of petty kingdoms and principalities that constituted the Germany of yesterday. Contrast the United States of to-day with the little isolated groups of colonists of the early eighteenth century. This process of aggregation into larger and larger units is the plain trend of human evolution. The question is not so much whether we desire world unity as whether we wish to influence the form it takes, or, by sitting still and doing nothing, let it overtake us in

whatever form destiny chooses to send it. This question is of very great importance, since, while world order is in some form inescapable, not all forms of world order are equally desirable.

There are three main possible forms:—

- (1) League of Nations, or some other form of what is known as Collective Security.
- (2) A World Super-State, viz. : one effective world government exercising all or most of the functions now exercised by existing national governments.
- (3) A Federal Government. This would have analogies with the present governmental structure of the U.S.A.

Let us consider each in turn.

(1) *League of Nations*

In discussing the merits of a League of Nations as compared with the other two possible forms of world order, I am obliged to rely very considerably upon the brilliant and convincing analysis of the subject in Mr. Streit's *Union Now*. Mr. Streit was for many years the Geneva Correspondent of the *New York Times*. He was present in Paris while the League constitution was being framed, and he has had therefore an almost unique opportunity of knowing at first hand how a League system works. His views result from an intimate blend of sound theory and acute observation.

The essence of a League is that its unit is the State or nation. Ultimate authority continues to reside in the governments of the separate states, and the constitution of the League is essentially therefore a Treaty between self-governing sovereign states. Like all treaties it is liable to be broken by those who feel strong enough to break it with impunity. Like all treaties, it depends therefore upon good faith; the continuing good faith, moreover, of constantly changing governments.

Since the unit is the State and since states differ

enormously in size, the first objection to a League is that it is undemocratic. Its equality being the equality of States and not of men, it accords one vote each to 4 million Swiss, 40 million French and 130 million Americans. For the sake of the prestige of the State it thereby flouts the most elementary principle of democracy. Nor is this all. For since, in order to preserve the principle of sovereignty, decisions must be unanimous, the 4 millions are enabled to thwart the other hundreds of millions.

We had an example of this in 1926 when Germany first applied for admission to the League. All the powers whose interests were really involved desired her admission. She was rejected because of a tawdry intrigue involving some South American republics. If Germany had been admitted then on a basis of equality with other powers, the whole subsequent history of the world might have been different. The desires and welfare of mankind were thwarted on account of intrigues on behalf of states constituting an insignificant minority of mankind.

The League system is doomed to futility from the beginning. Consider what happens. The fact that the sovereign State is the unit leads directly to the unanimity rule, since states are not prepared to be coerced by a majority of other states. So long as there is the rule of one state, one vote, there is even a certain amount of sense in this, since otherwise it would be theoretically possible for the majority of mankind represented by a minority of large states to be overruled by a minority of mankind represented by a majority of small states. The delegates, not being members of a government, but the representatives of governments, must act upon instructions from home. The first step, therefore, in any League discussion is to secure unanimity among a large number of delegates, each of whom must be constantly referring back to his home government for instructions. To get agreement under these circumstances requires, says Mr. Streit:

"A different technique, and a degree of tact, understanding, and persuasive power which Geneva experience shows is extremely rare, even among the world's ablest and most experienced politicians and statesmen."¹

As Mr. Streit goes on to point out:

"A league delegate must persuade not only his fellow delegates to the point where they will persuade the governments behind them to change their instructions, but he must often also persuade his home opinion at the same time, or keep it persuaded. He must also persuade the public opinion behind each of the delegates opposing him. And, since under the rules of national sovereignty every state must seek to win, the delegate of, say, the United States must publicly prove to the American people that they win by his policy while taking care to avoid thereby convincing, say, the French or British, that they will lose. For they will then disown the delegates who accepted this policy and the victory will be empty."¹

Now let us suppose that, by the exercise of super-human tact and ingenuity, an agreement at Geneva is reached. The agreement must be ratified by every one of the constituent governments. In some of the countries by the time the agreement comes up for ratification there may have been general elections leading to a change of government. This may lead to refusal to ratify. It will be recalled that this very thing happened over Mr. Macdonald's Geneva protocol in 1924. Agreement was reached at Geneva after prolonged negotiations. Before it was ratified, the Labour government was succeeded by a Conservative government, which refused to ratify it.

None of this is theory: it is the whole history of the League of Nations, of the League of Friendship among the original American states and of the international conference method in general. A League cannot act swiftly or decisively, precisely because it must secure unanimity, first at Geneva, and then from governments, in matters involving long and intricate negotiations.

¹ From Mr. Clarence K. Streit's *Union Now*.

"The worse the emergency the more swiftly there must be action, but the more a league then requires unanimity for action and the harder it is to get unanimity, if only because action then involves especial risk, and more risk or profit to some than to other states."¹

The first difficulty the League system encounters is then the difficulty of securing agreement.

The second difficulty is that of enforcing the agreement once it has been secured. The League has repeated the experience of the original Thirteen American States in which, as Hamilton wrote in *The Federalist*, we had the "new and unexampled phenomenon of a government destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the execution of its own laws." Hamilton went on:

"There was a time when we were told that breaches by the states of the regulations of the federal authorities were not to be expected; that a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the respective members. . . . This language, at the present day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from the same quarter will be thought when we shall have received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience. . . . Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary of this has been inferred by all accurate observers."

Hamilton saw then what the history of the League has abundantly confirmed, that mere agreement between States is not a method of establishing order, or peace, or justice.

What happens when a League attempts to enforce its law? Acting, as it does, upon States and not upon individuals, it can only use the methods by which States

¹ From *Union Now*.

have always enforced their will upon one another: the method of war, or the threat of war.

"People often talk as if the League of Nations could enforce the law in about the same way their own government does. The difference in unit, however, makes the procedure of the two radically and inevitably different. One can lock up a man pending trial, but not a nation—one cannot imprison a nation at all. When a policeman sees a man, knife in hand, creeping up behind another man he doesn't stop to consider whether perhaps no crime but only a practical joke is intended. He doesn't wait till the blow falls, the blood spurts, the victim appeals to him. He jumps in at once and arrests the man on suspicion. When the Italian government openly prepared for nine months to invade Ethiopia and the League of Nations did nothing to stop it except try to reconcile the two, many criticized the League for not acting like a policeman. But one cannot arrest a nation on suspicion."¹

One cannot arrest a nation on suspicion. One must wait until the crime has been committed, unless the nation freely agrees to accept conciliation in advance. Once the crime has been committed, blood is up on all sides. The mere threat of sanctions rallies behind the threatened government even sections of its own people hitherto opposed to its policy. Sanctions, therefore, will not be effective unless it is known that the Powers applying them are prepared to proceed to the limit of war, *and are certain to win.*

When a League comes to threatening war, it discovers that it has neither a general staff nor an effective executive authority. "There can be no sheriff in a community where every man is equally sheriff". "It is not the international character of such a force that makes it impossible—look at the French Foreign Legion—but the fact that a league army's real unit is not man but the nation."² The League "must at the last minute organise an army out of a mob of armies, of sovereigns so jealous of their

¹ From *Union Now*.

² From *Union Now*.

sovereignty that they are unable to organise a league force beforehand." It has already been noted why the League cannot provide in advance the military planning needed for confidence in its enforcement machinery.¹ Nor, for the same reason, can it make any advance plans to enforce its law by non-military means. To announce in advance to your victim (which you must do so long as he is potentially a sheriff and not the criminal) the methods by which you intend to coerce him is to enable him to take effective precautions by which to resist your methods. A League, therefore, is incapable of inspiring in its members confidence in its power to protect them. So long as this is the case the member states will not renounce their own armaments whether military or economic.

"There is no more possibility of monetary stability or free trade than there is of disarmament, security, or peace in any inter-state government requiring coercion of states. Through and through the league system is untrustworthy."²

(2) *A World Super-State.*

It may, I think, be assumed that a world super-state will not be created by consent. It involves so much surrender of autonomy, even in local matters, so great a departure from established traditions and ways of feeling, that if it comes at all it will be as a result of some major conflict, after which the victorious side imposes it on all the rest of the world. Or it may, of course, come in some such manner as is described in *The Shape of Things to Come*.

By a world super-state is meant a state in which all authority ultimately resides, and from which therefore all other organs of government derive their authority. Just as the organs of local government in England derive

¹ See Chapter II, pp. 39-40.

² From *Union Now*.

their authority from the Parliament at Westminster, which is at liberty at any time to increase, diminish or abolish it, so under a world super-state of a non-federal kind, all remaining organs of local government would derive their authority from that of the world government. The government of such a world state must be autocratic to a supreme degree. The area is so large that effective contact between the government and its constituent parts must be very limited indeed. Nor can the government be fully informed as to the effects of its decrees in every part of its domain. It is only too likely to acquire all the vices of those whose power is too great. It will have at its disposal the means of instantly quelling revolt anywhere, and it will be in danger of becoming not so much a government as a strait-jacket. It seems in the highest degree improbable that such a government would not develop absolutist tendencies and become jealous of any local vitality anywhere. It is improbable therefore that a world super-state could be made compatible with the liberal tradition. Because of this it is only too likely to become unstable. Excessively autocratic government produces men who are either slaves or rebels, and such a state of affairs makes for neither stability nor happiness. Tyranny produces smouldering resentment, and while a powerful government can make revolution improbable and unlikely to succeed, it cannot make it impossible. To modify Lincoln's celebrated saying, you can bully all the people some of the time and some of the people all the time, but you cannot bully all the people all the time.

The autocratic type of planner is apt to forget the psychological truth that for a society to be stable, it must not be too highly organised. He forgets the paradox that political stability is only possible if the conditions of dynamic growth and change are preserved. There must be freedom for experiment, freedom for new ways of thought and living; freedom to try out new

methods of community life. There must be freedom for men to be themselves and not merely fashioned in the image of some planner. It is because men will rightly doubt whether these conditions can be maintained under a world super-state that they will rightly distrust and resist it.

(3) *A Federal Government.*

A Federal government seems to give us the best of all worlds. Not only does it satisfy the theoretical criteria, but there are already in the world examples of successful federal governments with a continuous history of many generations. I find that a considerable number of English people have difficulty in understanding the idea of federal government. They appear to think it means something analogous to the present relationships between the County Councils and the Parliament at Westminster. This, of course, is an error, since the County Councils are subordinate to Westminster. The nature of federal government can best be explained by taking a concrete example. The biggest and oldest federal government in the world is that of the United States of America. Let us therefore consider in what respects the Government of the United States differs from that of a League of Nations on the one hand, and a super-state on the other.

The United States consists of forty-eight separate states, each retaining a measure of sovereignty. In each state, that is to say, there are functions in which the government of the United States may not interfere, the State's rights in these respects being guaranteed by the constitution and upheld by the Supreme Court. Each state controls those matters which, in the opinion of the framers of the constitution, were rightly considered to be local matters. There are doubtless marginal questions which some people would consider to be rightly local matters and others would consider to be rightly federal matters. Nevertheless, the main distinction is clear.

It is not essential, for example, that the laws regarding the building of local roads, marriage, the planning of housing, drains and the like, should come under the control of the central government. Equally, on the other hand, if there is to be a central government at all, it is clear that it should control currency, finance, foreign affairs, inter-state commerce, inter-state communications, and should establish a common citizenship. Under the federal system, therefore, what happens is not that a central government delegates part of its powers to local governments, but that the area of government is divided into two parts: one the prerogative of local government, the other the prerogative of the central government. In this way, local autonomy is preserved in all those matters which it is not essential should be centrally administered. Under a federal system, each citizen has a double citizenship; by virtue of birth he is simultaneously a citizen of his state and a citizen of the federal union. He therefore votes in two sets of elections. He votes for the government of his state and he votes also for the federal government. Each government therefore directly elected by, and is directly responsible to, the individual voter. The federal government does not govern the states' governments, nor does it govern through them. It is in this respect that it principally differs from a League. A League is an attempt to gain agreement among governments. A federal government governs individuals directly, just as any other government does. It has complete authority in the area of its jurisdiction and within the limits laid down by its constitution. There is no question of securing unanimity among the governments of separate states in order to secure their ratification of its edicts. Like any other government, it acts directly upon the individuals within the area of its jurisdiction. Unlike a League its power is effective; unlike a World State, its powers are limited.

A federal government gains its revenues by the direct taxation of its citizens, and it can enforce payment by imprisonment or distraint, just as any other government can. A League government depends for its finance upon the willingness of other governments to part with their money. Imprisonment and distraint are out of the question, and experience shows that this willingness is neither universal nor common.

Because a federal government operates directly upon individuals, its methods of law enforcement can be the same as those of any other government. Operating upon individuals, not upon states, its police action becomes genuine police action, whereas the so-called police action of a League can only take the form of war. In the matter of law enforcement, the federal system, as distinct from the League, takes account of what Hamilton called

"The important truth . . . that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory so in practice it is subversive of the order and the ends of civil polity, by substituting violence in place of law, or the destructive coercion of the sword in place of the mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy."¹

The method of law enforcement by means of sanctions and war is a method that must fall upon the guilty and innocent alike. Where the law applies to individuals and must, to be broken, be broken by some individual man, the responsibility for violating it becomes his and his alone. He does not automatically derive support and assistance from his co-nationals. Federal law does not drive the innocent to support the law-breaker as League law inevitably tends to do. Federal law is able to act against offenders more quickly than can League law.

¹ From *The Federalist*.

It can nip a crime in the bud. It can arrest on *prima facie* evidence of criminal intent.

No system of law enforcement works perfectly. Under any system, the guilty will sometimes escape and the innocent sometimes be punished. The Federal Union may even have to face civil war, as the American Union had to face it. Nevertheless, more than any other system does federalism act so as to ensure general respect for the law and general public support for the enforcement of the law.

In respect of public opinion, there is a very important distinction between Federal Union and League. Under a League system the divisions are national divisions and national minorities are not directly represented at all. An English socialist, that is to say, must at present be represented at Geneva by a British Tory. Under a federal system you tend to get party divisions based upon differences of outlook or interest, spreading across the whole federal area and thus diminishing the tendency for differences of opinion in the legislature to correspond to the differing interests of rival groups of states. This is very important, since it accentuates the tendency to regard the federal area as a whole as a definite political unit. A Pennsylvanian democrat making a speech in Kansas City is not regarded as a foreigner doing propaganda in some country to which he does not belong. National leaders can speak and write throughout the Union. A Pennsylvanian democrat feels no patriotic impulse to defend a Pennsylvanian republican against the onslaught of a New Jersey democrat. Under a League system, on the other hand, nationalism constantly vitiates the proper argument and discussion of policy, thus making it difficult to form a genuine public opinion for the League area as a whole.

What about disputes between States, or between the State and the Federal Government? On this point let Mr. Streit again speak :

"The knife edge is removed from disputes between states in a union because the citizens of each state are also citizens of the union, have the same control over both, and inevitably rate higher the citizenship that opens the wider field to them, lets them move freely from state to state, and gives them their standing in the world. When a man is equally sovereign in two governments, as he is in a union, disputes between these two agents of his tend to make him an arbiter instead of a partisan. A man can be at war with himself, of course, and this can lead him to commit suicide, but men organise government to save them from murder, not suicide, and to gain over each other some of the control they have over themselves.

History is even more reassuring than reason in these regards. For example there were many disputes—including eleven territorial ones—among the Thirteen American States during their league period. War threatened to result from some of these disputes, and this danger was one of the reasons that led them to shift from league to union. All these disputes lost explosiveness after union, none of them threatened war thereafter.

Supreme Court decisions settled them without the theoretical danger of a state defying the Court ever actually arising. Since this liquidation of the disputes inherited from the league and colonial periods, disputes between states have lost in importance. There are few Americans to-day who can recall off-hand what states and what issues were involved in any inter-state disputes before the Supreme Court, least of all the latest. That shows how popular interest in inter-state disputes dies out in a union. The way Americans still remember the Supreme Court's distant decision concerning one of the humblest among them, *Dred Scott*, shows how a union instead centres interest in cases that directly affect the freedom of the individual.

There is no example in the history of the American Union of a state refusing to accept the Court's decision in an inter-state dispute or seriously threatening to use force against another state. A state that contemplated such action in the American Union could not gamble on being left to fight it out with the other state as could Italy with Ethiopia and Japan with China in the League of Nations. Each state government knows that should it resort to force it would change its conflict from one with another state to one with the government of the United States, which is required by the Constitution to 'protect each of them against invasion'

132 THE CASE FOR FEDERAL UNION

and 'domestic violence', which has enough armed power at hand to overwhelm at once the strongest single state, and which can draw immediately, directly and without limit on the Union's whole potential power. The Union, moreover, can aim its coercive power at the Governor and other responsible members of such a state government as individual offenders. It can act against them personally on the ground that they and not the people are to blame and that as American citizens who are waging war against the Union they are committing treason.

The only memorable conflicts in American Union history in which states figured as parties were both, significantly, conflicts not with other states, as in the American league period, but with the Union government. There was South Carolina's nullification of the Tariff Act; President Jackson's blunt warning that he would uphold the Union law with force against such treason sufficed to maintain the law. Then there was the attempt of the eleven Southern States to secede which the Union overcame by force in the Civil War.

This last, however, was not, strictly speaking, a test of the Union's ability to enforce its laws, but a test of its ability to maintain itself. The fact that the American Union has suffered one civil war in 150 years cannot be held against the union system, for secession and civil war can occur and have more often occurred in other systems of government. The American Civil War must be cited, if at all, in favour of the union system. It shows what tremendous resistance that system can successfully overcome. What is more important, it shows too how swiftly, completely and solidly a union can make peace, even in the exceptional case where it must use its coercive power against a state instead of an individual."

Summary of the arguments of this chapter.

In this chapter it has been maintained that world order is inevitable, but that, since various forms of world order are possible, it is worth considering which we desire instead of merely waiting to see which we get. The League system is bound from the beginning to be ineffective. The world super-state system is unlikely to prove compatible with the liberal tradition, may well become harsh and unyielding, producing slaves and rebels rather than

free men, and in the last resort, therefore, destructive of happiness and liable to instability. A federal system is the logical application to the whole world of liberal democratic government, already discovered by mankind to be the only way of combining liberty with order. By assuming control over those matters that concern mankind as a whole, the federal government gains all the advantages of a world super-state. By retaining separate national governments, having authority in those matters of mainly local concern, we retain local diversity and maximise liberty. By making the individual a citizen with democratic rights both in his national state and in the federal area as a whole, we develop loyalties to the federal union which make it unlikely that serious conflict between a single state and the federal government will arise.

By defining, in terms of a constitution, the areas of government respectively under the control of national and federal government, we retain constitutional safeguards for the Rights of Man. By setting up a federal government, which acts directly upon individuals, and not upon nations, we make law enforcement possible without resort to anything resembling warfare. Because law enforcement is possible, because justice is secured in advance, because under this system State aggression becomes unthinkable, total disarmament, save for local police forces, becomes not an idle dream but the simple common-sense of the system we have set up. The union of free men for the preservation of their liberties and the fostering of their common purposes is the basis of democracy. Federal Union is the doctrine that enables us to apply throughout the world the only system of government which has hitherto proved either tolerable or durable.

CHAPTER VIII

UNION NOW

"What is the alternative to this bleak and barren policy of the inevitability of war? In my view it is that we should seek, by every means in our power, to avoid war by analysing its possible causes and by trying to remove them by discussing in a spirit of collaboration and goodwill. . . ."

—THE RT. HON. NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.

"Ten years of faith healing for the sickness of the world are enough. It is time that real work for world peace was begun."—H. G. WELLS.

CHAPTER VIII

UNION NOW

THIS chapter is based on the proposals contained in Mr. Clarence K. Streit's book, *Union Now*. A considerable part of the book is occupied with a discussion of the relative merits of the League system and the federal system. Mr. Streit shows convincingly that not only have League systems failed in practice, but that they are bound to fail since they have the defect, inherent from the beginning, of being Leagues of States, not governments of men.

The federal system, on the other hand, is a method which is shown by every theoretical criterion to be superior to the League method, and it is one which is already a proved success. There has never been a League that worked. Federations have worked in the United States of America, in Switzerland, in the Union of South Africa, in Australia and in Canada. Mr. Streit reminds us many times of how the Thirteen American republics, by 1786, had got themselves into most of the difficulties with which we are now faced. The League of Friendship, which they had formed among themselves, threatened to break into two camps: it could not coerce its members, and threats of withdrawal were common. It rarely had any money.

"The states issued worthless currency, misery was rife, and courts were broken up by armed mobs. When these troubles culminated early in 1787 with the attempt of Shay's rebels to capture the League arsenal in Massachusetts, so strong was state sovereignty and so feeble the League that Massachusetts would not allow League troops to enter its

138 THE CASE FOR FEDERAL UNION

territory even to guard the League's own arsenal. Washington had already written to Jay in 1786, 'I am uneasy and apprehensive, more so than during the war.'"

It was as a result of these troubles that a Federal convention was called with the object of revising the articles of Federation, yet—

"The idea of turning from league to union was so remote in 1787 that it was not even seriously proposed until the end of May when the Federal Convention opened. How remote it was may be inferred from the fact that the opening of the Convention had to wait ten days in order to have even the bare majority of the Thirteen States needed for a quorum. The Convention itself had been called by the Congress merely to reform the League—for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation.' It was not deflected away from patching and into building anew until the eve of its session—and then only thanks to George Washington's personal intervention. Even then, Union as we know it now was more than remote: it was unknown, it still had to be invented.

"Yet once the Convention decided to build anew it completed this revolutionary political invention within 100 working days. Within two years—two years of close votes and vehement debate in which Hamilton, Madison and others, now called 'men of vision', were derided as 'visionary young men', even by Richard Henry Lee, the revolutionist who had moved the Declaration of Independence in 1776—within two years the anarchy-ridden, freedom-loving American democracies agreed to try out this invention on themselves. Twenty months after they read its text the American people established the Constitution that still governs them—but now governs four times as many democracies and forty times as many free men and women."

Mr. Streit insists that the arguments now are the same as the arguments then, and that what could be done then, can be done now. The League of Nations was a recognition that some approach to world order was imperative. Because the League has failed, that does not mean that the approach was either premature or

unnecessary. It means that we adopted the wrong method.

"With the League and collective security as with the old high-wheeled bicycle we have started in the right direction but on the wrong wheel. For a generation inventors wasted ingenuity trying to make that absurd bicycle effective while carefully preserving the principle of harnessing the power directly to the front wheel axle. That seemed the easiest solution of the power problem, but it was the cause of the bicycle's absurdity, for it forced the front wheel to have a radius as long as a man's leg. When this principle was abandoned, the problem tackled afresh, and the power chained to the other wheel, the bicycle became at once effective. True, had the high wheel's absurdity led men to abandon the bicycle itself in despair and content themselves with the horse, they would never have solved the problem. It cannot be wiser to abandon the League of Nations or any other existing machinery for world government until a better mechanism has been found. Men cannot hope, however, to achieve reasonable and effective world government until they do abandon the assumptions which have led to the grotesque and unworkable, and start afresh their thinking on this problem too."¹

Mr. Streit insists that this is not a problem for our grandchildren. It is a problem for US NOW. But as soon as we come to the idea of UNION NOW we appear at first sight to encounter insuperable obstacles. First of all, there are the dictators. The governments of the totalitarian States are publicly pledged to oppose, and if possible to eradicate, all the ideas on which a democratic Federal Union would be based. Some help may come from Germans or Italians. None, it is plain, will come from Hitler or Mussolini.

Secondly, there are dozens of backward little States, scattered about the world, from whom little or no help can be expected and to whom the ideas of liberal democracy are still unfamiliar. Must we then wait until Hitler

¹ *Union Now*, Clarence K. Streit.

and Mussolini disappear from the stage and until the backward countries have reached the proper stage of civilisation? Mr. Streit's answer is that we need not wait.¹ The solution he proposes is that those liberal democracies that are now roughly in the same stage of political development should unite on a federal basis towards union of mankind as a whole.

"Common sense leads to this conclusion: if we the people of the American Union, the British Commonwealth, the French Republic, the Lowlands, Scandinavia and the Swiss Confederation cannot unite, the world cannot. If we will not do this little for man's freedom and vast future, we cannot hope that others will; catastrophe must come, and there is no one to blame but ourselves. But the burden is ours because the power is ours, too. If we *will* Union we can achieve Union, and the time we take to do it depends only on ourselves."²

We must start with the democracies for three reasons. The first, already mentioned, is that the rest are either too backward, or actively hostile. The second, which may be even more important, is that the world order we propose to create must have a democratic basis. There must be no compromise on this point. Countries that are unwilling to accept a democratic basis are best left out. Let them learn by experience—that it is cold outside. Let them come in when experience has taught them that democracies work and that the other systems do not. Once we compromise on the democratic basis, we have jettisoned that liberal tradition which must remain the core of any civilisation worth creating.

The third reason is that if discouragement is to be avoided, the union must achieve success from the begin-

¹ It is right to remind the reader that Mr. Streit is not the first to suggest that we need not wait for all the world. See several essays in H. G. Wells' *After Democracy*, and a discussion of possible amalgamation of the "Atlantic" communities in *The Open Conspiracy*. See also H. N. Brailsford's *Towards a New League*.

² From *Union Now*, Clarence K. Streit.

ning. It will not achieve success if it is rent by internal dissension based upon fundamentally opposed ideas as to how political life should be organised. If people are to co-operate with each other they must be sustained by common ideas and common purposes, and the Atlantic democracies could unite to-morrow if only they could be startled into realising the practicability of union.

"The essential thing, it is worth repeating, is to get government constituted soundly and without delay. We can then be sure that those left out at the start will not be left out long. . . . The best nucleus will be composed of those peoples who already have strong international bonds drawing them together and enough material power to provide them as soon as they unite with overwhelming world power in every important field."¹

With which countries, then, should we begin? Manifestly, there is room for argument here. Mr. H. G. Wells once proposed that a beginning might be made with only three or four of the great powers.² "Indeed," said Mr. Wells, "even two might begin; the two English-speaking systems, but before they had even begun, the mere realisation that they were presently beginning would inevitably bring in the two or three other powers needed for a complete peace ascendancy."

Mr. Streit's proposal is rather more ambitious, but he freely admits that there are marginal cases and that it would be a grave mistake to make too great a point of including or rejecting any particular nation. The important thing is that those who have the sense to unite should proceed to unite. Once they make a success of the thing, the others will clamour to come in. Mr. Streit thinks that the initial group of powers might number somewhere

¹ From *Union Now*.

² See "The A.B.C. of World Peace"—an article reprinted in *After Democracy*.

142 THE CASE FOR FEDERAL UNION

between twelve and twenty, and after due consideration of the marginal cases he plumps for the following fifteen:

United States
United Kingdom
France
Canada
Netherlands
Belgium
Australia
Sweden
Switzerland
Denmark
Finland
Ireland
Norway
Union of South Africa
New Zealand

Why these fifteen?

"Geographically, they have the enormous advantage of being all grouped (with three indecisive exceptions) around that cheap and excellent means of communication, a common body of water. The Roman Empire spread round the Mediterranean and then through Europe, not through Europe and then round the Mediterranean.

"But the Mediterranean was not nearly so small and convenient then as is the North Atlantic to-day. All the most important capitals of the North Atlantic democracies are within five days of each other by steam, one day by gasoline, less than a minute by electricity."¹

Secondly, the culture of these fifteen is inextricably interconnected. "These peoples already do most of their travelling and studying and playing in the area they together own; they are more at home in it than in the outside world." These fifteen do most of their foreign trade with each other and the chief market of each of them is formed by the rest. "On the whole seventy per cent of the trade of all our democracies is with each other, seventy-three per cent of their exports going to

¹ From *Union Now*.

and sixty-seven per cent of their imports coming from the democratic group—while only eleven per cent of their trade is with the Triangle of autocracy.”

The table on page 169 shows how much these fifteen democracies depend on each other and how little they depend on the autocracies. It also shows how much the autocracies depend upon them.

“Not least are the fifteen bound together by the peaceful, good-neighbourly relations they enjoy with each other and desire to enjoy with all the world. In all that half the earth which the fifteen govern what a cause dangerous dispute among them? Their relations in this respect are far more promising than were those among the Thirteen American States when they formed their Union. Not one of the fifteen now fears aggression for any cause from any of the others.

“No two of the fifteen have fought each other once since the Belgian-Dutch war of 1830. There is no parallel in all politics with this remarkable and unremarked achievement of democracy in maintaining peace so long among so many powerful, independent and often rival peoples, burdened as these were with hatreds and prejudices left behind by all the fighting among them before they achieved democracy.

“Most essential of the ties binding together the fifteen is their common concept of the state. The machinery of government differs among them in detail, but in all it is based on the individual as equal unit, it follows the same broad lines of free representative government of the people and by the people, and it aims to assure the same minimum guarantees of freedom to the individual, whether called the Bill of Rights, the Rights of Man or *les Droits de l'Homme*.

“All are devoted to freedom of speech, of the press, of association and of conscience, to the supremacy of civil power and of law made by common free consent of men equal before it. All share the same desire to protect the individual from the mass and assure him the utmost possible liberty within the limits that the liberty of other individuals allows.

“These guarantees of men to man are ‘the very life-blood of democracy’, as Senator Borah once said. But though he was addressing the Council on Foreign Relations he showed no awareness that at least fourteen other peoples than his

own would think that he meant them when he added: 'We shall find our highest service, not only to our own people, but to mankind and to the peace of the world, in transmitting these principles unimpaired to succeeding generations. That is our supreme duty.'"¹

Is further argument needed? In every respect, geographically, culturally, commercially, financially, politically and historically, these countries provide a cohesive nucleus.

What about the power of the fifteen? Can they support themselves against the hostility of the autocracies? Table II gives the populations and areas of the fifteen quoted by Mr. Streit from the League of Nations Statistical Year Book, 1937. Table III, taken from the same source for 1938, gives the measure of world economic power. These figures make it abundantly clear that the position of the fifteen is overwhelmingly strong, and that it is precisely in the things that are most essential that the fifteen are most powerful, and the autocracies weakest.

"These tables suggest that the fifteen have more than enough power to form a sound nucleus world government. They suggest, indeed, that the fifteen have so much power that the problem of ending the present chaos and organising the world is nothing more or less than a problem in organising these few democracies."²

They show that when we say that democracies are weak and feeble and the autocracies strong and powerful, we are talking nonsense. If the democracies are weak it is because of their own disunion. Let them but unite and they will discover that they are invincible. Let them but unite and the world is made safe for peace and freedom. They have but to apply over the area they hold in common the principles they already agree in applying to the areas they hold separately.

¹ From *Union Now*.

² *Union Now*.

Mr. Streit discusses the question whether it would be better to start with a smaller group, say a British-American-French combination, but he concludes that this would have serious disadvantages. Such a nucleus would have an offensive air of exclusiveness. It would tend to alarm some of the countries it excluded. It would look like a mere alliance and it would encourage hostile combinations. It would deprive the nucleus of the great advantage of overwhelming strength from the start. From being badly balanced internally, internal jealousies would be only too likely to occur. The principal advantage of a small group would be that it need have only one or two languages, but I agree with Mr. Streit that the value of a common language has been overrated, and the value of common political principle underrated.

"Surely it is easier to maintain effective democratic government among peoples of common political principle but different languages (consider the experiences of Switzerland, Canada, Union of South Africa), than among people of the same language but of opposing political principles (consider the American War for Independence, the American Civil War, the Spanish Civil War)."¹

If our federal government is to be genuinely based on the principle of freedom and equality for all men and not simply for men of one race and one language, it is important to include from the beginning all men of whatever race or language who are prepared to accept its basic principles and sufficiently developed politically to know how to put them into practice.

It is not, of course, essential that the nucleus should include every one of the small democracies. If a few of them hesitate to come in at the beginning, and some might hesitate for strategic reasons, it would be possible to start without them, just as the American Union was constituted without Rhode Island.

¹ *Union Now*.

The case of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics is peculiarly controversial, and because of this I have dealt with it in the chapter: "Some Objections Answered."

Nevertheless, whoever is included or excluded at the start it is essential that the constitution of the Union should make it unambiguously clear that it is intended to be the nucleus from which universal world government may peacefully grow. There must be a definite pledge that the nucleus aims to attain universality peacefully and that no nation will suffer as a result of coming in late. It must be clear from the beginning that democracies admitted late would enjoy absolute equality with the founders. Americans born in Mississippi or Montana are no less Americans and feel no less pride in being Americans than those born in Virginia or New York. Remember, too, that we are aiming at founding a government based not so much upon democratic states as upon the individuals who compose them. It follows that individuals anywhere ought to be welcomed in helping to found it.

"In the founding of the United States there was room for such Englishmen as Tom Paine, such Frenchmen as Lafayette, such Germans as von Steuben, such Poles as Kościusko. Their fellow nationals still take pride in their contribution to the United States. Men like Paine and Lafayette contributed more to the American Union than did some of its founder states."¹

The provision for unlimited growth would, of course, assist the growth of democracy in all those parts of the world where democracy is still feeble. It can hardly be doubted that nothing would do more to disrupt the autocratic states internally, and to encourage and hearten the democratic elements still working inside them, than a union of democracies, beckoning these countries to come in and join them, once they throw off the yoke of dictatorship.

¹ *Union Now.*

What would be the relationship between the Union and the countries outside? It would be a relationship of co-operation, on whatever basis should prove possible. To begin with, it may be desirable for the Union to be a constituent member of the League of Nations, as a means of utilising existing international machinery to facilitate relationships with the countries outside the Union. There is no reason for the Union to adopt a hostile policy towards countries outside. The Union is not a Holy Alliance. It is a means of achieving Union where Union is possible, in order to serve as a nucleus for the Union of all mankind. Hostility usually springs from fear, and the Union would have nothing to fear. Union "only needs to flourish for autocracy to fade."

Such then is Mr. Streit's main proposal, that the leading democracies of the world should unite now on a federal basis, forming a federal government in which the individual citizen and not the state is the unit. What will be the initial powers of such a government? His proposal is that the union should establish immediately:

- a union citizenship
- a union defence force
- a union customs-free economy
- a union money
- a union postal and communications system

It would be the business of the Union government to "guarantee against all enemies, foreign and domestic, not only those rights of man that are common to all the democracies, but every existing national or local right that is not clearly incompatible with effective union government in the five named fields. The Union would guarantee the right of each democracy in it to govern independently all its home affairs and practise democracy at home in its own tongue, according to its own customs and in its own way, whether by republic or kingdom,

presidential, cabinet or other form of government, capitalist, socialist or other economic system."

It is clear that the five named functions are the *minimum* functions.¹ Finance, customs, money, and communications are all of them questions that affect not merely the states individually but their relations with each other. Without a common union citizenship there is no union. It may at first sight seem that the citizens of the democracies lose something when these powers are transferred to the new federal government, but so far from losing, the citizen will gain power by union. The powers that are transferred to the federal government are subtracted from the existing state governments. All that the citizens are doing is to divide the existing powers of government between two governments instead of concentrating them in one. Furthermore, while the citizen loses none of his existing rights as a citizen in the country in which he now lives, he acquires the rights of citizenship throughout the whole area of the federal union. He gains peace, he gains security. He gains greater freedom to travel and to trade than he now possesses. He becomes a partner in a greater prosperity than he can now know. He escapes from the menace of catastrophe that now shadows all his life. Why should he hesitate?

Mr. Streit goes into much illustrative detail as to the possible workings of such a federal government in respect of such questions as money, communications, the methods of establishing a customs-free economy, and the various transitional problems that would arise. He also provides an illustrative constitution, based upon the constitution of the United States. The object of this draft constitution is to make the proposed union clearer by illustrating concretely on what kind of basis the democracies might unite. This is the only purpose of the draft constitution. It is not intended to be a hard

¹ Compare Chapter VI.

and fast plan. *The details of the union, when it comes about, will manifestly depend upon the circumstances out of which it arises, and the particular group of nations that initially compose it.* We cannot dictate these in advance. Nevertheless, it is useful to have a draft constitution, and I include it as an appendix to this chapter.

For a discussion of the transitional problems of union I refer the reader to Mr. Streit's book. It is, however, important to remember that any such discussion now of the detailed problems that will be encountered must be illustrative discussion intended to make the proposal concrete. Our job now is not to determine in advance the legislation that the union government will enact.¹ Our job is the securing of union. And the first part of that job is to create the desire for union.

The importance of Mr. Streit's book is not therefore in the details, as to which at this stage it would be a mistake to be obstinate or doctrinaire. Its importance lies in the fact that here are proposals sufficiently realistic and concrete to be made the basis of world-wide propaganda and discussion of what a Federal Union of the democracies might mean.

The foregoing section of this chapter was written early in August, when it was still possible to hope that there would be a breathing space which might be used to lay the foundations of a genuine world order. Pacts and alliances, policies based upon the idea of the balance of power, collective security and the like, all these, whatever their immediate usefulness, were mere expedients to tide over from one crisis to the next. They did little or nothing to establish the foundations of an international society from which war had been finally abolished. In the opinion of those who were advocating

¹ Cf. page 177, *Some Objections Answered*.

Federal Union, our task was not to meet crises, but to find out how to create a sane and ordered world.

The importance of *Union Now* was that it appeared to be the outline of such a plan as was needed, not merely to avert the war that was threatening, but to get rid of war for good and all. The idea caught on, and the organisation known as Federal Union held a very successful week-end conference in London, and began to grow in influence and numbers very rapidly. For thousands of bewildered, anxious and frustrated men and women, it provided a new and inspiring goal for their endeavour. *Union Now* became a best-seller among political books. Given a breathing space, this rapidly growing and entirely constructive movement might have carried all before it. The time seemed to be ripe: the devotion and enthusiasm of the handful of pioneers was tremendous.

"The beginnings of such things are never conspicuous. Great movements of the racial soul come at first like 'a thief in the night' and then suddenly are discovered to be powerful and world-wide."¹

Does the fact of war mean that we should abandon our propaganda? On the contrary it means that we should redouble it. The grounds for this view have already been set forth in Chapter I. But what about the proposals contained in *Union Now*? To what extent has the war rendered them obsolete?

Mr. Streit's book has three main theses. The first is that international government is necessary. The second is that the only form of international government which is both workable and compatible with liberty and democracy is Federal Union. The third is that this Federal Union should begin with a group of existing democracies instead of waiting until the whole world is ready.

¹ H. G. Wells, *The Outline of History*.

The argument for international government can surely only be strengthened by this war, which is the plainest demonstration (if after 1914-39 further demonstration were needed) of the tragic and futile idiocy of international anarchy. If we fail to learn the lesson this time, then we are indeed unteachable, and the sooner the human experiment comes to an end the better.

The arguments for a federal, as opposed to a league or world super-state, solution are unaffected by the war, save that the war provides ample illustrations of the horror and danger of too much concentrated power. Indeed if the war continues very long there will be a danger that we shall all come to detest authority so excessively as to be opposed to any government whatsoever.

The immediate cause of the war however (as distinct from the underlying conditions that made it sooner or later inevitable unless they were altered) affords a most excellent example of the sort of problem that is fundamentally insoluble in terms of State sovereignty, but which simply ceases to exist in an effective Federal Union. I refer to the problem of Danzig and the Polish Corridor.

For what was the problem? Here were a town and an area, mainly German, and according to the ordinary principles of nationality properly part of Germany. The Corridor was created, and Danzig made into a Free City, not because the inhabitants desired this solution, but because Poland needed an outlet to the sea, and was not prepared to have the mouth of the Vistula controlled by a potentially hostile Power. In terms of State sovereignty this problem was insoluble. It was insoluble because any solution would be in some degree unsatisfactory to one of the parties, or might become so owing to a shift in the balance of power or a change in the diplomatic situation. The aggrieved party would then attempt to alter the status quo, either by force, or by the threat of force, as soon as it felt strong enough to do so. That Germany should be unwilling to leave in the hands of Poland

territory which it regarded as ethnographically German was the normal attitude of a powerful sovereign State. That Poland should be unwilling to have its access to the sea at the mercy of a powerful neighbour was also the normal attitude of a sovereign State. Conflict sooner or later was inevitable.

Contrast this with what happens when local government is not sovereign. Do Northumberland and Durham squabble about who shall control the mouth of the Tyne? Does Wiltshire want a corridor through Hampshire to Southampton in order to have free access to the sea? Do we hear of the sad fate of such inland States as Illinois, Kentucky, and Kansas, depending as they must for access to the sea upon routes passing through other States? How is it possible that Connecticut and New Jersey tolerate the fact that New York dominates the mouth of the Hudson? Surely the States of Missouri, Tennessee, and Mississippi find it altogether intolerable that Louisiana should control the delta of their great river? All these are situations that would give rise to 'tension' (diplomatic language for intention to provoke a quarrel) *if the areas concerned were sovereign States*. When they are not sovereign States, and do not therefore menace each other, either immediately or potentially, *the problem simply does not arise*.

But, it will be said, the war was not caused by the problem of Danzig, but by the inordinate ambitions of Hitler, for the realisation of which Danzig, like the Sudetenland, was a mere excuse. We are not fighting, the Prime Minister has told us, about "the fate of a far-away city in a foreign land", but, to quote Mr. Eden's broadcast, "to show that aggression does not pay".

All this is very largely true, but it only goes to strengthen the argument for getting rid of sovereignty and substituting federation. If there had been a European or world federation *there would have been no Danzig problem for Hitler to exploit*. As explained above, such problems

only arise out of the smouldering contentiousness in which sovereign States necessarily live. Their sovereignty is an expression of their militant character. When sovereignty disappears, these problems disappear along with it. And even though it is undoubtedly true that Hitler's professions are insincere, his methods abominable, and his treachery and bad faith intolerable, it is not true that he created the Danzig problem, or that there would have been no problem without him. Ever since the last war it has been realised that Danzig and the Corridor contained the seeds of future trouble. Potential conflict was there, Hitler or no Hitler, and but for our dislike of Hitler, and our very proper suspicions as to his real motives and intentions, the German case would have had a great deal of our sympathy. In the case of the Sudetenland many Englishmen felt themselves bound to admit the justice of much of what Hitler said. That they have changed their stand completely over the problem of Danzig is due to the fact that they disbelieve utterly in the sincerity of Hitler's professions, and have come to regard him as a mere international bandit who, like the devil, will quote scripture for his purpose, and who must, therefore, be treated, not as a reasonable man putting a case to be judged on its merits, but as a menace to the peace and civilisation of the world.

The war then, it is said, is not due to the problem of Danzig, it is due to the fact that we are threatened by an intolerable and unscrupulous gangster who must be put down just as any other gangster is put down. If this be accepted the case for Federal Union becomes complete. For what would have happened to him in a sanely organised world? At an early stage of his career, he would have been arrested by the Federal police for conspiring to produce a breach of the peace. *There would have been no need for a war.*

For contrast what has happened with what might have happened. For years every decent instinct of humanity

has been trampled upon by the Nazi regime. The treatment of Jews, and of political opponents, the arbitrary arrests and shootings, the cruelty and bestiality of the concentration camps, the lies, the cynical treachery, and the licensed and chartered gangsterism, all these things, for a decade now, have filled every decent man and woman with impotent rage and horror. And we could do nothing about it without violating our own repeated professions that the internal affairs of other States are not our affair. In an interdependent world that doctrine no longer makes sense. Morally it never made sense. But our hands were tied by our own belief in the inviolability of the separate sovereign State.

Suppose that in some county of England there was an atavistic outbreak of witch burning, and that witch burners had captured the County Council. Would we all sit by on the ground that what happened in other counties was none of our concern? Would the government at Westminster be paralysed by a belief in the divine right of counties to do what they like? It would not. The witch burners would go to gaol. And England would not need to declare war on the county, to blockade it, to bomb and burn it, and punish thousands of innocent along with the guilty.

Suppose a Hitler were to arise in Pennsylvania, raise an armed movement with a view to capturing the government of the State, and later imposing his will on its neighbours. Suppose that in the course of doing this he was to indulge in all the outrage and terrorism that the Nazis employed. Would the Federal Government sit by and do nothing, on the ground that what happens in Pennsylvania is not its concern? It would not; and if it did, it would be neglecting its plain duty under the constitution of the United States, which charges it with the defence of the rights and liberties of all American citizens, and imposes upon it the duty to suppress insurrection and to uphold democracy. It would not wait until Hitler had

control of the whole machinery of the State, and had built up a powerful army and air force, until, that is to say, he could only be brought to heel by declaring war on the State of Pennsylvania. Long before that stage was reached, *it would arrest him for conspiring to produce a breach of the peace.*

The monstrous tragedy of our present situation is that there existed no international authority that could have arrested Hitler at a stage when it would have meant, not a European war, but merely police action. What he needed was 'protective custody' from the beginning.

Nothing then that has happened since the beginning of September in any way diminishes the case for Federal Union. On the contrary the war makes tragically clear that mankind is faced with the inescapable choice: unite or perish.

What of the suggestion that union should begin with the fifteen named democracies? This is clearly open to some revision. In the first place you cannot, in the middle of a war, federate belligerents with neutrals. Secondly, the belligerents are likely to be compelled to a large measure of *de facto* federation. Thirdly, any tolerable war settlement must be freely negotiated with representatives of the German people, and we must make it unmistakably clear that we are prepared, at any time, for such negotiation. Before the war it would have been worth while to start Federal Union without Germany for the simple reason that Hitler was an insuperable obstacle to starting *with* Germany. The situation is now changed completely, and it must be our object to detach the German people from Hitler by offering to establish a federal structure that would include the German people *on terms of absolute equality*, and to that end we should at once offer to hand over to the federal government to be established all our non-self-governing dependencies, including of course the old German colonies, and the military control of such places as Gibraltar and the Suez

canal. We should, in short, make it clear that we do not wish to continue in possession of those privileged positions which we secured by force, or in the last resort only retain by force. We hear a lot nowadays of how we are fighting to establish a peace based on liberty and justice. Let us not leave these sentiments as pious generalities impressive to ourselves but only too apt to inspire cynicism in others. Let us translate them into realities which show that this time we mean business.

I am not suggesting that we should offer to 'give up' the empire, or let it fall to pieces. The world is divided into too many pieces already. What is needed is not further fragmentation but further integration. What we must offer to do is to merge the empire into a larger federal unit, as a first step towards the federation of the whole world.

The first step might well be the convening of a convention analogous to the Philadelphia convention of 1787, the initial invitations to be sent out jointly by the United States, Great Britain and France.

But that will not come about unless, in each of these countries, there is a large and articulate public opinion, sick to death of the old world with all its waste and futility, its petty jealousies and mean spites, its tawdry parochial loyalties and blood-soaked flags, and determined that out of the filthy horror and carnage of this war there shall emerge a new international order based upon the rights of men, and not the rights of States, a new world from which tanks and bombers and all the horrible prostitution of science to destruction will disappear, and science and the creative spirit be at last released for the cultivation of Man's vast estate.

CHAPTER VIII
APPENDICES

CHAPTER VIII

APPENDIX I

The following illustrative constitution is quoted, by permission of the publishers, from Mr. Streit's *Union Now*.

I include it, not because I agree with all its details, but because it is useful to have it as a basis of discussion. It is an ingenious adaptation of the constitution of the United States of America, but I should suppose that something altogether more novel will be needed for the United States of the World. Its principal immediate utility is to make concretely clear to people who have never seen a federal constitution that *such an instrument can in fact be devised*, and is not a mere vague and unrealisable aspiration.

ILLUSTRATIVE CONSTITUTION

"The draft constitution that follows is meant to make the proposed Union clearer by illustrating how the democracies might unite. . . . This draft is not intended to be a hard and fast plan. Practically all of its provisions, however, are time-tested.

The draft is drawn entirely from the Constitution of the American Union, except for (a) a few provisions that, although not drawn from it, are based on American practice (notably Art. II, sections 1, 2, 4, 5), and (b) a few innovations. These latter are given in italics so that they may be seen at once. Most of the draft taken from the American Constitution has been taken textually, though its provisions have sometimes been re-arranged with a view to greater clarity and condensation, and once or twice they have been made more explicit and somewhat expanded. The Preamble is the only serious example of this last. In the American Constitution the Preamble reads:

We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote

160 THE CASE FOR FEDERAL UNION

the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

No important element in the American Constitution has been omitted. The draft follows:

ILLUSTRATIVE CONSTITUTION

We the people of the Union of the Free, in order to secure freedom equally to every man and woman now and to come, to lessen ignorance, poverty and disease, to insure our defence, to promote justice and the general welfare, to provide government of ourselves, by ourselves, and for ourselves on the principle of the equality of men, and to bring peace on earth and union to mankind, do establish this as our Constitution.

PART I

THE RIGHTS OF MAN

Article I

In the individual freedom which this Constitution is made to secure we include:

1. Freedom of speech and of the press and of conscience.
2. Freedom to organize ourselves for any purpose except to change by violence this Constitution and the laws made under it; freedom to assemble peaceably and to ask redress of grievances and to make proposals.
3. Freedom of our persons, dwellings, communications, papers and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures, and from warrants, unless issued upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
4. Freedom from *ex post facto* law and from bills of attainder.
5. Freedom from suspension of the writ of habeas corpus except when public safety may temporarily require it in case of rebellion or invasion.
6. Freedom from being held to answer for a capital or infamous crime except on indictment of a grand jury—save in the armed forces in time of war or public danger—

and from being twice put in jeopardy of life or limb or liberty for the same offence, and from being deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and from having property taken for public use without just compensation.

7. The right when accused of any crime to have a speedy, public trial by an impartial jury of the country and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, as previously ascertained by law, and to be informed in good time of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against one, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in one's favour, to be under no compulsion to be a witness against oneself, and to have the assistance of counsel for one's defence.

8. Freedom from excessive bail or excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishments.

9. Freedom from slavery, and from involuntary servitude and forced labour except in legal punishment for crime.

10. The right to equality before the law and to the equal protection of the laws.

11. The preceding enumeration is not exhaustive nor shall it be construed to deny or disparage other rights which we retain.

PART II

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION

Article II: The People of the Union

1. All persons born or naturalized in the self-governing states of the Union are citizens of the Union, and of the state wherein they reside. All citizens above the age of 21, except those in institutions for the feeble-minded or mentally deranged or in prison, are entitled to vote in all Union elections, and to hold any Union office for which their age qualifies them.

2. All other persons in the territory of the Union shall enjoy all rights of citizens except the right to vote in Union elections. The Union shall seek to extend this right to them at the earliest time practicable by helping prepare their country to enter the Union as a self-governing state.

3. *The self-governing states of the Union at its foundation are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,*

162 THE CASE FOR FEDERAL UNION

Switzerland, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

4. The non-self-governing territory of these states and of all states admitted later to the Union is transferred to the Union to govern while preparing it for self-government and admission to the Union.

5. *Before casting his or her first vote each citizen of the Union shall take this oath in conditions to be prescribed by law :*

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the Union or the Free against all enemies, foreign and domestic."¹

6. Treason can be committed only by citizens against the Union and can consist only in levying war against it or in adhering to its enemies, aiding and comforting them. No one shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or on confession in open court.

Article III: Rights of the Union and of the States

1. The Union shall have the right to make and execute all laws necessary and proper for the securing of the rights of man and of the Union and of the states as set forth in this Constitution, and to lay and collect income and other taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, provided these be uniform throughout the Union, and to incur and pay debt, provided that no money shall be drawn from the treasury except by lawful appropriation and that an account of all receipts and expenditure be published regularly.

2. The Union shall have the sole right to

(a) grant citizenship in the Union and admit new states into the Union;

(b) deal with foreign governments, provide for the Union's defence, raise, maintain and control standing land, sea and air forces, make war and peace, regulate captures, define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, call forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions, organize, arm, discipline, and govern such part of the militia as the Union may employ, and punish treason;

¹ The American Union requires this oath only of naturalized citizens, or of citizens entering the Union Service or applying for a passport.

(c) regulate commerce among the member states and in the Union territory and with foreign states;

(d) coin and issue money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign money, provide for the punishment of counterfeiting, fix the standard of weights and measures;

(e) own and operate the postal service and own, operate or control all other inter-state communication services;

(f) grant authors and inventors exclusive right to their work for limited periods;

(g) provide uniform bankruptcy law throughout the Union;

(h) govern any district which the Union may acquire for its seat of government or for forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful Union plant.

3. The Union shall have no right to establish a Union religion, grant hereditary or noble titles, levy any tax or duty on inter-state commerce, subject vessels bound to or from one state to enter, clear, or pay duties in another, grant preference by any regulations of commerce or revenue to one state over another.

4. The rights not expressly given to the Union by the Constitution nor forbidden by it to the states or the people are reserved by it to the states respectively, or to the people.

5. The Union shall guarantee to every state in it a democratic form of government and shall protect each of them and all the territory of the Union against invasion; and on application to the state legislature or executive the Union shall protect each state against domestic violence.

6. Each state has the right to maintain a militia and a police force, but may engage in war only if actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will admit of no delay.

7. Each state has the right to guarantee to the people in it greater rights than those enumerated in this Constitution.

8. No state has the right to

(a) Abridge the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens of the Union;

(b) exercise, except temporarily by consent of the Union, any of the rights given by this Constitution to the Union alone;

(c) raise any barriers to inter-state commerce or communications without the consent of the Union;

(d) adopt any law impairing the obligation of contracts;

(e) enter without the consent of the Union into any pact or agreement with another state or foreign power.

164 THE CASE FOR FEDERAL UNION

9. Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state in the Union.

10. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.

11. A person charged in any state with crime who shall flee and be found in another state shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled be delivered up to it.

Article IV: The Legislative Power

1. The legislative power of the Union is vested in the Congress, which shall consist of a House of Deputies and a Senate. Each shall choose its own officers, judge the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members, determine its rules of procedure, have the power to punish its members for disorderly behaviour, to compel their attendance and to expel them by two-thirds majority; keep and publish a record of its proceedings, meet and vote in public except when two-thirds shall ask for a private meeting on a particular question, vote by roll-call when one-fifth of the members ask this, form with a majority a quorum to do business though fewer may adjourn from day to day, act by majority except where otherwise stipulated in this Constitution.

2. The Congress shall meet at least once a year at a regular date it shall fix. During a session neither branch shall adjourn more than three days or to any other place without the other's consent.

3. Members of Congress shall not be questioned outside their branch of it for anything they said in it, nor shall they be arrested on any charge except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, during attendance at a session of Congress or while going to and from it.

4. No member of Congress shall hold other public office in the Union or in a state during his term, *except in the Cabinet*.

5. The Deputies shall be at least 25 years old, and shall be elected directly by the citizens every *third* year.

The number of Deputies from each state shall be determined according to population, a census being taken at least every ten years, and shall not exceed one for every 1,000,000 inhabitants or major fraction thereof, though each state shall have at least one.

6. Senators shall be at least 30 years old, shall have resided at least 10 years in the State by which elected, and shall be elected at large from each state directly by the citizens every *eight* years, except that in the first election half the Senators of each state shall be elected for only four years. There shall be two Senators from each state of *less than 25,000,000 population, and two more for each additional 25,000,000 population or major fraction thereof.*

7. To begin with, the apportionment of Deputies and Senators shall be:

Australia	.	.	7	2	Norway	.	.	.	3	2
Belgium	.	.	8	2	Sweden	.	.	.	6	2
Canada	.	.	11	2	Switzerland	.	.	.	4	2
Denmark	.	.	4	2	Union of South Africa	.	.	.	2	2
Finland	.	.	4	2	United Kingdom	.	.	.	47	4
France	.	.	42	4	United States	.	.	.	126	10
Ireland	.	.	3	2						
Netherlands	.	.	8	2						
New Zealand	.	.	2	2	Total	.	.	.	277	42

8. To become law a bill must pass the House and the Senate and be approved and signed by *a majority of the Board.*¹

If a majority of the Board shall return the bill with its reasons for not signing it, the bill shall become law only if passed again by House and Senate by two-thirds roll-call majority and if a member of the Board shall ask to be heard by House or Senate during its debate thereon he shall be heard. A bill not returned by the Board within fifteen days (holidays and Sundays excepted) after presentation to it shall be law, as if signed, unless adjournment of Congress shall have prevented its return. This shall also apply to every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the House or Senate may be necessary, except on a question of adjournment, and to every expression of the Union's will, unless otherwise provided herein.

9. The Congress shall have the power to declare war, make peace, and exercise all the other rights of the Union unless otherwise provided herein.

10. The Congress shall have the right to admit new states into this Union; but no new state shall be formed or erected

¹ The executive, see Art. V. The United States Constitution gives to the President the powers this paragraph gives to the Board.

within the jurisdiction of any other state, or any state be formed by the junction of two or more states or parts of states without the consent of the state or states concerned.

Article V: The Executive Power

1. The executive power of the Union is vested in the Board. It shall be composed of five citizens at least 35 years old. Three shall be elected directly by the citizens of the Union and one by the House and one by the Senate. One shall be elected each year for a five-year term, except that in the first election the citizens shall elect three, and the House shall then elect one for two years and the Senate shall then elect one for four years, and the Board shall then by lot assign terms of one, three, and five years respectively to the three members elected by the citizens.

2. A majority of the Board shall form a quorum, and it shall act by majority thereof unless otherwise provided herein.

3. The Board shall establish a system of rotation so that each Member may be President of it one year.

4. The Board¹ shall be commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the Union, shall commission all officers of the Union and appoint ambassadors, ministers and consuls, may grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the Union, shall have the power to make treaties by and with the advice and consent of the Premier and Congress², and to appoint with the advice and consent of the Senate the justices of the Supreme Court and of all lower Union Courts, and to make any other appointments required of it by law.

The Board¹ shall from time to time report to the people and Congress on the state of the Union, its progress towards its objectives and the effects and need of change, and shall recommend to their consideration such policies and measures as it shall judge necessary and expedient; it may require the opinion of anyone in the service of the Union on any subject relating to the duties of his office.

The Board¹ may convene extraordinarily Congress, adjourn it when its two houses cannot agree on adjournment, or dissolve it or either branch of it for the purpose of having it elected anew as shall be prescribed by law.

The Board¹ shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers.

¹ President, in the United States Constitution.

² Senate, in the United States Constitution.

5. *The Board shall delegate all executive power not expressly retained by it herein to a Premier, who shall exercise it with the help of a Cabinet of his choice until he loses the confidence of House or Senate, whereupon the Board shall delegate this power to another Premier.*

Article VI: The Judicial Power

1. The judicial power of the Union is vested in a High Court, and in such lower courts as the Union may from time to time establish by law. All Union judges shall be appointed for life. The number of High Court judges shall be fixed by law, but shall not be less than *eleven*.

2. The judicial power extends to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the Union, and treaties made by it; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between two or more states; between a state and citizens of other states; between citizens of different states, and between a state, or citizens thereof, and foreign states, or persons.

3. The High Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a state or a foreign state shall be party; in all the other cases before-mentioned it shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, under such regulations as shall be made by law.

Article VII: The Amending Power

1. The power to amend this Constitution is vested in *the citizens of the Union acting by a majority of those voting on proposals made by two-thirds majority of the House and of the Senate with the approval of three-fifths of the Board, or by two-thirds majority of either House or Senate with the unanimous approval of the Board or by a special constituent assembly established by law, or by petition signed by at least one-fourth the voters in one-half the states. No state, however, shall be deprived without its consent of its right to have its own language, and its own form of democratic government.*

Article VIII: General

1. This Constitution, and the laws of the Union which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties which

shall be made under the authority of the Union, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.

2. All persons in the service of the Union, and the legislative members and executive and judicial officers of each state, shall at the beginning of each term renew their oath to support this Constitution.

3. All Union elective offices, unless otherwise stipulated herein, shall be filled on the same day throughout the Union, to be fixed by law; the exact date when their terms shall begin and end shall also be fixed by law, as well as the manner of filling vacancies.

4. All persons in the service of the Union shall be paid from the Union treasury as shall be fixed by law, but the compensation of no judge shall be decreased during his term nor shall that of any elected officer of the Union be increased during the term for which he was elected.

5. Anyone in the service of the Union, on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes, shall be removed from office and may be disqualified from holding office again, and if convicted remains liable to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law.

The House shall have the sole power of impeachment and the Senate the sole power to try an impeachment, and it shall convict only by two-thirds majority of the Senators present sitting under oath or affirmation. The Chief Justice shall preside when a President or *Member of the Board* is tried.

6. No religious test shall be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the Union, nor shall there be any official Union religion.

Article IX: Ratification

1. The ratification of this Constitution by *ten states, or by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States*, shall suffice to establish it among them.

APPENDIX II

The following tables are quoted, by permission of the publishers, from *Union Now*.

They illustrate the argument on pages 143-144.

TABLE I

Country	Percentage of Trade with 15 Democracies 1936		Percentage of Trade with the Triangle 1936	
	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>
<i>Democracy</i>				
New Zealand . . .	96	92	4	5
Ireland	96	83	3	5
Canada	92	86	3	3
Union of South Africa	91	82	5	10
Finland	82	64	12	21
United Kingdom . .	75	71	6	6
Australia	74	80	16	10
France	73	66	6	9
Denmark	73	62	21	26
Norway	69	68	17	18
Sweden	69	59	19	26
Belgium	68	64	13	12
Holland	68	51	17	25
United States . . .	58	55	15	12
Switzerland	50	44	31	34
<hr/>				
Average	76	68	13	15
Weighted Average	73	67	11	11
<i>Autocracy</i>				
Japan	57	67	2	5
Germany	56	51	9	7
Italy (1934) ¹ . . .	47	51	19	23
<hr/>				
Average	53	56	10	12

General Note: This table is drawn from the League of Nations Yearbook, *International Trade Statistics*, 1936. It tends to err on the conservative side because the source does not give the trade with all the colonial possessions, and the omissions are much greater for the democracies.

¹ 1934 figures given because the sanctions of the League of Nations made Italy's trade in 1935 and 1936 abnormal.

TABLE II
POPULATION AND AREA (END OF 1936)

Country and Group	Population without Depend-encies (thousands)	Population with Depend-encies (thousands)	Area (sq.km) with Depend-encies (thousands)
<i>Democracies</i>			
United States . . .	128,840	144,505	9,694
United Kingdom . . .	47,187	505,528	14,299
France	41,910	112,358	11,558
Canada	11,080	11,080	9,543
Netherlands	8,557	75,135	2,085
Belgium	8,331	21,898	2,471
Australia	6,807	7,758	7,936
Sweden	6,267	6,267	448
Switzerland	4,174	4,174	41
Denmark	3,736	3,779	347
Finland	3,603	3,603	388
Ireland	2,954	2,954	70
Norway	2,894	2,895	389
Union of South Africa	1,944 ¹	10,060	2,058
New Zealand	1,585	1,659	272
Totals	279,869	913,653	61,599
<i>Autocracies</i>			
Japan	70,500	136,678 ²	1,984 ³
Germany ³	75,347	75,347	555
Italy	42,677	51,497 ⁴	3,329 ⁴
Totals	188,524	263,522	5,868
Soviet Russia	175,500	175,500	21,176
Latin America	127,540	127,540	20,479

Source: League of Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, 1937.

¹ White Population.

² Including Manchukuo.

³ Including Austria and the Sudetens.

⁴ Including Ethiopia.

TABLE III
THIRTY MEASURES OF WORLD POWER

Measure	15 Demo- cracies	3 Auto- cracies	Soviet Russia	Remain- ing Countries
<i>Per cent of World Total in 1937</i>				
Nickel Production ¹	95.8	0.0	3.0	1.2
Rubber Production	95.2	0.0	0.0	4.8
Motor-car Production	90.2	6.3	3.1	0.4
Ground Nuts Produc- tion ¹	90.0	5.0	0.0	5.0
Gold Reserves (known)	89.6	2.9	1.6	5.9
Sulphur Production	82.2	15.5	0.0	2.3
Wood Pulp Production ¹	76.2	17.0	3.2	3.6
Iron Ore Production (m.c.) ¹	72.7	6.9	12.7	7.7
Tin Production (m.c.)	72.2	1.1	0.0	26.7
Gold Production	72.2	3.9	16.8	7.1
Butter Production ¹	71.2	16.2	5.6	7.0
Merchant Ship Tonnage	70.1	17.5	1.9	10.5
Air Traffic (miles flown) ¹	66.7	10.8	14.4	8.1
Petroleum Production	66.0	0.3	10.0	23.7
Copper Production (m.c.) ¹	65.0	6.7	4.8	23.5
Foreign Trade (value)	65.0	18.0	1.1	15.9
Coal Production	65.0	18.8	9.4	6.8
Raw Cotton Production	64.7	0.6	10.0	24.7
Natural Phosphates Production ¹	64.2	1.5	29.3	5.0
Electricity Production ¹	63.1	19.0	7.9	10.0
Wool Production ¹	63.0	1.8	5.2	30.0
Lead Production (m.c.) ¹	61.6	7.6	3.3	27.5
Steel Production	60.6	21.4	13.1	4.9
Aluminium Production (Smelter)	56.3	34.1	9.1	0.5
Silk, artificial, Produc- tion	47.7	48.4	1.3	2.6

m.c.—Mineral content of ore.

¹ 1936, figures for 1937 too incomplete.

172 THE CASE FOR FEDERAL UNION

TABLE III—*contd.*

Measure	15 Demo- cracies	3 Auto- cracies	Soviet Russia	Remain- ing Countries
<i>Per cent of World Total in 1937</i>				
Wheat Production .	42.6	11.6	23.3	22.5
Potash Production ¹ .	25.2	63.6	6.0	5.2
Silk, raw, Production ¹ .	0.4	86.6	3.1	9.9
Area .	46.3	4.4	16.0	33.3
Population .	43.1	12.3	8.3	36.3

This table is computed from data in League of Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, 1938.


¹ 1936, figures for 1937 too incomplete.

CHAPTER IX

SOME QUESTIONS, DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS ANSWERED

"It is too probable that no plan we propose will be adopted. Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained. If, to please the people, we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterward defend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair; the event is in the hand of God."

—GEORGE WASHINGTON.



CHAPTER IX

SOME QUESTIONS, DIFFICULTIES AND OBJECTIONS ANSWERED

That Federal Union is not practical

WHEN we say that a proposal is not practical we may mean one of two things: either that it could not be made to work even if attempted, or that people are not likely to be persuaded to attempt it. It is clear that where Federal Union has actually been attempted, as in the United States of America, in Switzerland, in Canada, in Australia and in the Union of South Africa, it has actually worked. We can answer with some confidence that in the sense of being able to work, Federal Union is an entirely practical doctrine. Is it, however, too remote, fantastic and chimerical to be seriously entertained as a solution of the difficulties which at present confront the world? Is it out of the question that men should be brought to entertain it seriously? To this question I suggest two answers: First, what other solution is there? All other methods are mere expedients to tide over from one crisis to the next. What the world suffers from is too much national government and too little international government. It suffers from sovereignty and excessive patriotism; from too many currencies; from too many independently controlled armed forces; from tariffs and trade barriers which make no sort of sense in terms of *total human welfare*; from the subordination of the individual human being, his happiness, freedom and dignity, to the lust for power, and to the fears, of national sovereign states. What, but Union,

can get rid of these things? And what political end can compare in importance, *at this moment*, with getting rid of these things?

Secondly, there is history. Thomas Paine, himself one of the principal architects of the American Union, wrote in 1787, just *two years* before Union was achieved, these words: "Made up as it is of people from different nations, accustomed to different forms and habits of government, speaking different languages, and more different in their modes of worship, it would appear that the union of such a people was impracticable." He was speaking, not of Europe or the world to-day, but of the American republics then. It is exactly how people speak of the problem which confronts us to-day. Listen to another contemporary: "The mutual antipathies and clashing interests of the Americans, their differences of governments, habitudes and manners, indicate that they will have no centre of union and no common interest."

"In 1786," I quote Mr. Streit, "trade disputes threatened war between New York, Connecticut and New Jersey. Territorial disputes led to bloodshed and threat of war between New York, New Hampshire and Vermont, and between Connecticut and Pennsylvania . . . they lived in a time when New York was protecting its fuel interests by a tariff on Connecticut wood, and its farmers by duties on New Jersey butter." The problems of the thirteen infant democracies were, in short, *our* problems, and they solved them in the only way in which they *can* be solved, namely by Union.

There is no single difficulty now advanced as a psychological or political or economic impediment to union that was not thought to be an impediment in 1787. People ask how on earth is a federal government to attack its problems. What will be the nature of the common currency it will establish? How, and by what process, and in what stages will it abolish tariffs? What method will it adopt in detail for the government of

colonial peoples? How will it set up a common citizenship? What will be the details of its constitution? What is to be done about the unemployment resulting from the demobilisation of the national armed forces, and the discontinuance of the manufacture of armaments? What about the hordes of customs officials, Foreign Office officials and diplomats who will be thrown upon the labour market? There seem to be people who are prevented from embracing the idea of Federal Union because they cannot be told in advance how all these questions will be answered. "The makers of the first Union were not delayed by such considerations. They abolished each State's right to levy tariffs, issue money, make treaties, and keep an army, and they gave these rights to the Union without waiting for a plan to meet the difficulties of changing from protection to free trade, etc. . . . they were right in treating all this as secondary and leaving it to the Union itself to solve."¹

- Of course they were right! When Hitler annexed Austria or Bohemia, was he deterred by any such difficulties? Have they prevented the new partition of
- Poland? When has an anticipated inability to solve them ever prevented conquest or held up the march of Empire? They would never deter anyone who *wanted* Union. They are a very useful boggy for those who dislike the idea of Union and wish to discover impediments to its realisation. Let us not then be discouraged by those who doubt whether Union is practicable. Let us consider only whether we want it, and, if so, how to get it.

That we should aim at Socialism first

Many socialists are opposed to Federal Union on the grounds (a) that war is caused by capitalism, and that therefore the most direct way of getting rid of war is to get rid of capitalism; (b) that if Federal Union occurs before socialism is established in the various countries

¹ *Union Now.*

concerned it will make revolution impossible and social reform difficult; and (c) that Federal Union will mean the joint exploitation of subject peoples who would have less hope than before of emancipation.

The argument that war is caused by capitalism has already been dealt with in the second chapter. I cannot see that socialism alone would prevent war, since it is by no means obvious that conflict between socialist states would never arise. If, as regards some economic question, such as the control of important sources of raw materials, conflict did arise, then the socialist state would call upon its citizens to rally to the defence of national interests with more justice and probably with more force than a capitalist state can do now. Nevertheless, I agree that the traditions of socialism are international and that a group of socialist states would in all probability federate. I agree therefore that socialism is a possible road to Federal Union. Is it the best road? The answer to this question depends upon an estimate of the probabilities. If it were likely within the next few years that all the principal countries of the world would become socialist, adopting a liberal and democratic form of socialism, then it might be worth while to wait for Federal Union to come about in this way, instead of going for it directly. *But time is an absolutely vital factor*, since the alternative to Federal Union, if the argument of the preceding chapters has been accepted, is absolute disaster for mankind. Whether we want socialism, and, if so, how much and of what kind, is a matter on which opinions endlessly vary, but there can be no doubt that other forms of social order are workable. The issue is not therefore vital in the same sense that the issue of world order is vital. Mankind is not faced with the immediate alternative, socialism or disaster. It is quite conceivable that certain forms of liberal capitalism might endure for some generations yet, and granted freedom from war, give a tolerable life for

the mass of mankind. The issue that confronts the world is not socialism or catastrophe. It is cosmopolis or catastrophe. We must therefore adopt the method most likely to lead to Federal Union in the shortest possible time. For psychological and political reasons, I believe that Federal Union is much more immediately practicable, at least along the lines of Mr. Streit's proposals, than the achievement of a similar type of socialism in each of the constituent countries.

Socialism involves a radical change, not only in the internal structure of the State, not only in our habitual ways of thinking and feeling, but also in our daily lives. If it is to be anything more than an autocratic form of collectivism it means a profound revolution, not only in our institutions but in all our thoughts and feelings and ways of daily living. Men will have to relinquish many of the motives that now inspire their daily work. Psychologically, this may prove an impossible task. It will certainly prove a difficult task. We do not yet know to what extent socialism, in a technically advanced country like England or America, is a possible or desirable system. In our economic arrangements there is room for much experiment, and we should avoid dictation by doctrinaires.

Federal Union, on the contrary, makes no such revolutionary demands. If Pennsylvania were a sovereign state on the European model, its citizens would lead much the same daily lives as at present, save that they would carry certain burdens from which they are now exempt. They would have to support a Pennsylvanian army, navy and air force, with which they are not at present burdened. They would live under the constant menace of war. Their freedom to trade and travel in neighbouring states would be less than it is now, but the routine of their daily, breadwinning lives would not be fundamentally changed. *To ask the citizens of a democratic country to embrace Federal Union is to ask*

them to put into practice over a large area principles to which they have already become accustomed over a small area. And it is compatible with either a socialist or a capitalist economic system. It is true that many traditional ways of thought and feeling must be modified or abandoned but it is not true that there will be the sort of upheaval in men's daily lives that would make the change profoundly revolutionary. I do not therefore believe that Federal Union, once it is understood, will encounter the same psychological obstacles that socialism is bound to encounter. Save for that minority that directly profits from national animosities and preparations for war, Federal Union offers a fuller, richer, and more secure existence to all mankind.

I do not for a moment wish to suggest that because of these considerations socialism should not be attempted. On the contrary, I hope it will be. What I wish to suggest is that the achievement of socialism on such a scale that Federal Union would immediately result from it, must be a very much slower process than the direct achievement of Federal Union need be. The Federal Union of a group of existing democracies does no more than ask them to use their common-sense, and apply to the area constituted by all of them the principles they understand and have already developed in the area constituted by each of them.

Next, there is the argument that Federal Union would make revolution impossible and social reform difficult. I do not see how any political structure can make revolution impossible, since revolution may always occur if conditions are bad enough to provoke it, but if it be argued that Federal Union would make revolution extremely improbable, then I agree, and plead that this is an argument for Federal Union. Revolution is only likely to come about either as the Russian Revolution did, by taking advantage of the misery and chaos produced by defeat in war, or as the French Revolution

did, out of conditions that have become intolerable. It is the thesis of this book that Federal Union would both get rid of the catastrophe of war, and so immensely improve the standards of life for all the peoples concerned, that conditions, so far from being intolerable, would be more tolerable than they had even been before. Revolution, therefore, would be unlikely.

But would social reform be difficult? I cannot see why. To begin with, there would be an immense saving of all the money now spent on preparations for war. The labour and capital represented by that money would become available for other and saner purposes.

Secondly, all the energy, inventiveness and imagination that now go into preparations for war would need new outlets. It seems to me clear that the release of both energy and resources from war preparations would lead to an immense development of social reconstruction of every kind. There is an immense drive of public opinion towards higher standards of housing, education, travel, scientific and medical research, and public amenities of all kinds. How could that drive be resisted, if the necessary resources had become available owing to disarmament and the establishment of a peaceful and ordered world?

Many of the most tyrannical features of existing governments derive directly from the fear of war, and are only tolerated because that fear is played upon. With that fear removed tolerance and freedom would seem less dangerous and would therefore be less resisted. The Hitlers of this world would be seen from the beginning to be the intolerable nuisances they are. If there had been a Federal Government in Europe, Hitler would have been securely locked up years ago. There would have been no Nazi menace.

Inevitably, education would absorb many of the resources now going to warlike preparations. From this in turn would come better standards of public

criticism and more informed discussion. Everywhere there would be a greater knowledge of what is possible. The cause of social reform would lose none of the energy now being devoted to it. It would gain an immense access of energy now being devoted to other and less useful purposes.

Would Federal Union make life more difficult for subject peoples? The treatment of subject peoples is at present determined by several factors. They are treated badly partly on account of greed, and partly for reasons of strategy. Nevertheless, for the last generation there has been a steady improvement and an increased feeling of responsibility for the welfare of subject peoples. Federal Union would do nothing to diminish this sense of responsibility. On the contrary, owing to its declared democratic basis, its whole effect would be to increase it. It would destroy the grounds of strategy for treating subject peoples badly, and an international commission would find it harder than a purely national government to practise undesirable forms of exploitation, since it would inevitably work in the light of the public opinion of the whole world. It seems likely therefore that the administration of subject peoples by a commission responsible to a federal government would make it possible to realise more fully than under any other system the ideals implicit in the principle of the mandate, which are at present only imperfectly applied in some parts of the world and not applied at all in others. It is essential that these subject peoples should assume local self-government as rapidly as possible. What system, other than Federal Union, is likely to conduce more rapidly to this end?

The Pacifist Objection

Many pacifists find it difficult to support Federal Union on the ground that in the last resort it must envisage the use of force, and that a Federal Union as

proposed by Mr. Streit, embracing in the first instance only a limited number of nations, might find itself at war with the rest and be obliged to defend its union by force of arms. To the pacifist who makes this objection I would ask the question, what other conceivable form of political organisation will give him more of what he wants? Does he seriously think that the time is coming at all quickly when the task of government can be performed without force, even in the background? Must he not face the fact that the majority of mankind are not pacifists in his sense and are not likely to be? A warless world will come when one government has the ordering of all world-wide affairs. That government will need a minimum of force. Which is better—to take the most rapid steps possible towards the creation of that government, or to rest content with a state of affairs which employs the maximum of force, in the altogether vain hope that without fundamental changes in the government of mankind men will be persuaded to lay down their arms? The carrying of arms by private individuals in this country has been made obsolete, not by our conversion to individual pacifism, but by the establishment of the King's Peace. We do not carry arms, because we are more secure, and know that we are more secure, if we arm the law than if each of us is armed individually. International security will have to come by the same road. It will come by something analogous to the establishment of the King's Peace. A Federal Union is the peaceful and orderly means of obtaining it. The Pacifist therefore, who refuses to support Federal Union, on the ground that in the last resort the government it proposes to establish will resort to the use of force, is condemning himself to political futility in the hope of saving his own soul.

Pacifists must not remain content with refusal to fight in national wars; their refusal will not prevent war, for there are not enough of them, and in any case refusal to

fight is not a solution of the problems that give rise to war. Government is the only alternative to solution by combat that mankind has discovered, and democracy the only safeguard of freedom. But only some problems are world problems; others are local problems. Hence the need for a federal structure with a democratic basis, taking the individual human being as the unit.

That Federal Union is unworkable unless all the peoples within it have the same standard of living

It is maintained by some critics that since Federal Union necessarily involves free trade within the area of the union, this condition to be reached as soon as the necessary adjustments can be made, Federal Union will only be workable among countries having the same standard of life. If, the critics assert, we attempt to include countries with different standards of living, the effect will be that cheap imports from the countries with a lower standard will under-cut the standards of living in those countries with higher standards, and thus drag the whole area down to the level of the lowest.

This argument would be formidable if there were anything in it, since it is extremely unlikely, in any future that we can foresee, that standards of living will be uniform through the world. Fortunately, it rests upon the same fallacies as the arguments for tariffs. The standard of living of any developed people is the result, not of tariffs, but of high productivity. This means that the production per worker per day exceeds that of workers in countries where the standard of living is lower. A high standard of living is based upon high average productivity, and in the long run, *it can have no other basis*. If, in each of two countries, the worker is paid the same fraction of the value which he produces, it will by no means follow that the labour cost per unit of production (not per unit of time) will be higher in the country with the higher standard of living. Failure to

perceive this fact is the basis of most of the tariff fallacies. Mr. Ford can pay his workmen a higher hourly rate than any motor car manufacturer in Europe, and even so, without European tariffs, he could undercut any of them in their own market, even after paying transport costs across the Atlantic. This would not be possible if there were anything in the theory that high wages necessitate high labour costs. This theory altogether neglects the fundamental fact that high wages must in general be the result of low labour cost *per unit of production*, resulting in turn from a highly efficient *form* of production. This highly efficient form of production is the basis, and the only basis, on which a high standard of living can be permanently built. Since no country can protect all its industries it follows that, in those countries that adopt protection, the industries needing protection are the less efficient and are being subsidised at the expense of the more efficient. High wages only mean high labour costs when the wages are not being earned. All this is obvious and is the classical case for free trade. Furthermore, it is born out by experience. During the nineteenth century, England practised free trade with countries at a lower standard of living. Was her own standard of living thereby reduced to theirs? On the contrary, it steadily rose and a steadily increasing population was maintained at steadily increasing standards of living by free commercial intercourse with countries at a lower standard of living.

In the United States at this moment, standards of living vary very considerably indeed between different parts of the Union. If the separate states had the power to impose tariffs, this fact would doubtless be used by vested interests as the basis of a clamour for the states to impose tariffs. Nevertheless it is a truism that the United States could not have developed her very high standards of living if the states had in fact been separated by tariff barriers, and that her possession of an immense

customs-free area has been one of the chief contributory causes of her prosperity. *It has had the effect, not of lowering standards, but of raising them.*

The notion therefore that free trade is impossible in any area unless throughout that area the standards of living are uniform has no basis either in theory or in history. It is doubtless true that any sudden adoption of free trade would cause distress. Any change of the fiscal system in either direction causes distress, in view of the fact that it changes the proportions in which the resources of a country are devoted to different industries. An increase in tariffs will shift resources from industries catering for the export markets to those catering for the home markets. A reduction of tariffs will have the converse effect. This, however, is an argument for making change gradually and with due regard to all the factors involved. It is not an argument affecting the *direction* in which change should occur. But since a free trade system would be infinitely preferable to our present system it is essential to move as rapidly as possible in the direction of free trade.

There is this in addition to be said. For the past few years the fear of war, the existence of tariffs, quotas and currency restrictions, have retarded industrial and commercial developments the whole world over. If these restrictions could have been removed, and industrial development allowed to proceed freely, it is probable that all the slack produced by changes in the fiscal system could have been absorbed by the new employment that would have been created.

That language differences constitute an insuperable obstacle

This is not an argument against Federal Union. It is only an argument for thinking that Federal Union may be very difficult to attain. That language differences are a serious obstacle cannot be denied, since they are a grave

impediment to free and easy intercourse between the members of different nations. But they have not proved an insuperable obstacle in Switzerland, which has three¹ languages, nor in the case of Canada, which has two, nor in the case of the Union of South Africa, which has two. The little canton of Berne has two languages and two religions. This does not prevent peaceful and orderly administration. All that needs to be said on this subject, therefore, is that the obstacles can be overcome if we have the will to overcome them, and furthermore, that the creation of Federal Union and the release of travel and communication that it would bring about would do more than any other single agency to promote the development of a universal tongue. Whether that should be a new language, like Esperanto, or a modification of an existing language, like Basic English, is not germane to our immediate discussion.

The objection that Russia could not be included²

Socialists tend to believe that Russia affords the nearest approximation now in existence to a properly governed state. Furthermore, the whole of the Left, together with a large proportion of the Right, has based its hopes for peace upon a Russian Pact. For both these reasons it scandalises many members of the Left parties to observe that Russia is not included in the countries that Mr. Streit proposes to federate. The basis of Mr. Streit's proposal is that Federal Union is the logical next step for a particular group of countries which he believes to be roughly at the same stage of political development. Whether Russia has not yet reached this stage, or has already far surpassed it, is

¹ Four, if you count Romansch.

² This section was written before the Russo-German agreements. I have not modified it, since the arguments of principle remain unaffected, and the situation is changing so rapidly that detailed modifications may become obsolete between completion of manuscript and publication.

doubtless a matter for discussion, but surely it cannot be maintained that the present political and economic system of Russia is suitable for amalgamation with that of the countries still in the stage of liberal capitalism. The first objection to the inclusion of Russia then is that her political and economic system differs in too many important respects (whether for better or worse we may leave open to argument) from that of the democracies, to make it likely that a constitution could be devised covering both Russia and them.

Secondly, it is an integral part of the proposal for Federal Union that its constitution should be democratic. It is therefore essential that throughout the whole area of the Union there should be free speech and free publication, and that no member of the union should be excluded from knowledge, information or propaganda available in other parts of the Union. There should also be freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. Surely it is plain that Russia at present does not satisfy these criteria. I sometimes hear it said that there is more genuine free speech in Russia than in the liberal democracies, in that in Russia a man is free to say what he thinks of his foreman or of the management of his factory, even if he is not free to criticise communism. It is held that since he does not wish to criticise communism and may very well wish to criticise his foreman it is more important that he should have the latter kind of freedom. This may, or may not, be the case, but it is surely irrelevant to the matter under discussion. In the liberal democracies, there is more freedom of political discussion than anywhere else in the world. This statement remains true even though in these countries there is less freedom than there ought to be. It is possible for an English subject to make a speech in London, or to write a book, or a newspaper article, in which he criticises in the most radical fashion the whole political and economic system of Great Britain. He may advocate

republicanism, he may advocate communism, he may advocate atheism, or free love, or anything else he pleases. It is true that as regards the last two subjects he must choose his language carefully, but provided he does this he may say what he likes with considerable impunity. The same is not true in Moscow. It is not, that is to say, possible to advocate in Moscow that it would be advantageous to the Russian people to restore the Tsardom and the pre-Revolutionary economic system. I am not at the moment concerned with whether the restrictions on free speech and free publication in Russia are justified or not. It may be, as my communist friends assure me, that they are an essential part of the revolutionary period and that in due course they will pass away. I trust that their optimism will be justified. The point is that at present these restrictions exist, and that so long as they exist it is hard to see that one could devise a constitution satisfactory both to Russia and to the liberal democracies. It is essential that the constitution of the Federal Union should guarantee free speech and publication throughout the whole Union. It should also guarantee elementary civil liberties. So long as the Russian government is not prepared to concede these points it is difficult to see how Russia could be included.

This does not in the least mean that collaboration between the Federal Union and Russia is excluded any more than collaboration is now excluded between Russia and the countries that would constitute the Federal Union. Indeed, the Federal Union would have to devise methods of collaboration and intercourse with all that part of the world not originally included. Whether this collaboration should take the form of treaties, pacts, membership of the League of Nations, is a matter to be decided in due course. The essential thing is that the Federal Union itself should have a constitution which is effective and binding a throughout its area and that

peoples should only be admitted as and when they are able and willing to accept that constitution.

Nevertheless it must be abundantly clear from the start that any people is welcome which is prepared to accept the constitution, and that the Federal Union is not an Alliance *against* other peoples. It should be plainly and emphatically stated that Federal Union has not finally succeeded until it has peacefully expanded by voluntary enrolment so as to embrace the whole world. But the inducements to enter must not be threats or penalties; Federal Union must avoid making enemies. The inducements must consist of the manifest advantages of membership.

It will be desirable not to be unduly doctrinaire. Provided the constitution was formally accepted, it might even be desirable to wink at certain infringements in the early days in those countries in which democracy is weak or new. Thus in the Southern States of the U.S.A. the constitutional rights of negroes are habitually violated. These violations are outrageous, but a civil war to prevent them would be more outrageous. So would the expulsion of these States from the Union. But while infringements may be sometimes ignored they must never be formally condoned or approved. The constitution must stand as not merely the declared basis of our society, but also as the basis of a continuous education in its meaning. If it is perpetually proclaimed, taught and studied, it will be ever more completely realised. The immediate necessity is not to allow a doctrinaire affection for the democratic basis of our constitution to blind us to the fact that the *main* purpose of our Federal Union is the creation of effective world government, and the supersession of State sovereignty. Any people willing to accept this *main* condition, namely the surrender of sovereignty in certain defined respects, presents a strong *prima facie* case for admission. The question is one of degree, like nearly all important practical questions. It is therefore

a matter for judgment, and is not suitable for doctrinaire decision in advance.

What will be the effect of Federal Union upon the Monarchy?

The only form of monarchy with which Federal Union is incompatible is absolute monarchy, since the basis of Federal Union is democratic. The constituent states of a Federal Union will each normally have a titular head, just as American states have a Governor, and London a Lord Mayor. Whether a state desires that its official head should be a President or a King can remain a domestic matter which each state settles for itself. Countries like England, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium, which are all constitutional monarchies, could remain monarchies while yet becoming members of a Federal Union. Whether any given State wished to retain the monarchy, or adopt a republican form of Government, would be for that State to decide.

What would happen to the Dominions and Colonies?

This question has already been answered in other parts of this book, but since it is frequently asked at meetings on Federal Union it may be well to include it in this chapter. The answer is simple and straightforward. Self-governing dominions would be invited to be constituent members of the Federal Union on the same basis as the mother-country. Non-self-governing dependencies would be placed under the control of an international commission representative of all the states members of the Federal Union. The constitutional position of the King in relation to the dominions need not be affected: ties of affection and history would remain.

In spite of the fact that Federal Union exists in the U.S.A. they continue to have unemployment, political graft, gangsterism and a variety of other evils

I find it hard to take this objection seriously but I include it because it so frequently crops up. It seems to result from pugnacity rather than thought. Federal Union does not claim to be the panacea for all ills. It is not a method of producing Utopia overnight. Federal Union claims to be a method of getting rid of the evil of inter-state war, and from this evil the United States is free. It claims that and nothing else. It claims that having got rid of inter-state war, it would have got rid of the greatest single evil that afflicts mankind, and by getting rid of it will have released for the attack upon other evils, such as poverty, disease, unemployment and ignorance, energies which are now devoted to preparations for mutual slaughter. Federal Union does not guarantee that these other evils will be cured. Nothing can guarantee that. All Federal Union can do is to offer mankind the chance of getting rid of its principal evil and so find the time, energy and opportunity to attend to the others.

Federal Union does not solve the population problem

The answer to this objection is to a certain extent the same as the answer to the last. It is worth adding, however, that Federal Union will remove some of the principal difficulties in the solution of this problem. The population problem is compounded of many subtle and complex factors into which this is not the place to enter. At present it is made endlessly difficult by strategic considerations that would not exist if Federal Union had been established throughout the world. At the present moment, governments both proclaim that their populations must expand in order that they should be strong and powerful, and even offer financial inducements to parents to have large families, and, on the other hand, maintain

that they are not able to support their present population on their existing territory and must acquire new territory, if necessary by force. This is an example of the self-contradictory folly into which nationalism lands us. It makes the population problem needlessly difficult. If the growth of population is to be in any way deliberately influenced, controlled or planned, it must plainly be by an authority representing the whole world. Let me repeat, Federal Union will not solve the problem. It will give us the conditions under which it can be solved.

Why not begin with a United States of Europe?

This question is included here because it is so common, but as the answer is already given on pages 144-145 it will not be repeated here, save to emphasise once more that, especially under modern conditions of travel and communication, federation is more likely to succeed on a basis of community of purpose and outlook, than of mere geographical propinquity. Great Britain, France, Sweden, and the United States of America have, for example, more in common, and could therefore federate with more chance of success, than Great Britain, Russia, Germany and Italy.

What about the good side of nationalism?

People asked to assent to the idea of world order and world government are sometimes troubled by the thought that after all there are aspects of nationalism and nationality that are pleasant and beneficial. What is to happen to them under these new conditions?

The need to retain a large measure of local self-government has already been admitted, and is part of the case for a federal government as opposed to a world super-state. But what of local colour and diversity? Would they not die out?

The answer is that the political changes proposed are not really very relevant to these. Yorkshire pudding

continues to be a speciality of Yorkshire and Devonshire cream of Devonshire in spite of the fact that Yorkshire and Devonshire are part of the same governmental area. Is the way of life in Virginia forced to conform to that of New York or Chicago by the fact that the United States are united? If England and France were to federate does anyone really suppose that Frenchmen would presently have bacon and eggs and tea for breakfast, while Englishmen adopted coffee and rolls? Even under federation the intimacy of known and loved places would remain. Why indeed should it be affected?

There is a further point. The present state of the world forces all existing states to impose more uniformity *within* the state than would otherwise be necessary. Standard bread, standard tea, standard lack of illumination, standard petrol, standard clothes, and standard ideas and information: these things result from a world full of the menace of war. The totalitarian state, which is the chief threat to diversity in the world to-day, is very largely the product of war and the threat of war, and these things impose totalitarian methods and ideas upon people who would not otherwise tolerate them. If war and the threat of war could be removed from the world two results would at once follow: governments would lose all excuse for excessive government; and there would be such a release of energy and imagination and creativeness that diversity would everywhere once more assert itself. What is good in nationality is part of this diversity.

What about India and China?

The proposal that this book is concerned to advocate is that since a federal government for all mankind is not immediately practicable, a start should be made with those countries that are ripe for union now because they are in a similar stage of political evolution, and are on the whole inspired by similar desires. Nevertheless India

and China between them comprise about half the human race, and it is clear that no proposal that aims at the organisation of the affairs of the whole planet can afford to neglect them for long. What part may we expect them to play?

Both countries are at present subject to foreign control, both have been the victims of imperialist exploitation, both have a passionate desire for freedom, and neither, left to itself, seems likely to be a menace to its neighbours. At first sight, therefore, the answer seems to be, leave them alone. They both have immensely complex internal problems to solve, for both are struggling with the problem of establishing unity over a vast area, and both are grappling with the problems created by adaptation of an ancient culture to the modern industrial world. It would seem that for a decade or so they would have enough to do with their own affairs without bothering about the rest of the world, and that the best service we could render them would be to secure them freedom from external molestation.

Plainly this freedom is necessary, and a Federal Union should set itself to secure it. As regards India, all that is necessary is British good faith. As regards China the problem is more difficult (though it might not have been in 1932) but it is difficult to believe that Japan would defy resolute economic boycott by a Federal Union that plainly meant business. Indeed the mere formation of such a Union might be sufficient to change Japan's whole policy and outlook.

But while freedom is necessary, we can clearly hope for more, and for active co-operation at an early stage. The Working Committee of the Indian National Congress has issued a statement deploring the action of the British Government in declaring India a belligerent country without her consent, promulgating emergency ordinances, passing the India Act Amending Bill, and

limiting and circumscribing the existing power and activities of provincial Governments. It appeals for a declaration of British war aims, and in particular of how these apply to the problem of India. It points out that vague declarations that we are fighting for liberty and democracy are not enough, and that the post-war history "is full of betrayals of proclaimed ideals". It

"invites the British Government to declare unequivocally their war aims regarding democracy and imperialism and the establishment of a new world order and how those aims will be applied to India now, and whether they include the elimination of imperialism and the treatment of India as a free nation whose policy is guided by her own people. The real test of their declaration is its application to India at present."

But they make it clear that "A free India will gladly join other free nations for mutual defence, economic co-operation, and a new world order based on freedom", and that "As a free country and with her energies released, India must play her part in world reorganisation". Is it not clear from this that an India released from her present burning sense of injustice, and provided with technical and financial assistance (not domination) in the solution of her own problems, would presently play a far from negligible part in the new world order to be created?

China seems likely for some time to be absorbed in her own internal problems, but the part to be played in world civilisation by a united and invigorated China ought to be wholly good provided the present war does not drag on so long that China loses her characteristic virtues. What these are may be gleaned from Mr. Lowes Dickinson's *Letters from John Chinaman*. No civilised Westerner who has visited China has failed to return full of admiration for the sensitiveness to beauty, the grace and charm, the profound rationality and sensible pacifism that characterise her ancient civilisation. At present

China is being driven to adopt some of our western militarism and the vices that go with it, and if we are not careful she may be driven to adopt a militant form of nationalism. She will do this reluctantly, for her instincts are opposed to it; China is the only great civilisation in which the profession of the soldier has not been highly esteemed. But it is in peace, not in war, that civilised virtues thrive, and in allowing China to become the battle-ground of rival imperialisms we have run a frightful risk not merely to China, but to civilisation as a whole. If, however, peace can be restored to China before, in the course of acquiring western vices, she has lost her own virtues, we can be sure that no nation will welcome more wholeheartedly the opportunity that Federal Union provides of co-operating in the building of a sane, peaceful, democratic world order. From a China rescued from aggression there is much to hope, and nothing to fear save demons of our own creation.

CHAPTER X

EDUCATION AND WORLD ORDER

"Our world is a mad world. Ever since 1914 it has ceased to be constructive, because men will not follow their intelligence in creating international co-operation, but persist in retaining the division of mankind into hostile groups. This collective failure to use the intelligence that men possess for purposes of self-preservation is due, in the main, to the insane and destructive impulses which lurk in the unconscious of those who have been unwisely handled in infancy, childhood, and adolescence. In spite of continually improving technique in production, we all grow poorer. In spite of being well aware of the horrors of the next war, we continue to cultivate in the young those sentiments which will make it inevitable. In spite of science, we react against the habit of considering problems rationally. In spite of increasing command over nature, most men feel more hopeless and impotent than they have felt since the Middle Ages. The source of all this does not lie in the external world, nor does it lie in the purely cognitive part of our nature, since we know more than men ever knew before. It lies in our passions; it lies in our emotional habits; it lies in the sentiments instilled in youth, and in the phobias created in infancy. The cure for our problem is to make men sane, and to make men sane they must be educated sanely."—BERTRAND RUSSELL: *Education and the Social Order*.

CHAPTER X

EDUCATION AND WORLD ORDER

THIS is not the place to write at length on the connection between education and the political and economic changes which are necessary if civilisation is to survive, but it is clear that a new world order will not be stable unless it is accompanied by very drastic changes in education, and it would therefore be a mistake to omit this topic altogether from this book. Those who desire the new world order must face all the changes, educational, economic and political, that it will entail.

It is maintained by some writers that it is foolish to hope for profound change as a result of political action alone, and that educational changes must come first. They point out that existing adults are for the most part incapable of the necessary change of outlook, and will continue till they die to view the world through a rather close-fitting set of patriotic blinkers. They tell us therefore that salvation is to be sought in education alone and that we must work through the rising generation. This view is plausible and attractive, but it is subject to a very serious limitation. Unfortunately, the only people who can do anything about the rising generation are the existing adults, who, *ex hypothesi*, are incapable of perceiving what needs to be done. It is no reply to say that there are at least some adults with adequate vision and understanding, since presumably it is a mass change in education that is intended.

The education of children as a whole is in the control of the state, which in turn is dominated by conventional opinion. To say, therefore, that we must get hold of the

children, because the adults are hopeless, is to involve ourselves in a vicious circle, since we have begun by saying that the only people who are in a position to get hold of the children are incapable of making right use of their opportunity. It is useless, therefore, to base the whole of our hopes upon education.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that while any preliminary changes in the political structure of the world must result from the conversion of adults, those changes are not likely to prove stable unless they are immediately followed by changes in education. Those who hold the view that salvation lies in education are right to the extent that existing education encourages and develops emotional and intellectual attitudes which are inimical to the creation or stability of a world order. If we succeed in getting such order established it will be in spite of existing education. But you cannot indefinitely maintain the new order if education is working against it. If that order is to be stable, education will have to be conducted in accordance with its needs. The object of this chapter is to indicate very briefly some of the changes in education that a stable world order would demand.

First of all, in what ways is existing education an obstacle to the establishment of world order? In answering this question we must ask two others: What are the intellectual and emotional attitudes in adults that make world order difficult to obtain? To what extent are these attitudes the product of education? The emotional obstacles are plainly far more important than the intellectual. Intellectual error, not supported by strong emotion, is comparatively easy to eradicate. Indeed, to point out the error is normally sufficient. Where, however, intellectual error is based upon an emotional attitude, purely intellectual arguments rarely prove effective, since the whole apparatus of rationalisation is at once brought into play. This is easily seen in such a subject as tariffs, where very intelligent men are

found to support doctrines based upon fallacies so elementary that they would be detected at once if it were not that the doctrines are supported by strong patriotic feeling.

In the intellectual sphere existing education does two kinds of harm. In the first place, it does too little to encourage the will to doubt and too much to encourage the will to believe. This partly results from its authoritarian bias. Authoritarian education is at a very serious initial disadvantage if it sets out to promote scepticism, since the scepticism it is advocating might be extended to those in authority. Nevertheless, in a world drenched in propaganda, scepticism is a very necessary antidote if one is to preserve sanity and balance. Secondly, historical teaching has been mainly an account of the glorious exploits of the military and political heroes of one's own nation. When I was at school I was hardly made aware that there had been a common people in the past, and so far as I could see, foreigners only existed in order that British armies could achieve renown by defeating them. I was not taught that Shakespeare and Newton were more glorious than Wellington or Nelson, and it was not until I grew up that I realised that the world would not be substantially worse off if Wellington and Nelson had never been born, whereas it owes an immeasurable debt to Shakespeare and Newton. If the teaching of History is not to conduce to a pugnacious habit of thought in regard to foreigners and an unduly bombastic attitude in regard to one's compatriots, it must be less concerned with military and dynastic events and more concerned with the general progress of the human race in its slow and very chequered course from barbarism to civilisation. What children ought to acquire from history is not a sense that they belong to the chosen people, but a sense that they belong to mankind. Biology and History combined should give a feeling for evolution and a feeling that one can play one's part in the unfolding

of this great drama. That one is an Englishman rather than a Frenchman or a German should seem somehow unimportant. What matters is that one is a human being, a citizen of the world, with a responsibility not for the glory of this or that petty nation but for civilisation as a whole. Mr. Wells made a brave beginning with his *Outline of History*. We want more efforts in the same direction. It is of course important that the pupil should study some part of history in greater detail than he can possibly study the history of the whole world, and it would generally be better that this should be some aspect of the history of his own part of the world. Even so, this can be a study of social and political development, and need be neither bombastic nor pugnacious.

Turning now to the field of character and emotions it can hardly be doubted that existing adult human nature is more sadistic, more pugnacious, more partisan, more intolerant and more irrational than is compatible with a stable democratic world order. Until recently, many of us would have tended to question the assertion that we are unduly sadistic. We imagined that torture and the like were things of the past and that nowadays we were civilised. The concentration camp has taught us better, and not only in Germany. For the last generation there have occurred in nearly every part of the world scenes of horror and cruelty deliberately inflicted, which no newspaper would dare to print in bare detail. These tortures have normally been inflicted by paid officials upon victims who an hour before were utter strangers, against whom they had no personal quarrel. It is clear from the accounts one has read that the delight in cruelty is more widespread than we had thought, and it is probable that in each of us sadistic impulses are stronger and nearer the surface than we like or dare to think. The modern world demands more and more officials, and its complex organisation, its rapid means of communication, and the powerful weapons at the

disposal of the armed forces, all mean that the ordinary man is more and more helpless against officialdom gone cruel or ruthless or mad. The need that ordinary human nature should become kindlier and friendlier and more tolerant and less pugnacious is therefore one of the greatest needs of our time. Efficiency, combined with the ruthless cruelty that is now so common, bids fair to make life utterly intolerable, except for those who are strong and ruthless. In the long run, gentleness and decency and tolerance are worth more to civilisation than strength, or even efficiency. It is important to construct a world in which gentleness and decency and tolerance are able to find a place.

Partisanship is a very good example of the type of emotional attitude now almost universally accepted as a virtue, but standing in need of modification and correction if a stable world order is to be created. Partisanship is the habit of taking sides. This characteristic doubtless has its advantages, but it is clearly carried to excess in the modern world. When, for example, there is a strike, most of us know which side we are on before we know what the strike is about, since we have already got into the habit of siding with the masters or with the men as the case may be. The same of course is true in international relations. The practical effect of this is that disputes are hardly ever judged on their merits, and rational decisions are hardly ever attainable. Partisanship is clearly an instance of a characteristic which, though instinctive, is deliberately strengthened by conventional education. Not only do schools compete with each other in athletics and the like, but not infrequently schools are deliberately divided into artificial sub-divisions, which compete, not merely in athletics, but in work, tidiness, punctuality, and so on. This has the sole object of promoting partisanship which, in turn, is thought to promote zeal. The emotions involved are psychologically equivalent to those involved in adult

nationalism, and since children are taught at school to accept them as virtues it is not surprising, since the pattern is the same in both cases, that as they grow up, they unthinkingly adopt nationalism as a right and proper attitude. I suggest that from the point of view of world order and a democratically planned society, schools should be investigating ways of promoting co-operative effort which is based upon the desire to create something which can only exist as the result of co-operation. An orchestra or a dramatic group are examples of this kind of thing. In an orchestra there is no other orchestra to be defeated: nobody wins. Nevertheless, all the genuine merits of the team spirit are present, indeed in a much more severe form than that to be found in team games, since there must be complete subordination, throughout the playing, to the score and to the indications of the conductor. But the subordination is due to the common desire to produce something. It is not due to the common desire to defeat something. If unthinking partisanship is to be reduced it is important that schools should scrutinize very carefully the ways in which they at present produce and strengthen it, and should investigate forms of co-operative activity which do not involve it.

The problem of cruelty and kindness raises very difficult psychological issues as to which anything like complete knowledge is not yet available. Nevertheless, it is now clear that the impulse to hurt and destroy is very largely the product of severe repression and thwarting of natural impulses. Most of us who are grown up need only reflect upon our own childhood to realise the degree to which children have in the past been quite unnecessarily thwarted and restricted. Some degree of thwarting of impulses is necessary if we are to have any tolerable social life; but there can be no doubt that there has normally been far more interference with the natural impulses of children than can be justified by any arguments based upon expediency, and that much of it indeed

is merely part of a vicious circle: adults enjoy exercising power, and except for adults who have power over other adults, children are the handiest victims. These children in turn will get their own back both by bullying younger children as they become older, and by bullying all children when they are grown up. Both theory and experience make it no longer possible to doubt that far more can be done than the average person realises to make people kinder and more tolerant by wiser and more understanding treatment in childhood. The movement towards humaner treatment of children is now very widespread and has gained considerable momentum during this century. It is still confined to a small minority of the human race, but it is a growing movement and is one of the few hopeful signs of these times.

The connection between education and the social order is one of the few topics on which the progressives agree with the dictators.¹ Hitler knows very well that if you treat children decently they will not become Nazis, and one of his first acts was to stamp out utterly the progressive education movement in Germany which between 1919 and 1933 had grown very rapidly. It is sometimes suggested as an argument against the alleged connection between education and the social order that the Nazi system emerged in one of the countries in which progressive education had made most headway. To believe this, however, is to ignore the fact that the schools and homes which attempted to practise modern methods were always a very small minority, and that the main state education system in Germany had been left entirely in the hands of the pre-war type of teacher who hated not merely progressive education but the Weimar Republic and all that it stood for. Indeed the Republican leaders in Germany made the cardinal mistake against which this chapter is directed. They supposed that you

¹ See *School for Barbarians*, by Erika Mann, for a horrifying but balanced picture of education in Nazi Germany.

could alter the political structure while leaving the educational system substantially unchanged. Nothing was done to dismiss teachers whose whole teaching was directed against the democratic system the republican leaders were attempting to introduce. The old Prussian type of history teacher was left in possession, and in the state school at least the Nazi propagandist found a not unfruitful soil.

Fundamental political and social change must doubtless be inaugurated by adults, but if this is to be permanent it must be accompanied by fundamental educational change. If our object is to produce a world which is cosmopolitan, rational, democratic, co-operative and kindly, then our schools must be societies in which these virtues are embodied. The attitudes children acquire are the result, not so much of exhortation, as of the values implicit in the societies in which they grow up. This is why the late F. W. Sanderson of Oundle was so fond of saying that "Schools must be miniature copies of the world as we would love to have it".

This book is intended as an introductory account of the case for Federal Union. It did not seem right therefore to devote more than a very few pages to the subject of education, though it would have been misleading to omit the subject altogether. Doubtless there will be readers who are convinced by the arguments for union, but unconvinced by the suggestion that fundamental educational changes will be needed.

This chapter does not so much put the case as hint at it, and those interested in a fuller treatment may be referred to Bertrand Russell's *Education and the Social Order*, or my own book, *The School*.

EPILOGUE

A CONCLUDING LETTER TO
JOHN CITIZEN

"Écrasez l'infâme."—VOLTAIRE.

EPILOGUE

A CONCLUDING LETTER TO JOHN CITIZEN

DEAR JOHN (or Fritz or Alphonse),

I don't know whether you will agree with me, but I sincerely believe that I have put before you a case for Federal Union which, in terms of reason and good will, is unanswerable. What I want to know now is, what are YOU going to do about it? You are doubtless tempted to say that while the idea is all right and you personally are all for it, the other fellow isn't ready. That chap next door is prejudiced and unreasonable and it is no use attempting to convert him. I wonder if he thinks the same about you? After all, as Mr. Streit insists: "To get Union, the first thing those who want it should do is to say so and unite for it . . . so long as most men wait for the majority to make known their will for Union, that majority cannot possibly be formed."

Remember too, that—

"There was a time when men with the gift of writing or speaking went to the stake so that other men with such gifts might freely use them. To preserve these rights to-day those with the gift of writing or speaking need only lend to Union some of their gift. Each needs but lend a bit of the thing he is richest in and can best afford to lend. If each who profits from the Rights of Man gives now his mite as he sees best for the cause that made these Rights possible, he will soon have world union, and its greater rights for men."¹

So don't say there's nothing you can do. There are a great many things that you can do. You can lend this

¹ From *Union Now*.

book to 'that chap next door', and you can nag him until he has read it. If he likes it you can get him to read Mr. Streit's book. And then many other books. For much study and discussion and mutual enlightenment will be needed. You can form a study circle in your own neighbourhood. You can write a postcard, or if you have time, a letter, to twelve of your friends telling them about the idea and urging them, if they agree with it, each to write to twelve of his friends. You can write to your M.P. and get all your friends to do so. You can write to the local newspaper, whenever some theme crops up which enables you, in commenting on it, to do a little propaganda for Federal Union. When, for example, you read that Great Britain and France have made arrangements for a common general staff for the purposes of war, you can ask yourself, you can ask your friends, and you can ask the readers of your local paper, why, if we can pool our armed forces, cannot we pool everything else? Why must England and France, any more than England and Scotland, be foreign countries to each other? Why should we need passports? Why should there be a customs barrier between us?

You can begin in your own circle to create that public opinion which will alone bring union about. If we are to save ourselves, none of us can dodge or divide his individual responsibility. You can write to Federal Union, at 44 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1., and obtain particulars of an organisation which has been formed to study and promote the ideas set forth in this book. They need your help and they will tell you how you can give it. If you believe in democracy, that means that you believe in the union of free men, and in the value of the contribution that each can make to society. That means that you believe in yourself and in that obstinate fellow next door. For, as Mr. Streit concludes: "If you and I and the other man and woman, working

freely and equally together, cannot gain our common end, then how on earth can it be gained ? ”

This isn't a job for our grandchildren. It is a job for US NOW. Unless we get on with it there will be no world fit for our grandchildren to live in. So for their sakes, as well as for your own, I implore you to get busy while there may yet be time. But it is very late.

Yours ever, and really not unhopefully,

W. B. CURRY.

INDEX

A

Abyssinia, 41
 Acton, Lord, 93
 American Civil War, 132, 145
 American War of Independence,
 59, 145
 Angell, Sir Norman, 24, 33, 34,
 54, 75, 83
 Armenia, 56
 Aryan race, 74
 Australia, 137, 142, 165

B

Basic English, 187
 Bacon, Francis, 101
 Balance of Power, 61, 149, 150
 Belgium, 56, 142, 165
 Bell, Clive, 63
 Blücher, 59
 Borah, Senator, 48
 Bottomley, H., 26
 Brailsford, H. N., 28, 140
 Briand, Aristide, 37, 38
 Bryce, Lord, 22
 Buxton, Mrs. Dorothy, 75

C

Canada, 52, 68, 137, 142, 165,
 175, 187
 Cape, Messrs. Jonathan, xiii, 19
 Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
 national Peace, 21

Capitalism, 33, 35, 111, 178
 Cecil, Lord Hugh, 58
 Chamberlain, Sir Austen, 37
 Chamberlain, The Rt. Hon.
 Neville, 135, 152
 Charles I, 93
 China, 23, 51, 56, 63, 194-7
 Clausewitz, 41
 Collective Security, 39, 40, 120,
 149
 Colonies, 112, 113, 191
 Cromwell, Oliver, 96

D

Daily Mail, 67
 Danzig, 151-3
 Davy, Sir Humphry, 23
 Declaration of Independence, 89,
 138
 Denmark, 142, 165
 Dickinson, G. Lowes, 43, 80, 196
 Dreyfus, 85

E

Eden, The Rt. Hon. Anthony
 17, 152
 Elections, American, 76
 Enciclopedia Italiana, 85
 Esperanto, 187
 Factory Acts, 98
 Faraday, Michael, 23
 Fascism, 85-7

Federal Union Movement, vi,
19, 150, 212
Federalist, 123, 129
Federal Convention of 1787,
138, 156
Finland, 142, 165
Ford, Henry, 98, 100, 185
Forster, E. M., 95
France, 23, 27, 36, 38, 41, 85,
142, 156, 165, 168, 193, 212
Free Trade, 67, 185, 186

G

Gasset, Ortega Y, 81
Geneva, 77, 79, 122
Geneva Protocol, 122
Germany, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28,
38, 41, 63, 68, 121, 151, 155,
193, 207
Goebbels, Dr., 83
Goering, 97
Goethe, 96
Gooch, Professor G. P., 105
Great Britain, 37, 38, 63, 85,
156, 165
Gresham's Law, 54

H

Habeas Corpus, 93
Hamilton, Alexander, 123, 129
Harding, President, 49
Hegelian Theory of the State, 90
Hitler, Adolph, 20, 25, 26, 27,
28, 74, 84, 93, 94, 97, 112,
115, 139, 153, 154, 155, 177,
181, 207
Hoare, Sir Samuel, 74

I

India, 56, 75, 194-7
Industrial Revolution, 51
International Court of Justice, 49
International Labour Office, 49
International Postal Union, 114
Ireland, 56, 142, 165
Italy, 36, 41, 193

J

James I, 93
Japan, 23, 195

K

Kellogg Pact, 31, 37, 38
Kellogg, Secretary, 37
Keynes, J. M., 70
Khaki Election, 27

L

Laissez-faire, 98, 99, 100
League of Free Nations Association,
28
League of Friendship, 122, 137
League of Nations, 28, 29, 47,
49, 112, 116, 120, 189
League of Nations Society, 28
League of Nations Union, 28
Liberalism, 67, 83, 100, 101
Lincoln, Abraham, 126

M

MacDonald, The Rt. Hon.
Ramsay, 122
Manchester Guardian, 38
Mandates, 112

Mann, Erika, 207
 Mill, John Stuart, 90, 91
 Monarchy, 191
 Mooney, Tom, 85
 Mosley, Sir Oswald, 94
 Mussolini, 22, 24, 56, 81, 84,
 94, 97, 115, 139

N

Napoleon, 97
 Napoleonic War, 23
 Nazi régime, 83 207
 Nelson, Lord, 203
 Netherlands, 142, 165
 New York Times, 120
 New Zealand, 142, 165
 Newton, Sir Isaac, 66, 203
 Northcliffe, Lord, 54
 Norway, 142, 165

O

Ottawa Agreements, 108

P

Pacifism, 40, 41, 87, 183
 Paine, Tom, 146, 176
 Pact of Paris, 37, 38
 Poland, 115, 151, 152, 177
 Popola d'Italia, 56
 Population Problem, 192
 Plant, Professor, 68
 The Press, 51-56

R

Refugees, 22, 73
 Rights of Man, 115, 133, 147

Rilke, Rainer Maria, vii
 Rule Britannia, 58
 Rumania, 56, 57
 Russell, Bertrand, vii, xiii, 96,
 199, 208
 Russia, 38, 47, 51, 187-190, 193

S

Sacco and Vanzetti, 85
 Salisbury, Lord, 47
 Sanderson of Oundle, 208
 Scott, Dred, 131
 Senate, American, 49
 Shakespeare, 203
 Shape of Things to Come, 125
 Shaw, George Bernard, 26, 50
 Shelley, P. B., 81
 Socialism, 67 111, 178-180
 Socialists, 33, 187
 Spencer, Herbert, 98
 Stalin, 94
 Stamp, Lord, 70
 Streit, Clarence K., xiii, 19, 39,
 67, 77, 120, 122, 130, 137-150,
 176 179, 187, 211 212
 Supreme Court, American, 36,
 127
 Sweden, 85, 142 165, 193
 Switzerland, 106, 137, 142 165,
 187

T

Tariffs, 67 72, 73, 78, 185, 186
 Trade Unions, 34

U

Union of South Africa, 56, 137,
 142, 165, 187

Union Now, xiii, 19, 39, 77,
122-5, 137-150, 176, 211
United Kingdom, 142, 165, 168
U.S.A., 35, 36, 49, 50, 52, 56,
68, 76, 78, 79, 80, 85, 137,
142, 165, 168, 192-4

V

Versailles, Treaty of, 26, 28
Voltaire, 96, 209

W

Washington, George, 173
Waterloo, Battle of, 59
Weimar Republic, 207
Wellington, Duke of, 203
Wells, H. G., x, xiii, 20, 29, 31, 84,
103, 117, 135, 140, 141, 150, 204
Whitehead, Professor A. N., 92
Whitman, Walt, 93
Wilson, President, 24, 28
Woolf Leonard, 88

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Edgar Mowrer.....	<i>Germany Puts the Clock Back</i>	S 1
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Vicki Baum.....	<i>Helene</i>	194
Adrian Bell.....	<i>Carduroy</i>	247
Hilaire Belloc.....	<i>But Soft: We Are Observed</i>	189
J. D. Beresford.....	<i>The Camberwell Miracle</i>	224
Ambrose Bierce.....	<i>In the Midst of Life</i>	199
Phyllis Bottome.....	<i>Private Worlds</i>	107
	<i>The Mortal Storm</i>	S 12
Ernest Bramah.....	<i>Kai Lung's Golden Hours</i>	174
	<i>The Wallet of Kai Lung</i>	39
	<i>Kai Lung Unrolls His Mat</i>	108
Ann Bridge.....	<i>Peking Picnic</i>	171
Joanna Cannan.....	<i>High Table</i>	213
G. K. Chesterton.....	<i>Man Who Was Thursday</i>	95
Susan Ertz.....	<i>Madame Claire</i>	4
	<i>Now East, Now West</i>	106
Rachel Ferguson.....	<i>The Brontës Went to Woolworth's</i>	245
C. S. Forester.....	<i>The Gun</i>	229
E. M. Forster.....	<i>A Passage to India</i>	48
Crosbie Garstin.....	<i>The Owls' House</i>	28
Stella Gibbons.....	<i>Cold Comfort Farm</i>	140
Graham Greene.....	<i>It's a Battlefield</i>	257
Jaroslav Hasek.....	<i>The Good Soldier Schweik</i>	S 37
Ian Hay.....	<i>"Pip"</i>	211
	<i>A Safety Match</i>	43
Ernest Hemingway.....	<i>A Farewell to Arms</i>	2
Constance Holme.....	<i>The Lonely Plough</i>	47
	<i>Crumphall Going Home</i>	244
Claude Houghton.....	<i>Chaos is Come Again</i>	178
W. W. Jacobs.....	<i>Deep Waters</i>	104
	<i>Many Cargoes</i>	214
M. R. James.....	<i>Ghost Stories of an Antiquary</i>	91
Stephen Leacock.....	<i>Literary Lapses</i>	212
Eric Linklater.....	<i>Poet's Pub</i>	3

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
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	<i>Ragged Banners</i>	177
J. C. Masterman.....	<i>Fate Cannot Harm Me</i>	252
J. B. Morton (Beachcomber).....	<i>The Barber of Putney</i>	246
R. H. Mottram.....	<i>The Spanish Farm</i>	52
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Antoine de Saint-Exupéry.....	<i>Night Flight</i>	182
Rafael Sabatini.....	<i>Bardelys the Magnificent</i>	208
	<i>The Tavern Knight</i>	243
"Saki" (H. H. Munro).....	<i>Selected Stories</i>	184
William Saroyan.....	<i>The Daring Young Man</i>	201
Olive Schreiner.....	<i>Story of an African Farm</i>	197
Graham Seton.....	<i>The W Plan</i>	50
Beatrice Kean Seymour.....	<i>Youth Rides Out</i>	102
"Shallmar".....	<i>A Windjammer's Half-Deck</i>	241
Ignazio Silone.....	<i>Fontamara</i>	143
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Ben Travers.....	<i>A Cuckoo in the Nest</i>	44
Robert Tressall.....	<i>The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists</i>	251
Doreen Wallace.....	<i>Barnham Rectory</i>	192
Hugh Walpole.....	<i>Mr. Perrin and Mr. Traill</i>	132
Evelyn Waugh.....	<i>Black Mischief</i>	179
	<i>Decline and Fall</i>	75
	<i>Vile Bodies</i>	136
Mary Webb.....	<i>Gone to Earth</i>	9
Antonia White.....	<i>Frost in May</i>	206
Henry Williamson.....	<i>Tarka the Otter</i>	81
P. G. Wodehouse.....	<i>My Man Jeeves</i>	27
Francis Brett Young.....	<i>The Crescent Moon</i>	172

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
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